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PART

COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE

DEPT. SOUTH ASIA

TITLE: INDIA: POLITICAL AFFAIRS - EXT (MULTI):
MIDDLE EAST: POLICY TOWARDS.

SC
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REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE	DEPT.	NAME	DATE
	A.G. L. Turner	2/8.		R. 115				
	RMP.	7/8.		Purcell	19/X			
	RMP.	8/8.		R 115	20/X			
	RMP.	14/8.		PURCELL	24/10			
	Mr. Duff	15/8.		R 115	24/X			
	RMP	16/8.		Purcell	14/11			
	Mr. Duff	18/8.		Mr Duff	16/11			
	RMP.	20/8.		Mr. Allison	17/XI			
	Mr. Duff	21/8.		R 115				
	W. L. A.	23/8.		Best	21/XI			
	Reg	4/9.		Keogh	21/11			
	Mr. Best	7/9.		Best	24/11			
	R. 115	13/9		Mr. Allison	24/11			
	Mr. Allison	14/9		Mr. MacLellan	25/XI			
	R 115	"		R 115				
	Leaver	27/9						
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20th Nov. 1967

R. / Mr. J. H.

R. Mr. Russell, Esq.
South Asia Dept.



With the compliments of

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

MIDDLE EAST, WESTERN AND
UNITED NATIONS

A. G. L. Turner

LONDON, S.W.1

M. 10/5



94A

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FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO. 2500

17 NOVEMBER, 1967

(E)

R + PA
W. Purcell

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ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 2500 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1967.
AND TO BEIRUT JEDDA CAIRO KUWAIT RABAT TUNIS TRIPOLI KHARTOUM
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UK MIS NEW YORK BAHRAIN RESIDENCY
TEHRAN ANKARA RAWALPINDI AND SAVING TO UK DEL NATO.

UK MIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3248 TO FOREIGN OFFICE:
MIDDLE EAST IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

(SE 212-86)

POSTS IN MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE BEEN INSTR-
UCTED TO LOBBY AS PROPOSED BY LORD CARADON. (MY TEL. NO. 12052 TO
WASHINGTON).

2. UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION PLEASE TAKE URGENT ACTION TO CONVEY
THE TEXT OF OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION (WHICH HAS BEEN TELEGRAPHED
SEPARATELY) TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED.

YOU SHOULD MAKE THE POINTS IN THE LAST TWO SENTENCES OF PARAGRAPH
3 OF UK MIS TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, AND IN MY TEL. TO WASHINGTON
UNDER REFERENCE.

3. RECIPIENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM FOR INFORMATION ARE AUTHORISED AT
THEIR DISCRETION TO CONVEY OUR TEXT TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH
THEY ARE ACCREDITED AND MAKE THE FOREGOING POINTS.

4. NO REPEAT NO MENTION SHOULD BE MADE OF OUR LOBBYING ACTION
IN SECURITY COUNCIL CAPITALS TO DIVERT SUPPORT FROM THE INDIAN
DRAFT RESOLUTION TO OUR OWN.

SOSFA

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21st Nov. 1967



W.L. Atkinson nvo

South Asia Dept

Reg. Entry

2. Indico

3. Mr Duff

27/11

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WA 21/X1

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

MIDDLE EAST, WESTERN AND
UNITED NATIONS

A.G.L. Jones

p.a. 12-5/67

LONDON, S.W.1

*MAN 1/1
M 10/5*

Mr. Turner

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Mr. Morrice James

to do, pe. Mr. Edmonds

Sir Morrice James

The Acting Indian High Commissioner, who is an old friend of mine from Washington, called on me this afternoon. He asked first about Aden and then about the situation at the U.N. on the Middle East.

2. On Aden, his purpose was to ascertain whether we thought that we were handing over to a viable group. His fear was apparently that we should leave Aden in chaos. I explained how we had searched for a broadly based government but failing its achievement we had decided to deal with the NLF. I told him that negotiations would start on Monday and we would hand over to a government which could hold the position at least for some time. He asked if the South Arabian government would be a part of the Commonwealth. I said I thought not.

3. On the situation in New York, for which Mr. Hayman joined the meeting, we explained the present position and our purpose in trying to secure a practical resolution in which both sides acquiesced. He appeared to understand this and made no sort of complaint about lack of our support for their resolution. He clearly thought that the Israelis ought to make concessions and he drew a parallel between their position and that of India which, in spite of its great victory against Pakistan, had, in order to secure a settlement, given up valuable territory secured by brilliant feats of arms!

Denis Greenhill

(Denis Greenhill)

16 November, 1967

Copy to: P.U.S.
Sir Denis Allen
Mr. Hayman
Aden Department



SE 2/2.

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(93)

*Publy
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with 20/11*

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*Mr Duff
Copy sent to Mr Edwards*

18 November, 1967.

Message to Mrs. Gandhi: Middle East

Please refer to my letter of 16 November about the Security Council debate on the Middle East.

I now enclose a self-explanatory telegram (U.K. MIA telegram No. 3272) in which Lord Caradon asks that a high level message be sent to New Delhi in support of our draft resolution in the Security Council.

...
...
I have discussed this with the Foreign Secretary who hopes that the Prime Minister will agree to send a message to Mrs. Gandhi on the lines of the second of the two draft telegrams attached.

I am copying this letter to Williams in the Commonwealth Office.

D. J. D. Haldland



A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.

RECEIVED IN
COMMONWEALTH
20 NOV 1967
/
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

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<div><div>●</div><div>Top Secret Secret <u>Confidential</u> Restricted Unclassified</div></div>	<div><div>Flash <u>Immediate</u> Priority Routine</div><div>}</div><div>*</div></div>

(Date).....

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Draft Telegram to:—
New Delhi
No.
(Date)
And to:—

Addressed to NEW DELHI

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to U.K. MIS. N.Y. IMMEDIATE

Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Washington

Saving to

Repeat to:—
UKMIS, NY
Rio de Janeiro
Buenos Aires
Washington

UKMIS N.Y. tels Nos. 6272 and 6273: Middle East.

Please pass message in m.i.f.t. to Mrs. Gandhi
from Prime Minister as soon as possible.

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Draft Telegram to:— NEW DELHI	Addressed to New Delhi.....	
No.	telegram No..... (date)	
(Date)	And to Immediate	
And to:—	repeated for information to UKMIS, N.Y. & to Rio de Janeiro,	
	Buenos Aires and Washington	
	Saving to.....	
Repeat to:— UKMIS NY-Immed.	M.I.P.T.:Middle East.	
Rio de Janeiro Buenos Aires	Begins.	
Washington	I am writing to you about the crucial stage	
Saving to:—	which the Security Council has reached in its	
	consideration of the Middle East crisis. Unless	
	the Council can pass a resolution which can have	
	some hope of being effective on the ground, an	
	opportunity will pass which might never recur.	
	I know the immense effort which the Indian	
	Delegation have made to find a basis for such a	
	resolution. Unfortunately, despite its great	
	merits, the draft which the Indian, Nigerians,	
	and Mali Delegations have proposed to the Council	
	has been rejected by one of the parties. We	
	thus reluctantly conclude that, even if passed,	
	it could no longer help to bring about the peace	
	which the region so sorely needs.	
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2. It is in these circumstances that, basing ourselves on the work already done by the Afro-Asian and other members of the Council, we took up the task of producing a draft resolution. Our objectives were the same as yours--to provide for the despatch of a Special Representative on the basis of the principles of withdrawal and security in terms in which the parties might at least be brought to acquiesce, even if they could not specifically accept them. Only in this way can we get the effective action on the ground which is so essential.

3. We think that the draft we were able to table this week might be acceptable for this purpose. We recognize its imperfections, but no draft could completely meet the demands of the two sides. We are encouraged that, despite their reservations, both the Arabs and the Israelis seem prepared to acquiesce in it. We thus think that it is the draft resolution which would give the Special Representative the best hope of success in carrying out his mandate.

4. India has played a key role in the consideration of the Middle East question since June. Your role in the Security Council is still a vital one. I very much hope, therefore, that you will agree that our draft should be given a fair wind and that you will instruct your Delegation to vote for it when it comes to the vote, probably on Monday, 20 November. If you can go further and consider adopting our draft resolution as a text on which members of the Council might agree, that would be best of all.

5. May I say again that we have much admired the patient and persistent efforts of the Indian Delegation to reach agreement. We wholeheartedly share this aim and think that it can be reached as I now propose.


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FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 6351



(EASTERN)

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ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 6351 OF 16 NOVEMBER. MIDDLE EAST.

INTENSIVE CONSULATATIONS AND SEVERAL MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE HAVE STILL PRODUCED NO AGREEMENT ON ONE DRAFT RESOLUTION. EARLIER THIS WEEK THE LATIN AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY WERE THINKING OF TABLING A DRAFT RESOLUTION COUCHED IN SIMILAR TERMS TO THAT WHICH THEY TABLED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE SUMMER (EXCLUDING THE REFERENCE TO JERUSALEM BUT PROVIDING FOR A UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE). THEY HAVE NOT YET TABLED BUT MAY DO SO. THIS WOULD BE WELCOME TO THE ARABS BUT NOT TO ISRAEL : IT WOULD PROBABLY BE ADOPTED, BUT WOULD SUFFER THE SAME DEFECT AS THE THREE-POWER AND U.S. DRAFTS, THAT IT WOULD NOT PRODUCE RESULTS ON THE GROUND.

2. THE ARABS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS SHOWED SIGNS OF INTENDING TO PRESS TO A VOTE BEFORE THE WEEKEND. LORD CARADON HAS THEREFORE NOW TABLED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO. 3231 (BEING REPEATED TO ALL POSTS). AS WE EXPECTED, THIS IS NOT PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE TO EITHER SIDE. INDEED, EBAN HAS SAID IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT REPRESENTS THE CLOSEST APPROACH TO A MIDDLE POSITION WHICH BOTH SIDES COULD LIVE WITH AND NEITHER SPECIFICALLY REJECTED IT WHEN IT WAS TABLED TODAY. THE AMERICANS HAVE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TABLE IT.

3. THE VOTE IS EXPECTED TO COME ON THE AFTERNOON OF FRIDAY 17 NOVEMBER ON PRESENT ESTIMATES, THE U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION WILL FAIL AND IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE THREE POWER RESOLUTION WILL CARRY. IF THEY FAIL AND UNLESS THE LATIN AMERICANS TABLE THEIRS AND GET PRIORITY FOR IT, OURS WOULD COME TO THE VOTE LAST. WE HOPE THAT IT MIGHT SECURE ENOUGH VOTES TO CARRY, THE ALTERNATIVE BEING THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL FAILS TO ACT.

4. ADDRESSEES AT SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS SHOULD AT HIGH LEVEL URGENTLY CONVEY THE TEXT IN M.I.P.T. TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH THEY ARE



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/ACCREDITED,

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FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 6351 TO UKMIS NEW YORK

- 2 -

ACCREDITED, URGING THAT THEY CAST THEIR VOTE IN FAVOUR. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, THEY SHOULD DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON THE FOLLOWING :

(A) THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS NOT SIMPLY THE PASSING OF A RESOLUTION IN NEW YORK BUT WHAT RESULTS IT PRODUCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE OURSELVES COULD SUPPORT EITHER THE THREE POWER OR THE US DRAFTS WERE IT NOT THAT EACH IS UNACCEPTABLE TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER AND CAN THEREFORE HAVE NO PRACTICAL EFFECT :

(B) OUR TEXT TAKES A MIDDLE POSITION AND EMBODIES OUR VIEW OF WHAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE ABLE TO GO ALONG WITH. ON WITHDRAWAL, THE CRUX FOR THE ARABS, IT USES LANGUAGE WHICH IS VERY CLOSE TO WHAT THEY WANT IN THE MANDATE FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, IT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT HE IS TO PLAY AN ACTIVE PART, AS THEY WISH. BUT IT MEETS THE ISRAELIS ESPECIALLY IN REFERRING TO QUOTE RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES UNQUOTE (OPERATIVE PARA 1. (II) AND TO PROMOTING AGREEMENT (OPERATIVE PARA 3). IT ALSO OMITTS THE DATE AND THE WORD QUOTE ALL UNQUOTE IN OPERATIVE PARA 1 (I).

(C) WE CANNOT SAY THAT OUR TEXT HAS THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE TWO SIDES. BUT WE CAN SAY THAT IT IS MORE LIKELY THAN THE OTHERS IN THE FIELD TO SECURE PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THE LONG RUN. IT IS THEREFORE THE MOST LIKELY FORMULA OF ALL FOR PROGRESS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

(D) IT IS IMPORTANT FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND FOR THE U.N. ITSELF THAT THE COUNCIL ADOPT A RESOLUTION, AND A PRACTICABLE ONE, IF IT FAILS, WE FORESEE A SET-BACK TO MODERATION AND A RENEWED SLANGING MATCH IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

5. ADDRESSEES AT ARAB POSTS SHOULD ALSO TAKE URGENT ACTION TO CONVEY OUR TEXT TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED AND TO EXPLAIN OUR REASON FOR TABLING IT, DRAWING ON THE POINTS ABOVE AS APPROPRIATE. THEY CAN, AT DISCRETION, ADD THAT WE HAVE STUCK TO WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE THE ESSENTIAL ARAB REQUIREMENTS AND THAT OUR DRAFT IS DESIGNED TO COVER THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF COMMON GROUND.

/6.

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FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 6351 TO UKMIS NEW YORK

- 3 -

6. TEL AVIV SHOULD URGE AT THE HIGHEST AVAILABLE LEVEL THAT, DESPITE MR. EBAN'S LETTER TO LORD CARADON OF 15 NOVEMBER (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3230), THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE WITH-HOLDING OF THEIR CONSENT TO OUR TEXT. THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WILL BE BAD FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, BAD FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ABOVE ALL IN THE LONG RUN BAD FOR ISRAEL. OUR TEXT WILL NOT PREJUDICE THEIR VITAL INTERESTS. IF OUR TEXT DOES NOT PASS THE COUNCIL MAY WELL ADOPT THE LATIN AMERICAN TEXT WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE MUCH LESS ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL.

7. RECIPIENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM FOR INFORMATION ARE AUTHORISED AT THEIR DISCRETION TO INFORM THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED AND MAY DRAW ON THE FOREGOING AS APPROPRIATE.

8. DELHI ONLY.

IN VIEW OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2272 YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT FUNDAM-ENTALLY THE INDIAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS ARE WORKING TO THE SAME END. THE DIFFICULTY WHICH THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION HAS PRESENTED HAS BEEN THAT, WHILE IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO OURSELVES, IT WOULD HAVE NO PRACTICAL EFFECT ON THE GROUND FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN PARA 4 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. THIS POINT OF VIEW WAS URGED ON THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER BY GREENHILL THIS EVENING. YOU MAY ASSURE THEM THAT LORD CARADON REMAINS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE INDIAN DELEGATION IN NEW YORK.

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IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL NO. 3254

16 NOVEMBER 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO. 3254 OF 16 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW AMMAN TEL AVIV
CAIRO BEIRUT PARIS RIO DE JANEIRO BUENOS AIRES

MY TELEGRAM NO. 3179.


MIDDLE EAST - SECURITY COUNCIL

THE COUNCIL RESUMED ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE EGYPTIAN
COMPLAINT (MY TEL NO 3061) THIS AFTERNOON. THE U A R, ISRAEL,
JORDAN AND SYRIA WERE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT RIGHT OF VOTE.

2. I SPOKE FIRST TO INTRODUCE OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION (FULL
TEXT TELEXED TO F O SEPARATELY).

3. RIAD (U A R) CLARIFIED HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE
ISSUE BEFORE THE COUNCIL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS
CONSIDERING THE SITUATION CAUSED BY ISRAELI AGGRESSION
AGAINST THE U A R, JORDAN AND SYRIA. ISRAELI OCCUPATION
OF CONQUERED TERRITORIES COMVINUED. IT WAS THE COUNCIL'S
DUTY TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL
TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 4 JUNE. THE U A R WOULD NOT
COMPROMISE ON THIS POSITION, NOR SHOULD THE COUNCIL.
AGGRESION HAD TAKEN PLACE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES MUST BE
ELIMINATED AS LAID DOWN IN THE CHARTER. HE SAID THAT DURING
LENGTHY PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS, THE U A R HAD LOOKED AT ALL
SORTS OF IDEAS, DISCUSSED ALL SORTS OF FORMULATIONS AND
LOOKED AT MANY DRAFTS. HOWEVER, ITS POSITION ON ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL, WHICH WAS IMPERATIVE, REMAINED CLEAR AND UNCHANGED.
HE ASKED ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO STAND BY CHARTER
PRINCIPLES IN THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE.

/3. EBAN



3. EBAN (ISRAEL) RESTATED THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ISRAELI POLICY. HIS COUNTRY HAD FOR 19 YEARS BEEN THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION BY GOVERNMENTS WHO CONSIDERED THEMSELVES AT WAR WITH ISRAEL. THE EVENTS OF LAST JUNE HAD NOT BEEN AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL BUT RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION. ISRAEL WOULD MAINTAIN THE CEASE FIRE SYSTEM UNTIL IT WAS REPLACED BY PEACE TREATIES GUARANTEEING SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THESE WAS ESSENTIAL. ISRAEL WANTED PERMANENT AND CONTRACTUALLY BINDING PEACE. IN AN ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION, THE MIDDLE EAST STATES SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH EACH OTHER TO ACHIEVE PEACE. HIS DELEGATION WOULD EXAMINE ALL DRAFT RESOLUTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES.

4. KANTE (MALI) SPOKE AS A SPONSOR OF THE THREE POWER DRAFT BEFORE THE COUNCIL. HE ASSERTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL AND WITHDRAWAL MUST BE A PRECONDITION TO ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. ISRAELI FORCES MUST WITHDRAW TO THE POSITIONS THEY HELD BEFORE 4 JUNE. AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INVIABILITY MUST BE APPLIED. JUSTICE MUST BE DONE TO THE REFUGEES FROM PALESTINE, SINCE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS THE HEART OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION MUST BE ALLOWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.

5. IGNATIEFF (CANADA), ON A POINT OF ORDER, SAID THAT THE COUNCIL NOW HAD THREE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS TO CONSIDER. HE BELIEVED THAT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WERE NECESSARY BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO UNNECESSARY DELAY. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONTINUE ITS DELIBERATIONS TOMORROW (FRIDAY) AT 3.30 PM.

6. THERE BEING NO OBJECTION, THIS WAS AGREED.

FO REPEAT TO MOSCOW NO 586, AMMAN 449, TEL AVIV 594, CAIRO 190, BEIRUT 194, PARIS 593, RIO DE JANEIRO 62 BUENOS AIRES 87. CARADON.

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IMMEDIATE FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 3253 16 NOVEMBER 1967
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3253 OF
16 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 3251: MIDDLE EAST.

KUZNETSOV ASKED TO SEE ME THIS EVENING AND SAID THAT THE
U.S.S.R. WAS STILL IN FAVOUR OF THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT. HE WAS NOT
HAPPY ABOUT OUR DRAFT AND HE GAVE ME THESE "PRELIMINARY"
COMMENTS:-

- (A) THE PROVISION FOR WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE MORE DEFINITE
AND SHOULD BE EITHER IN THE WORDING OF THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT
OR AS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT. THIS WAS THE MOST
IMPORTANT POINT OF ALL:
- (B) PARAGRAPH 1 (II): THE FINAL WORDS SHOULD BE "THEIR RIGHT
TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY WITHIN ITS BOUNDARIES FREE
FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE":
- (C) HE HOPED THAT REFERENCE TO DEMILITARIZED ZONES COULD
BE OMITTED:
- (D) PARAGRAPH 3 SHOULD END "MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH THE STATES
CONCERNED IN ORDER TO ASSIST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES
IN THIS RESOLUTION":

2. KUZNETSOV ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REFERENCE
IN THE PREAMBLE TO PREVIOUS U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND THAT THE LAST
OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH SHOULD STATE A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD REPORT.

/3.

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UKMIS. NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3253 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

- 2 -

3. I TOLD KUZNETSOV THAT I WOULD REPORT TO YOU WHAT HE HAD SAID AND WOULD SPEAK TO HIM TOMORROW BUT I COULD SAY RIGHT AWAY THAT IT WAS NO GOOD SUGGESTING THAT WE SHOULD KNOCK THE GUTS OUT OF THE DRAFT.

F O PASS MOSCOW 584

LORD CARADON

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK

TO

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TELNO. 3251

16 NOVEMBER 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 3251 OF 16 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND PARIS.

YOUR TELNO. 6323: MIDDLE EAST.

I WENT FIRST THING THIS MORNING TO GOLDBERG ANXIOUS LEST HE SHOULD PRESS ME NOT TO PUT IN OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE TOLD ME THAT UP TILL YESTERDAY MORNING ISMAIL FAHMY (A MINISTER ON THE UAR DELEGATION) HAD BEEN TELLING HIM THAT IF THE AMERICANS COULD MEET THE EGYPTIANS ON TWO POINTS ONLY (ON WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED "IN THE RECENT CONFLICT" AND ON DROPPING THE WORDS "MUTUAL RECOGNITION") THE UAR COULD ACCEPT THE AMERICAN TEXT. BUT THEN THE AMERICANS RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM CAIRO SAYING THAT PRESIDENT NASSER NOW HAD EIGHT POINTS OF OBJECTION TO THE AMERICAN TEXT. GOLDBERG THEN GOT ON TO RIAD AND ASKED HIM WHETHER WHAT FAHMY HAD SAID WAS TRUE AND RIAD STARTED TO TALK ABOUT THE OTHER SIX POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT. GOLDBERG CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS NO GOOD PURSUING THE DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH RIAD. HE CONSEQUENTLY THOUGHT THAT THE WAY WAS CLEAR FOR US TO GO FORWARD WITH OUR RESOLUTION AND HE ENCOURAGED ME TO TABLE IT TODAY. HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD GIVE US ALL THE HELP THEY COULD, INCLUDING PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS.

2. I THEN WENT TO A MEETING WITH A NUMBER OF ARABS, INCLUDING RIAD (UAR) RIFAI (JORDAN), PACHACHI (IRAQ), BENHIMA (MOROCCO) AND HAKIM (LEBANON), AND I GAVE THEM COPIES OF OUR DRAFT.

3. RIAD AT ONCE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SUPPORT OUR DRAFT BECAUSE THE PROVISION REGARDING WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY EXPLICIT. IF THE DATE (4 JUNE) COULD NOT BE MENTIONED THEN AT LEAST IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT. IT WAS CLEAR /THAT THE

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3251 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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THAT THE OTHER ARABS WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT RIAD'S ATTITUDE BUT RIFAI BEGGED THAT AT LEAST THE WORD 'THE' SHOULD BE PUT IN BEFORE TERRITORIES. AFTER SPEAKING TO PETER HAYMAN I ASKED GOLDBERG WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THIS. HE SAID THAT IF WE DID CHANGE OUR TEXT AT THIS STAGE IT WOULD MAKE PROBLEMS FOR HIM WITH THE ISRAELIS AND HE STRONGLY ADVISED THAT WE SHOULD STICK FOR THE PRESENT AT LEAST TO THE WORDING WHICH WE HAD INTENDED.

4. CONSEQUENTLY AT THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING OF THE COUNCIL I PRESENTED THE TEXT UNAMENDED. JUST BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL I SAW KUZNETSOV AND SHOWED HIM THE TEXT. HE HAD SEVERAL CRITICISMS TO MAKE, MAINLY THAT THE PROVISION REGARDING WITHDRAWAL WAS INADEQUATE AND THAT THE WORD 'RECOGNISE' BEFORE BOUNDARIES WAS OBJECTIONABLE. HE SAID THAT THE TEXT GENERALLY SEEMED TO CLOSE TO THE AMERICAN TEXT FOR HIS LIKING.

5. AFTER THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL I SAW RUDA (ARGENTINE) AND CARVALHO SILOS (BRAZIL). I TOLD THEM THAT I HAD UP TO NOW DELIBERATELY REFRAINED FROM COMMENTING ON THEIR TEXT OR ASKING THEM TO DELAY ITS TABLING. I WAS VERY GRATEFUL TO THEM FOR HOLDING BACK TO ALLOW OUR TEXT TO BE PRESENTED FIRST. NOW, HOWEVER, IT SEEMED THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE BRITISH TEXT MIGHT DEPEND ON THE VOTES OF THE LATIN AMERICANS AND ALSO ON WHETHER A LATIN AMERICAN TEXT WAS PUT IN AS AN ALTERNATIVE. I SAID THAT I FELT SURE THAT THE BRITISH TEXT WAS THE ONE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD TO EFFECTIVE ACTION AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY I MUST DO EVERYTHING I POSSIBLY COULD TO MAKE IT SUCCEED. THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE UNDER INSTRUCTION TO TABLE THEIR TEXT. I TOLD THEM THAT I WOULD ASK MY GOVERNMENT TO INTERCEDE IN RIO DE JANEIRO AND BUENOS AIRES IN THE HOPE THAT THE ARGENTINE AND BRAZIL WOULD NOT PUT IN THEIR TEXT AT ALL BUT DECIDE INSTEAD TO VOTE ONLY FOR OURS. THEY SAID THEY HAD NO OBJECTION TO MY DOING SO.

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6. IT IS EARLY TO JUDGE THE REACTION TO THE TEXT WHICH I PUT TO THE COUNCIL TODAY. RIAD AND EL KONY (UAR) SEEMED TO BE VERY OBSTRUCTIVE AND THEY MAY GET ENCOURAGEMENT IN THEIR NEGATIVE ATTITUDE FROM THE USSR, BUT A NUMBER OF OTHER ARABS SEEMED MUCH MORE ANXIOUS TO GET A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME FROM THE COUNCIL WITHOUT ANY FURTHER DELAY, AND PACHACHI TOLD ME THAT THE FACT THAT THE AMERICANS WERE LIKELY TO SUPPORT OUR TEXT MADE A BIG DIFFERENCE. A NUMBER OF DELEGATES OUTSIDE THE COUNCIL, INCLUDING YUGOSLAVS AND RUMANIANS, TOLD ME THAT THEY WERE VERY PLEASED WITH OUR INITIATIVE.

7. IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE HOW THE VOTING WILL GO (MUCH DEPENDS ON THE LATIN AMERICANS) BUT I WILL REPORT ON THIS TOMORROW.

8. I AM SENDING A SEPARATE TELEGRAM ABOUT LOBBYING.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 584, AMMAN 448, TEL AVIV 593, CAIRO 189
BUENOS AIRES 86, RIO DE JANEIRO 61, PARIS 592 AND BEIRUT 193.
LORD CARADON

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IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 3250

16 NOVEMBER 1967

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ADDRESSED TO RIO DE JANEIRO TELEGRAM NO. 60 OF 16 NOVEMBER AND TO BUENOS AIRES, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 3250.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 3248, PARAGRAPH 5.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH THE BRAZILIANS AND ARGENTINIANS ARE CONSIDERING TABLING:
BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

CONSIDERING THAT ALL MEMBER STATES HAVE AN INESCAPABLE OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE PEACE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE,

CONSIDERING FURTHER THAT THE CEASE FIRE ORDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ACCEPTED BY THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE STATES OF JORDAN, SYRIA, AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, A STEP WHICH MUST BE REINFORCED BY OTHER MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED BY THE ORGANISATION AND COMPLIED WITH BY THE PARTIES,

1. AFFIRMS THE URGENT NECESSITY:

(A) FOR ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY IT AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CONFLICT:

(B) FOR THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT TO END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, TO ENDEAVOUR TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF COEXISTENCE BASED ON GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND TO HAVE RECOURSE IN ALL CASES TO THE PROCEDURES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT INDICATED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

(C) FOR GUARANTEEING THE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT ON THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE REGION:

(D) FOR ACHIEVING AN APPROPRIATE AND FULL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
/OF

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3250 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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OF THE REFUGEES AND GUARANTEEING THE TERRITORIAL INVIOABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES OF THE REGION, THROUGH MEASURES INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES:

2. REAFFIRMS ITS CONVICTION THAT NO STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN BE BASED ON THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AND DECLARES THAT THE VALIDITY OF THE OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BROUGHT ABOUT BY SUCH MEANS SHOULD NOT BE RECOGNIZED;

3. DECIDES TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY RELYING ON THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE AREA.

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO PROCEED FORTHWITH TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION AND IN ORDER THAT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE CAN BE ESTABLISHED.

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE EFFORTS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

ENDS.

F O PASS IMMEDIATE TO RIO DE JANEIRO 60 AND BUENOS AIRES 85.

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FLASH U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 3249

16 NOVEMBER 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 3249 OF 16 NOVEMBER.
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO, WASHINGTON,
MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, TOKYO, COPENHAGEN, LAGOS, DELHI, SOFIA,
TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JEDDA, AMMAN, KUWAIT, RABAT, TUNIS,
TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, ADDIS ABABA, BAHRAIN, TEHRAN, RAWALPINDI,
ANKARA, AND U K DEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BRITISH DRAFT RESOLUTION AS TABLED AND
INTRODUCED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

(1) EXPRESSING ITS CONTINUING CONCERN WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

(2) EMPHASISING THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORY BY WAR AND THE NEED TO WORK FOR A JUST AND LASTING
PEACE IN WHICH EVERY STATE IN THE AREA CAN LIVE IN SECURITY,

(3) EMPHASISING FURTHER THAT ALL MEMBER STATES IN THEIR
ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A
COMMITMENT TO ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER,
1. AFFIRMS THAT THE FULFILMENT OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES REQUIRES
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE APPLICATION OF BOTH THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES

(I) WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI ARMED FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED
IN THE RECENT CONFLICT:

(II) TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND
RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE
IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND
RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE:

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2. AFFIRMS FURTHER THE NECESSITY

(A) FOR GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA:

(B) FOR ACHIEVING A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM:

(C) FOR GUARANTEEING THE TERRITORIAL INVIOABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA, THROUGH MEASURES INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES:

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESIGNATE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO PROCEED TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH THE STATES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT AND ASSIST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN THIS RESOLUTION:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PROGRESS OF THE EFFORTS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ENDS

F O PASS FLASH TO BUENOS AIRES 84. AND FLASH TO RIO DE JANEIRO 59 IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 583, PARIS 591, TOKYO 43, COPENHAGEN 136, LAGOS 15, NEW DELHI 71, SOFIA 8, TEL AVIV 592, CAIRO 188, BEIRUT 192, JEDDA 102, AMMAN 447, KUWAIT 26, RABAT 16, TUNIS 30, TRIPOLI 11, KHARTOUM 19, ADDIS ABABA 49, BAHRAIN 21, TEHRAN 38, RAWALPINDI 10, ANKARA 86, AND UKDEL NATO 30.

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F L A S H UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3248

16 NOVEMBER

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 3248 OF 16 NOVEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BUENOS AIRES, RIO DE JANEIRO,
WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, OTTAWA, TOKYO, COPENHAGEN, LAGOS,
NEW DELHI, SOFIA, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JEDDA, AMMAN,
KUWAIT, RABAT, TUNIS, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, ADDIS ABABA, BAHRAIN,
TEHRAN, RAWALPINDI, ANKARA AND UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 11847 TO WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST.

THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH WE
HAVE TABLED TODAY IS CONTAINED IN M.I.F.T. IT MAY BE VOTED ON
TOMORROW (FRIDAY) AFTERNOON.

2. I HOPE THAT POSTS IN COUNTRIES REPRESENTED ON THE SECURITY
COUNCIL CAN NOW BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE THE MAXIMUM EFFORT TO SECURE
A VOTE FROM GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED IN FAVOUR OF IT.

3. IN SEEKING THIS SUPPORT POSTS WILL HAVE TO MODIFY THE ARGUMENT
CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 3 TO 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO SAY THAT WE COULD SUPPORT THE
INDIAN AND AMERICAN DRAFTS. THIS COULD IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF THE
INDIAN TEXT. INSTEAD POSTS COULD SAY THAT IT IS CLEAR FROM THE COUNCIL
PROCEEDINGS THAT NEITHER THE INDIAN NOR THE AMERICAN TEXT CAN
PROVIDE A BASIS ON WHICH THE ISRAELI AND ARAB GOVERNMENTS COULD
BE BROUGHT TO COOPERATE WITH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. WE CANNOT
CLAIM THAT OUR DRAFT YET CARRIES THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PARTIES
BUT IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT OUR TEXT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT SPECIFICALLY
REJECTED BY EITHER SIDE WHEN THEY SPOKE IN THE COUNCIL TODAY TO
MAKE THEIR WELL KNOWN RESERVATIONS OF POSITION. IT IS MOREOVER
THE PRODUCT OF THE MOST INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS AND WE BELIEVE THAT,
OF THE TEXTS NOW BEFORE THE COUNCIL, IT IS ONE WHICH TAKES MOST
CLOSELY INTO ACCOUNT THE ESSENTIAL INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES AS
/THEY

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3248 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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THEY HAVE STATED THEM. WE HAVE HOPES THAT THE PARTIES WILL COME ROUND TO ACQUIESCENCE AND THAT OUR TEXT WOULD GIVE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE THE BEST HOPE OF SUCCESS IN CARRYING OUT HIS MANDATE.

4. OUR CHANCES OF SUCCESS MUST REMAIN UNCERTAIN. IT IS HOWEVER NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT PROVIDING THE INDIAN TEXT FAILS (THE U.S. TEXT HAS NO HOPE OF CARRYING) MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL RALLY TO OUR TEXT. THE INDIAN TEXT WOULD PROBABLY NEED THE ARGENTINE ETHIOPIAN AND JAPANESE VOTES TO ENABLE IT TO SUCCEED. THE FIRST TWO AT LEAST HAVE FOR LONG HAD STANDING INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTE FOR IT. IT WOULD GREATLY HELP OUR PROSPECTS IF THESE THREE GOVERNMENTS COULD BE PERSUADED THAT OUR TEXT IS NOW THE ONE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD TO EFFECTIVE ACTION ON THE GROUND INSTEAD OF SIMPLY A VOTING VICTORY IN THE COUNCIL (THE JAPANESE HERE HAS INDICATED THAT IF WE CAN COLLECT 8 OTHER VOTES FOR OUR TEXT HE COULD PROBABLY PROVIDE THE NINTH).

5. THE MAIN KEY TO SUCCESS HOWEVER WILL BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE LATIN AMERICANS. THEY ARE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO TABLE A TEXT OF THEIR OWN SO AS TO AVOID RECOURSE TO THEIR STANDING INSTRUCTIONS (THE TEXT HAS BEEN TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY TO BUENOS AIRES AND RIO). IT WOULD GIVE OUR TEXT A REAL CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF THE BRAZILIAN AND ARGENTINE GOVERNMENTS COULD BE PERSUADED TO VOTE ONLY FOR OUR TEXT AND NOT TO TABLE THEIR OWN, AND I HOPE THAT HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADORS IN BUENOS AIRES AND RIO WILL DO THEIR UTMOST TO ACHIEVE THIS. (THE POINT IS THAT, SINCE THE LATIN TEXT IS MUCH MORE PRO-ARAB THAN OUR OWN, IF IT IS TABLED IT WILL DRAW AWAY SUPPORT FROM OURS, AND THOUGH IT WOULD BE FOURTH IN LINE IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY SUCCEED. BUT IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR NO CHANCE OF BEING EFFECTIVE ON THE GROUND. IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ACT VERY QUICKLY IN RIO AND BUENOS AIRES IF INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO GET TO NEW YORK IN TIME.

6. (TO NEW DELHI ONLY)

IN NEW DELHI THE HIGH COMMISSIONER MIGHT TAKE THE LINES THAT WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY AZZAM HUSSEIN. WE SEE LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN OBJECTIVE BETWEEN THE INDIAN'S

/AND OURS

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 3248 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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AND OURS. BUT AS THE ISRAELIS AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT COOPERATE ON THE BASIS OF THE INDIAN TEXT WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL CONCLUDE THAT OUR TEXT IS THE ONE MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES WHICH BOTH HAVE IN MIND. IF WE HAVE HAD TO LEAVE IN A NUMBER OF POINTS UNPALATABLE TO THE ARABS IT IS BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN SO MUCH MORE SPECIFIC ON WITHDRAWAL THAN ANY OTHER TEXT WHICH SEEMED CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING ISRAELI ACQUIESCENCE.

7. ADEBO (NIGERIA) WOULD LIKE, I BELIEVE, TO VOTE FOR OUR TEXT AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT. BUT REPRESENTATIONS IN LAGOS COULD HELP GREATLY IN THIS.

8. WE ALSO THINK THAT THE ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR WOULD LIKE TO VOTE FOR OUR TEXT AND IT WILL BE WELL WORTH WHILE MAKING STRONG REPRESENTATIONS IN ADDIS ABABA.

FO PASS F L A S H TO BUENOS AIRES NO. 83, F L A S H TO RIO DE JANEIRO NO. 58, AND IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW NO. 582, PARIS NO. 590, TOKYO NO. 42, COPENHAGEN NO. 135, LAGOS NO. 14, NEW DELHI NO. 70, SOFIA NO. 7, TEL AVIV NO. 591, CAIRO NO. 187, BEIRUT NO. 191, JEDDA NO. 101, AMMAN NO. 446, KUWAIT NO. 25, RABAT NO. 15, TUNIS NO. 29, TRIPOLI NO. 10, KHARTOUM NO. 18, ADDIS ABABA NO. 48, BAHRAIN NO. 20, TEHRAN NO. 37, RAWALPINDI NO. 9, ANKARA NO. 85 AND UKDEL NATO NO. 29.

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British High Commission,
New Delhi.

Reg. Copy to Mr. Turner Mtd. UN Dept
Bu. for the World Bank on 27/XI
14 November, 1967.
W. A. 20/XI

See file

INDIA, ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

In Delhi telegram No. 2272 to the Commonwealth Office (not to all) the High Commissioner reported his conversation with Azim Husain, the Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, on 13 November in which the latter sought H.M.G.'s assistance at the United Nations.

2. The same evening I was told by the resilient Israeli Consul, Mr. Dafni, who is obliged to reside in Bombay, that he, too, had seen Azim Husain. Dafni believes that Azim Husain (a Muslim) is to be replaced shortly as senior Indian official dealing with the Middle East by the present Indian Ambassador in Moscow, Kewal Singh. In Dafni's view any change can only be an improvement, and a Hindu (as Kewal Singh is) can be expected to take a relatively more objective line than any Muslim in Middle East Affairs; - this is a point of view which it is difficult to dispute. It was likely during the June war in India, that part - at any rate - of the overwhelming support for Israel in Parliament and outside was due to the pleasure with which many Hindus witnessed the Israelis' clobbering of Middle Eastern Muslims. (It may be noted, in passing, that Dafni is very active among Parliamentarians).

3. Dafni's relationship with Azim Husain has been strained. He had evidently been summoned to Delhi to be read a lecture on Israel's 'truculence' at the United Nations. In reply, he said that he had criticised the Indian attitude there, and enquired how the Indians would have liked it if the Israelis had gone round canvassing a solution to the Kashmir dispute - without consulting India. According to Dafni, there was no reply - but he appeared to have emerged from the Ministry unscathed!

4. Incidentally, Surendrapal Singh, the amiable but intellectually unimpressive Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (the only full-time Minister in the Ministry, since Mr. Chagla's departure) conceded to me on 7 November, that the Indians had perhaps, erred in the manner in which they had conducted their Middle Eastern policy since June. "But", he maintained, "we decided, this time, that having started on a course of action, we would be consistent". It was with the utmost difficulty, that I refrained from quoting Sir Winston Churchill's aphorism about 'consistency' (the last resort of fools).

5. I am sending copies of this letter to George Chalmers in Tel Aviv, to UKMIS, New York, and to Rich in Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

cc. R 12/5/67

Yours truly,
Dunroby

W.L. Allinson Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department, C.O.

(A.M. SIMONS)

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CYPHER CAT. A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 11847 10 NOVEMBER 1967 (E)

p.a. 12-5/6a.

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ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELNO 11847 OF 10 NOVEMBER AND TO MOSCOW PARIS OTTAWA TOKYO COPENHAGEN LAGOS NEW DELHI SOFIA TEL AVIV CAIRO BEIRUT JEDDA AMMAN KUWAIT RABAT TUNIS TRIPOLI KHARTOUM BUENOS AIRES RIO DE JANEIRO ADDIS ABABA REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK BAHRAIN TEHRAN RAWALPINDI AKNARA AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST.

YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT CURRENT DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL SITUATION IS REVOLVING ROUND TWO ALTERNATIVE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS, THE INDIAN WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE AMERICAN WITH WHICH THE ISRAELIS SAY THEY CAN LIVE. (TEXTS ARE BEING REPEATED TO POSTS WHICH HAVE NOT SO FAR HAD THEM). THE ISRAELIS SAY THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THEY ACCEPT THE INDIAN DRAFT NOR WILL THEY COOPERATE WITH ANY ARRANGEMENTS MADE UNDER IT. THE ARABS ARE EQUALLY FIRM IN SAYING THAT THE INDIAN DRAFT EMBODIES VERY CONSIDERABLE CONCESSIONS ON THEIR PART, AND REPRESENTS THE FURTHEST LIMIT TO WHICH THEY CAN GO TO MEET THE ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW. WE ALSO HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL REFUSE ANY AMERICAN TEXT.

2. BOTH DRAFTS AIM TO SET OUT THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE BASED IN A BALANCED WAY AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO WORK TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN THE RESOLUTION. THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM CENTRES ON THE EXACT WORDING TO BE USED FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND ON WHETHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD TRY TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT OR SHOULD, AS THE ISRAELIS WOULD LIKE, CONFINE HIMSELF TO ASSISTING THE PARTIES CONCERNED THEMSELVES TO REACH A SETTLEMENT.

3. IN OUR VIEW THE ESSENTIAL THING IS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD PASS A RESOLUTION WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN ACCEPT AS A BASIS FOR MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. THIS IS A MORE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION THAN THE PRECISE WORDING OF ANY RESOLUTION. WE OURSELVES COULD ACCEPT THE FORMULATION IN EITHER THE INDIAN OR THE AMERICAN DRAFT, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD IN OUR OPINION IN /THEIR

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FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 11847 TO WASHINGTON

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THEIR LATEST FORM PROTECT THE VITAL INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE. BUT EVEN IF ONE OR OTHER WERE PASSED THIS WOULD SERVE NO PRACTICAL PURPOSE SINCE IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE EITHER TO THE ARABS OR ISRAELIS.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I HAVE IT IN MIND THAT OUR BEST COURSE WILL PROBABLY BE FOR LORD CARADON TO SAY THAT WHILE EITHER OF THE TWO DRAFTS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US, WE SEE NO VALUE IN VOTING FOR A DRAFT WHICH CAN IN THE END HAVE NO PRACTICAL EFFECT ON THE GROUND OWING TO ITS UNACCEPTABILITY TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, AND THAT TO MAKE OUR OWN POSITION CLEAR HE WILL AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT TABLE A DRAFT EMBODYING OUR VIEW OF WHAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE ABLE TO GO ALONG WITH. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THIS WOULD BE CLOSER TO THE INDIAN THAN TO THE AMERICAN DRAFT IN FUNDAMENTALS, BUT WOULD USE DIFFERENT LANGUAGE AT SOME KEY POINTS.

5. WE SHALL DISAPPOINT THE AMERICANS AND ISRAELIS ON THE ONE SIDE AND THE ARABS ON THE OTHER TO THE EXTENT THAT BOTH OF THEM ARE COUNTING ON OUR VOTE TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS FOR THE DRAFTS WHICH THEY FAVOUR. OUR ASSESSMENT IS, HOWEVER, THAT THE HARM WILL BE MINIMISED IF WE EMPHASIZE THAT OUR DECISION IS TAKEN PURELY BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE GROUND AND TO AVOID WASTING TIME ON PAPER EXERCISES WHICH WILL HAVE NO CONSTRUCTIVE EFFECT. BY TAKING THIS LINE IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT THE SUPPORTERS OF BOTH INDIAN AND AMERICAN DRAFTS WILL DECIDE TO BACK OUR COMPROMISE TEXT, THUS ENABLING A CONSTRUCTIVE RESULT TO EMERGE IN NEW YORK.

6. ON RECEIPT OF FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS YOU SHOULD BE READY TO EXPLAIN OUR ATTITUDE AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN THE COUNTRY TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED ON THE LINES WHICH LORD CARADON WILL BE USING (SEE PARA 4 ABOVE). THE TEXT HE TABLES WILL BE TELEGRAPHED TO YOU.

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Mr. DuffINDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

I have spoken to Mr. Tennent and Mr. Turner in MEW and UN Dept and explained that we wished to be kept closely in touch with the Indian request for our help in the United Nations and to see any reply before it goes in draft.

2. I am told that the present situation in the UN is extremely confused and is changing from hour to hour rather than day to day. There are now apparently five or six draft resolutions which include those of the United States, Soviet Union, Japan and India. We are also putting forward our own resolution which is a modification of the United States resolution.

3. I understand that the Indian resolution is not likely to get very far as it is anathema to the Israelis, but this does not matter very much as all the Indians now want is agreement on some resolution which has a chance of leading to a settlement. It seems clear that the Indians are now looking to us because they believe that we can have some decisive influence on the course of events in the United Nations in so far as the Middle East crisis is concerned. The answer to the Indians will probably lie in our own modified version of the United States resolution which will presumably be rather more favourable to the Arabs; but the main point is that we shall not be able to say anything to the Indians until we have consulted Lord Caradon in New York. MEW & UN Department will arrange for this to be done after consulting with the Foreign Office. I have explained that we feel we must give the Indians some definite reply.

4. The only earlier representations to us by the Indians in Delhi on this subject, if it is right to call them representations, are contained in the talks with Mr. Husain recorded at 77A and 81A.

(R. M. Purcell)
15 November, 1967

Mr. Auer

We must give

Mr. Freeman Cannon (12th)

something to say to Agin

(Husain, known interview. Please

/see

Argentine

X Eastern Dept (Fio)
have now telegraphed
New York about
Delhi Tel 2272

UK MISTEL
No 3248

has given
Mr. Freeman
adequate
instructions
WA/X

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the reflection of the telegram
referred to it is
sufficient.

Pl-4A 17/10

AP

16:11

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Tel. No. 2272

13 November, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 2272 of 13 November.
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington and Moscow.

Your telegram No. 11847 to Washington.

Middle East.

I was summoned today, 13 November, by Azim Husain, Secretary in External Affairs Ministry. Subject was West Asia situation at the United Nations.

2. Husain spoke with great force and seriousness in the following sense:-

Government of India felt that now was the time to secure a resolution which could lead to practicable implementation. If the present opportunity was lost it might not quickly recur. Indians attached no special element of amour propre to the so-called Indian Resolution which had in fact been drafted by a Consortium of seven nations. They wanted only to see progress made. They believed that now that our relations with Arabs and U.A.R. in particular are on the mend our experience and our direct interest give us the opportunity of being decisively helpful. They were disappointed in the United States Resolution which, Husain argued, goes back on significant points in the Dobrynin Resolution. They had reason to think that Nasser was eager to achieve a settlement if necessary at a high price but he could not compromise on the issue of withdrawal. GOI agreed with this both in principle and because of their own interest in seeing the Canal opened. They believed that we should probably take a similar view. They further believed that Nasser might not survive unless he could deliver an Israeli withdrawal in the foreseeable future and they thought the consequences of his fall might be disastrous. They calculated that the Arabs had been pushed almost to the limit but perhaps not quite except on the issue of withdrawal.

3. Husain drew my attention to the four passages in the American Resolution which seemed to the Indians to be reasonably unacceptable to the Arabs.

- (a) In first paragraph of the substantive resolution the obligation on Israel to withdraw was not nearly explicit enough.
- (b) In the same paragraph the words "secure and recognized boundaries" appeared to hint at an obligation to accept /frontier

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New Delhi telegram No. 2272 to Commonwealth Office

- 2 -

frontier revision which would be bound to be in Israel's favour.

- (c) In paragraph 2(c) of the substantive resolution objection was taken to the establishment of demilitarized zones. Husain said that he believed Nasser would be willing to accept this if it were put to him by U Thant's representative and so long as it involved equivalent action by the Israelis but he would not accept it in the Resolution.
- (d) Paragraph 3 of the substantive resolution. Nasser objected to the special representative being requested to "assist" in achieving a political solution since this would imply bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Arabs.

4. Husain did not state explicitly but I think intended me to understand that (b), (c) and (d) above were mainly terminological points but that (a) above was of fundamental substance.

5. He then drew my attention to the terminology of the Indian Resolution pointing out that paragraph 1(i) and 1(ii) of its substantive provisions were completely explicit in respect both of withdrawal and of the security of the nations involved. In both cases he argued they strengthened in a useful way the somewhat vague provisions of the Dobrynin Resolution.

6. Husain concluded by asking me whether I saw any possibility that Her Majesty's Government could help in this situation and whether I thought the Indian objectives would be in any serious way objectionable to you.

7. I said that I had received no instructions and therefore anything that I said to him must be accepted as being my personal interpretation of a rapidly developing situation. On that basis and emphasizing that I was speaking without instructions I drew cautiously on your telegram under reference but expressed it all as my own reading of your probable attitude. I referred in passing to the possibility of a compromise resolution but said that this might be one of a number of possible courses which it seemed to me you might be considering. I promised to report his representations to you in full and on receipt of my own instructions to redress any misapprehension which I might have created about your attitude (it seemed to me unwise in the present circumstances to give him a totally non-committal reply to what was a very earnest representation).

8. Husain said that what GOI were asking was the closest possible collaboration between Lord Caradon and Parthasarthy in New York. The object of his representations were to be quite sure that in drafting instructions to Lord Caradon Her Majesty's

/Government

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New Delhi telegram No. 2272 to Commonwealth Office

- 3 -

Government were aware of Indian objectives. He repeated that there was no pride of authorship in present Indian Resolution and that GOI now sought agreement under whatever draftmanship. 81(A)

9. This of course is not out of line with earlier representations which have been made to us in Delhi. However I was impressed by the extreme seriousness and sense of urgency with which Husain presented his case. He is a far more responsible and constructive official than T.N. Kaul and I interpret his representations to me as having been made with genuine intent and in a constructive spirit.

Commonwealth Office please pass Priority UKMis New York 27, Washington 123 and Moscow 30.

Mr. Freeman

[Repeated as requested]

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M.E.W. & U.N.Dept.

XXXXX
PPPPP

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Reference.....

with —

827

Mr. Duff
Mr. Allinson

17/11
JH 21x1

India and the Middle East Crisis

I have now read the attached document which gives quite a good historical description of India's policy towards the Arab/Jewish dispute. The policy of Indian leaders has for some 25 years been quite consistent and logical. India has been strongly critical on the principle of establishing a Jewish national home and eventually a Jewish state at the expense of the Arabs. This, of course, is a perfectly tenable line, but in the whole exposition of their policy no credit whatsoever is given to us for the motives lying behind our own actions; nor is there any indication that we may have been misguided for quite honourable reasons. This is a pity, but I doubt whether we can have expected anything much better from ^{the} Indians and the description of their policy might have been even more tendentious than it in fact is.

2. One can, I think, have a measure of sympathy with India's consistently held views and for her actions in the U.N. and elsewhere up to the 1967 war; but at this point India's whole attitude to Arab/Israel problems seems to depart from reality and become outdated (page 58). It is unconvincing to maintain the view that the Israelis are always wrong and that the Arabs are always wronged.

3. The first sentence on the last page (page 74) indicates that India's attitude in 1967 is a perfectly logical continuation of her past policy. This is correct enough: but the significant point is that although the Indian Government's policy has probably

/commanded



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commanded fairly general support in India for much of the time it has been in existence, it has now ceased to do so. Indian public opinion towards the Arabs seems to have changed rather radically, particularly perhaps since the 1965 Indo/Pakistan hostilities, as the ordinary Hindu has come to realise that the Arabs have given them no help or support whatsoever in their dispute with Muslim Pakistan. India's Middle East policy seems now to be out of line with Indian opinion and may well get more so if, as we expect, the influence of Jana Sangh increases. Although any radical change in policy seems very unlikely, it may be that domestic factors will lead to some weakening of the current still very pro-Arab stand.

4. At least we now have a fairly clear view of the reasons and principles governing India's policy towards the Arab/Israel dispute and I wonder whether we have a similar, and preferably shorter, document setting out the background to our own policy. If so, it might be worth handing over to the Indians as a counter gift.

Easton Dept
did probably produce
a draft of
White Paper -
Blue Books?
WA

R. M. Purcell
1 November, 1967.

Mr Rutter

Para 4 above.
Do you have anything which
might be worth handing over?

R. M. Purcell

2.159

P.O.

27/11

South Asia Dept (Mr Purcell)

I am afraid that there is no single compilation which would serve this purpose, and to produce a clutch of basic documents would not only be a waste of time but also have no value. I am afraid that the Indians already have and know.

RESTRICTED

R. M. Purcell

THE HIGH COMMISSION OF INDIA

1. Mr Allison

Still very pro. Arch-

Have Eastern Dept had

2. Mr Pincell

a copy? WH 17/10

I have kept a
copy to him though -
we had better see later
there is anything right.

With the Compliments of the

Public Relations Officer

in it.

Mr Rattan

Have you seen We
this?

Thank you,
We have a copy

17:10

R.N. Pincell

S. Anwar Khan

INDIA HOUSE,
ALDWYCH,
LONDON, W.C.2.



P. a. 2/10/67

INDIA

AND

PALESTINE

—The Evolution of a Policy

INDIA AND PALESTINE

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- I. India and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
The Evolution of Policy
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I

INDIA AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
THE EVOLUTION OF A POLICY

Western colonialism in India and in the Arab world are linked; in fact, the desire to control the routes to India was one of the main motives that drew the European Powers to the Arab world. And the struggle for freedom from Western dominance in India and the Arab world were simultaneous. Inevitably, the historical ties of friendship between India and the Arab world were strengthened by the common experiences acquired at about the same time in dealing with imperialist forces. The roots of free India's attitude to the current problem of West Asia are to be found in the positions taken in the early years of this century by the leaders of the nationalist movement in India, particularly of the Indian National Congress — the organization which formed the spearhead of all nationalist forces in India against British rule. Besides the considerable emotional sympathy for the Arab cause, the Indian leaders also discovered the seeds of future conflict in the policies pursued by the European powers in West Asia — an area in whose peace, stability and progress, independent India was bound to have a great stake. Since 1947, therefore, India has continued to view the problems of West Asia in this context and has consistently endeavoured to help in the construction of a stable peace, based on fairness and justice, in that region. An attempt is made here to briefly recount the evolution of Indian attitudes and policies towards the fundamental issues in the West Asian conflict.

not now
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indian
H. policy

II

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

It is necessary to recount briefly the history of the Palestine question. The seeds of the present tension in West Asia were sown at the beginning of this century, when the proposal to create a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine received the sanction of the British Government. The subsequent conflicts, violence and tension in the area can all be traced to this decision on the part of the British, who were awarded the Mandate for Palestine at the conclusion of the First World War. To say this is not to indulge in criticism of one party or the other; the objective fact is that, any discussion of the rights or wrongs of the West Asian situation, as it obtains today, inevitably leads one back to the original decision to establish a "national home" for the Jews in Palestine.

Prior to World War I, Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, up to 1918 the whole area now constituting Syria, Israel and Jordan was commonly referred to as "Syria". After the First World War, the territories of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan were established, and the boundary between Palestine and the Trans-Jordan lay basically along the Jordan river.

After the War, Britain and France were vying with each other for control over this part of the Ottoman Empire. These former Turkish provinces were, therefore, converted into Mandates as provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Mandate for Syria and Lebanon (later known as the 'Levant States') was allotted to France and the Mandate for Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine were given to Great Britain, at the San Remo Conference of the principal Allied Powers, on 25th May, 1920.

The Covenant of the League of Nations made provision for three types of Mandates — 'A', 'B' and 'C'. The 'A' class Mandates (to which the Levant States, Mesopotamia and Palestine belonged) were to be treated as territories whose inhabitants were fairly well advanced and who might be expected to obtain self-rule in a short period. However, the Palestine Mandate did not provide that Pales-

tine was to be considered as provisionally independent, in contradistinction from the Mandates for Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. This, it would appear, was due at least in part to the desire of the Mandatory Powers to provide for certain special rights of the Jews in Palestine.

A Jewish National Home

For the purpose of this booklet, it is not necessary to explain in detail the Zionists' aims and aspirations and the recognition or encouragement given to them by the Western Powers. It is enough to point out that prior to the establishment of the Palestine Mandate, the area in question had been inhabited by the Arabs continuously at least since the 13th century when the Mamluk Dynasty in Cairo wrested control of Palestine from the Christians. In the 16th Century the Ottoman Turks conquered this area from the Mamluks and Turkish rule persisted till about the conclusion of World War I.

In 1909, Israel Zangwill, founder of the Jewish Land Development Foundation, had declared:

"Palestine is a country without a people; it should be given a people without a country. The duty of the Jews, once in Palestine, is to bring about such pressure upon the Arabs as would force them to leave the country."

In the same year, Theodor Herzl had urged:

- (1) the promotion of an organised large-scale colonisation of Palestine;
- (2) acquisition of an internationally recognised legal right to colonise Palestine; and
- (3) the formation of a permanent organisation to unite all Jews in the cause of Zionism.

During the course of the First World War, the British became increasingly sympathetic to Zionist aspirations for the creation of a "national home", primarily on the grounds that Zionist money, talent and sympathy were required both in Europe and the United States for the promotion of the cause of the allies. Further, it was

now generally realised in Britain, as Lord Kitchener had done before, that Palestine was an important strategic guard-base for the Suez Canal in Egypt. The then British Prime Minister, therefore, instructed Mark Sykes to open negotiations with the Zionist leaders and arrange a *quid pro quo*. In 1914, Dr. Chaim Weizmann promised Jewish support in the war in return for a British promise of support for Zionist claims. Zionist claims included Palestine, the present territory of Jordan and the Gaza strip. A little later, the Zionists also agreed that they would press for an exclusively British post-war administration in Palestine if their claims to a national home were recognised.

The Balfour Declaration

On 2nd November, 1917, the British Cabinet approved the issue, by the then Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, of the well-known "Balfour Declaration" which was essentially a declaration of support to Zionist aspirations. The declaration was subsequently endorsed by the other Allied and Associated Powers. The substance of the Declaration was also incorporated in the Mandate for Palestine. Thus in the Preamble, the Mandate recognises "the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine" and "the grounds for re-constituting their national home in that country." Article II of the Mandate made Great Britain responsible for facilitating the establishment of such political, economic and administrative conditions as would secure the establishment of the Jewish national home. By Article IV of the Mandate the Jewish Agency was recognised as a public body to co-operate with the Palestine Government in such matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish population in Palestine. The Palestine Government was bound by Article VI of the Mandate to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions" and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land.

The Palestine Mandate was thus generally framed in the interests of the Zionist movement. It is true, of course, that the preamble repeated the stipulation of the Balfour Declaration that "nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." Article II of the Mandate also mentioned *inter alia* that the Mandatory Power was to be responsible for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine regardless of race and religion. Equally, Article VI of the Mandate added the proviso that the permission given

for Jewish immigration and land settlement was not to prejudice "the rights and position of other sections of the population." But it appears that these promises were disregarded by the British in the interests of the establishment of the Jewish national home.

The term "national home" was a somewhat novel one, whose exact connotations were not clear. The Zionists appear to have taken it for granted that the concept of a national home would lead to the establishment of a Jewish State. In any case, the ultimate settlement was determined by the considerable powers the British exercised under the Mandate, the use made by the Zionists of their opportunities and the resistance offered by the Arabs.

The Arabs contended that the terms of the Mandate conflicted with the League of Nations Covenant (Article 22), which included Palestine as among the communities belonging to the Turkish Empire that had reached a stage of development where their existence as an independent nation could be provisionally recognised. Another ground for Arab complaint was that the British war-time commitment to the Zionists conflicted with the explicit assurances given by the then British High Commissioner for Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, in October, 1915, to the Sheriff of Mecca. The latter had written to McMahon asking for Arab independence for the area limited "on the north by the Mersina-Adana line up to the 37th degree of latitude as far as the borders of Persia, on the east by the frontiers of Persia, up to the Gulf of Basra, on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of Aden, and on the west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina." The reply given by McMahon was that:

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modification and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs, we accept those limits and boundaries, and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interest of her ally, France."

During the inter-war years, there was steadily increasing Jewish immigration into the area, coupled with a matching resentment on

the part of the Arabs. The seeds had indeed been sown of an intense conflict in West Asia. Frequent outbursts of violence began to mark political developments in that region and there was increasing communal conflict in Palestine.

III

OPINION IN PRE-INDEPENDENCE INDIA

The growing tension in West Asia was a matter of concern for the political leaders of India and opinion rapidly crystallised on the fundamental issues arising out of the complex situation. Mahatma Gandhi had expressed his views in no uncertain terms about the problems in Palestine. It is worthwhile to quote him at length:

"My sympathies are all with the Jews. I have known them intimately in South Africa. Some of them became life-long companions. Through these friends, I came to learn much of their age-long persecution. They have been the untouchables of Christianity. The parallel between their treatment by Christians and the treatment of untouchables by Hindus is very close. Religious sanction has been invoked in both cases for justification of the inhuman treatment meted out to them. Apart from the friendships, therefore, there is more common universal reason for my sympathy for the Jews.

"But my sympathy does not blind me to the requirements of justice. The cry for a national home for the Jews does not make much appeal to me. The sanction for it is sought in the Bible and the tenacity with which the Jews have hankered after return to Palestine. Why should they not, like other people of the earth, make that country their home where they are born and where they earn their livelihood?

"Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English, or France to the French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs. What is going on in Palestine today, cannot be justified by any moral code of conduct. The mandates have no sanction but that of the last war. Surely, it would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to Jews, partly or wholly, as their national home.

"The nobler course would be to insist on a just treatment of the Jews, wherever they are born and bred. The Jews born in France are French in precisely the same sense that the Christians born in France are French. If the Jews have no home but Palestine, will they relish the idea of being forced to leave the other parts of the world in which they are settled? Or do they want a double home where they can remain at will? This cry for the national home affords a colourable justification for the German expulsion of the Jews."¹

The same views were expressed by Mahatma Gandhi on the eve of India's independence. Acknowledging the distinguished contribution made by the Jews to world civilization and pointing out the fact that they had been cruelly wronged in Europe, Mahatma Gandhi reiterated his views on Palestine on 14th July, 1946:

"But, in my opinion, they have erred grievously in seeking to impose themselves on Palestine with the aid of America and Britain and now with the aid of naked terrorism.....It is a blot on the Christian world that they have been singled out, owing to a wrong reading of the New Testament, for prejudice against them...

"No wonder that my sympathy goes out to the Jews in their unenviably sad plight. But, one would have thought, adversity would teach them lessons of peace. Why should they depend on American money or British arms for forcing themselves on an unwelcome land? Why should they resort to terrorism to make good their forcible landing in Palestine?"²

Nehru's Views

In 1933 Jawaharlal Nehru commented on the Palestine problem:

"Adjoining Syria is Palestine, for which the British Government holds a mandate from the League of Nations.... The people inhabiting it are predominantly Muslim Arabs, and they demand freedom and unity with their fellow-Arabs of

1. D.G. Tendulkar, *MAHATMA*, 1961 edition, Vol. IV, pp. 311-312.

2. D.G. Tendulkar, *MAHATMA*, 1962 edition, Vol. VII, 1945-47, pp. 158-159

Syria. But British policy has created a special minority problem here — that of the Jews — and the Jews side with the British and oppose the freedom of Palestine, as they fear that this would mean Arab rule. The two pull different ways and conflicts necessarily occur. On the Arab side are numbers, on the other side great financial resources and world-wide organisation of Jewry. So England pits Jewish religious nationalism against Arab nationalism, and makes it appear that her presence is necessary to act as an arbitrator and to keep the peace between the two."¹

In a note written in 1938 in the same book, Jawaharlal Nehru describes the ruthless measures adopted by the British to suppress Arab protests against the increasing Jewish immigration into Palestine:

"In April, 1936, the Palestine Arabs declared a general strike which lasted for nearly six months in spite of every attempt by British authorities, through military force and reprisals, to crush it. Huge concentration camps grew up after the well-known Nazi pattern..... The British Government has pursued and is pursuing a ruthless policy of destruction and killing, thereby seeking to crush the national struggle for freedom. Methods which are even worse than those employed in the Black and Tan era in Ireland are being practised in Palestine, and a heavy censorship hides them from the rest of the world. Yet what comes through is bad enough. I have read of Arab 'suspects' being herded together by the British military forces in huge barbed-wire enclosures called iron cages, each of these cages holding 50 to 400 prisoners, who are fed by their relations, literally like animals in a cage."

Further on, Nehru acknowledged that

"... it is a fact that the Jewish immigrants there have improved the country, introduced industries and raised standards of living."

but added that

"we must remember that Palestine is essentially an Arab country, and must remain so, and the Arabs must not be crushed and suppressed in their own homelands..."

1. *Glimpses of World History*.

Congress Resolutions

The Congress adopted resolutions from time to time on this complex question of Palestine and expressed its views. Meeting at Wardha (June 29 to July 1, 1936) the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress sent the following message to the Palestine Arabs:

"The Working Committee sends its greetings to the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle for Independence against British imperialism."

The President of the Indian National Congress at that time was Jawaharlal Nehru. The Working Committee included Acharya J. B. Kripalani, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Vallabhbhai Patel, Govind Ballabh Pant and Subhash Chandra Bose.

A similar view was expressed by the Indian National Congress in various other sessions. The All India Congress Committee meeting from October 29 to 31, 1937, passed the following resolution:

"The Committee record their emphatic protest against the reign of terror that has been established in Palestine by British imperialism with a view to coerce the Arabs into accepting the proposed position of Palestine and assure them of the solidarity of the Indian people with them in their struggle for national freedom."

At its Haripura session (February 19 to 21, 1938) the Indian National Congress adopted the following resolution on the Palestine situation:

"The Congress condemns the decision of Great Britain as a Mandatory Power to bring about the partition of Palestine in the teeth of the opposition of the Arabs and the appointment of a Commission to carry out this project. The Congress records its emphatic protest against the continuation of the reign of terror which is still being maintained in Palestine to force this policy upon the unwilling Arabs. The Congress expresses its full sympathy with the Arabs in their struggle for national freedom and their fight against British imperialism."

"The Congress holds that the proper method of solving the problem is by amicable settlement between themselves (Arabs and Jews) and appeals to the Jews not to seek the shelter of the British Mandatory and to allow themselves to be exploited in the interests of British imperialism."

The A.I.C.C., at its Delhi meeting in September, 1938, adopted another resolution in which it recalled that

"Since the Haripura Congress condemned the decision of Great Britain as a Mandatory Power to bring about the partition of Palestine in the teeth of the opposition of the Arabs... the A.I.C.C. regrets to find that the same policy is still being pushed with vigour and relentlessness."

Again at its 52nd Session (March 10 to 13, 1939) at Tripuri, the Indian National Congress recalled its earlier resolutions on the subject of Palestine and adopted yet another resolution, which *inter alia* stated:

"The courage, determination and sacrifices made by the Arabs in the struggle have evoked the admiration of the people of India who desire to convey to them again their feelings and good wishes for the complete success in the attainment of their objectives."

After expressing sympathy with the plight of the Jews in Europe and elsewhere at that time, the Congress deplored Jewish reliance on British arms and imperialism. The resolution went on to say:

"The Congress trusts that the Arabs and Jews will endeavour to find a basis for direct co-operation with a view to establishing an independent democratic state in Palestine with an adequate protection of Jewish rights."

It will thus be seen that the great leaders of India's freedom struggle were viewing the problem as primarily one of independence of the Arabs of Palestine from foreign rule. India was intensely anti-Fascist and there was deep sympathy with the Jews for their ill-treatment in Europe at the hands of various Fascist regimes and the great qualities of the Jewish people were fully recognised in India. But the humanitarian sympathy for the Jews did not lead to any support for

the proposal to partition Palestine; nor was there any hesitation to condemn the terrorist methods applied by certain Jewish organisations in Palestine. Attempts by Great Britain to bring about forcible partition of Palestine against the wishes of the majority of the population were also condemned. The political leaders of India also saw the similarity between the imperialist policies pursued in India and West Asia.

Nehru wrote in 1933:

"It is the same old game which we have seen in other countries under imperialist domination: it is curious how often it is repeated."¹

1. *Glimpses of World History*.

IV

PARTITION AND CREATION OF ISRAEL

When free India began to function as a vigorous member of the United Nations, one of the major problems faced by the world organisation was the problem of Palestine. Indeed, in the early years of the United Nations, the shape of post-war world politics was the real item on the agenda. This found its manifestation in two different phenomena: the growing conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and an intense struggle over the question of the dependent peoples between the colonial and anti-colonial powers. The Palestine question was itself inextricably linked up with the second phenomenon.

On 2 April, 1947, the British Government requested that a special session of the United Nations General Assembly be called "for the purpose of constituting and instructing a sub-committee to prepare for consideration, at the regular session of the Assembly," on the question of Palestine. This decision of the British Government was the result of the intensely hostile reaction of both the Arabs and the Jews to the White Paper issued by Britain in 1939 and the inability to find a meeting ground between the two contending groups. The White Paper had indicated that Jewish immigration would be stopped within a short period. The White Paper also ruled out unequivocally the establishment of a Jewish State and it was stated that the policy was to establish a Palestine State in which Arabs and Jews would jointly exercise governmental authority. It was also added in the White Paper that, if at the end of ten years it appeared to the British Government that circumstances required the postponement of the establishment of an independent Arab State, they would consult the representatives of the Palestine people, the League of Nations Council and neighbouring Arab States. Though the Arabs recognised that the 1939 White Paper went a long way towards meeting their basic claims, they did not fully endorse it in public. The Arab Higher Committee (representative of the Arab people in Palestine) repudiated the White Paper in a statement on 30th May, 1939. It was argued on their behalf that as the Mandatory Power persisted in recognising Jewish rights, the Arab cause was prejudiced. Moreover, non-coopera-

tion by the Jews could render illusory the promise of independence. The Jewish Agency on the other hand vehemently protested against the White Paper as a whole on the grounds that the Palestine Jews would be a permanent minority and under the domination of the Arabs. There was increased violence in Palestine and the Irgun (the terrorist Jewish organisation) was very active. There were also increased communal riots.

India's Role in UN General Assembly

The special session of the General Assembly was convened on 28th April, 1947. Apart from the item proposed by Great Britain, i.e. the constitution and instruction of a sub-committee, the Arab members of the United Nations had requested the inclusion of an additional item entitled "the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence." The representative of India generally supported the Arab position and their contention that the Mandate, which was based upon Article 22 of the League Covenant, violated the spirit of the latter by incorporating the Balfour Declaration and failing to take note of the wishes of the people of Palestine. He said that there should be no objection to the inclusion of the Arab proposal in the Agenda because the achievement of independence by Palestine was implicit in the very request of the United Kingdom, for the consideration at the next regular session of the Assembly of the question of the future government of Palestine. It was clear in the General Committee, however, that the weight of opinion was against the inclusion of the supplementary Arab item and eventually it was not adopted. The Chairman of the General Committee, Dr. Aranha of Brazil, declared that under the rules of procedure, the proposal must be either withdrawn or voted upon and accordingly the matter was put to vote. India abstained on the ground that since the sponsor did not want the vote, there was nothing that could appropriately be voted on. The representative of Egypt, sensing the mood of the Committee, had earlier announced that he did not wish to press the Arab proposal for a vote. He, however, declined to withdraw it on the ground that he had no instructions to do so. The motion was defeated by 8 votes to 1 with 5 abstentions.

There was considerable debate in the Assembly and its first Committee as to whether representatives of the majority groups in Palestine should be invited to express their views. Originally, the

resolution adopted specified only the Jewish Agency by name. However, at the instance of India it was decided that the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee should also be heard. The representatives of the two bodies addressed the Committee and also answered questions.

The first Committee considered the terms of reference of the proposed Special Committee to report on Palestine. The Arabs were most anxious to incorporate, in the terms of reference of the Special Committee, some provision whereby it would be obliged to relate all its plans and proposals to the eventual independence of Palestine. In this they were supported by the Indian representative. This was not found to be feasible owing to opposition from the majority of the members and accordingly the term "independence" was not mentioned in the terms of reference explicitly. The President, however, assured the Assembly that the independence of Palestine would naturally be borne in mind by members of the Special Committee. This statement was made after the representative of India had appealed for the maintenance of peace in Palestine.

The drafting of the resolution containing the Special Committee's mandate was subject to much procedural controversy. India, as we have seen, generally supported the Arab contention regarding the establishment of an independent State of Palestine. Finally the General Assembly adopted the resolution constituting the Special Committee, consisting of 11 members (including India and excluding the permanent members of the Security Council). The mandate of the Committee was to

"ascertain and record facts and to investigate all questions and views relevant to the problems of Palestine."

The Committee was also to give "most careful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity" and to submit by 1st September, 1947, to the General Assembly a report, including such proposals as it may consider proper for the solution of the problem of Palestine.

The UNSCOP Report

The UN Special Committee on Palestine held its first meeting on 26th May, 1947, and finalised its report on 31st August, 1947, after

visiting *inter alia* Jerusalem, Beirut and Damascus. A sub-Committee of UNSCOP was set up to visit displaced persons' camps in Germany and Austria. The UNSCOP also interviewed representatives of the Jewish Agency as well as other Jewish organisations. The Arab High Committee refused to meet UNSCOP but the Arab States met with UNSCOP in Beirut.

The Report of UNSCOP contained 12 recommendations, 11 of which were adopted unanimously, relating to the grant of independence, the need to preserve the sacred character of the holy places, the need to ensure respect for human rights, the rights of religious communities and of minorities and such other matters.

The Report contained a majority proposal for a plan of partition with economic union and a minority proposal for a plan for a federal State of Palestine. The majority plan (proposed by the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay) would have divided Palestine into an Arab State, a Jewish State and the City of Jerusalem. The latter was to be eventually treated as a trust territory. The details of the plan are now only of academic interest. It need only be pointed out that the proposed Arab and Jewish States would have become independent after a transitional period of two years and would enter into a treaty providing for an economic union of Palestine. Boundaries for both Arab and Jewish States were proposed.

The minority plan (proposed by India, Iran and Yugoslavia) called for an independent federal state comprising an Arab State and a Jewish State "with Jerusalem as the capital". There was to be a single Palestine nationality and citizenship, even though boundaries were laid down in the minority plan of the proposed Arab and Jewish areas of the federal state. The federal government would have powers in relation to such matters as defence, foreign affairs, immigration and currency, while the constituent units would enjoy full local self-government.

Jewish Population in Palestine

At this juncture, it might be pertinent to refer to the origin of Jewish immigration and the number of Jews actually present in Palestine. The following extract from the summary of a reply by the Jewish Agency to a question put by the representatives of India,

at the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly, is self-explanatory:

"With regard to the question of the Indian representative, the figures of the Jewish population in Palestine were 50,000 in 1900, 165,000 in 1930 and 475,000 in 1939. At present, it was about 630,000 and was greater than the Arab population at the end of the First World War. In one sense they were all immigrants: the return had started in the early 1880's and had been practically continuous since then; but in another sense they were not 'from outside' as they were all convinced of their right to return."

So, according to the statement of the Jewish Agency itself, prior to the early 1880's there had hardly been any Jews in Palestine. The Arab High Committee, replying to another question put by the Indian representative, gave the following figures:

"The number of Jews in Palestine had increased as follows: for 1900: no official figures; in 1928: 56,000 Jews; in 1930: 165,000 Jews; in 1939: 445,000 Jews. Between 1920 and 1930, 105,000 Jewish immigrants had entered Palestine, between 1931 and 1939, 218,000. These were figures of registered immigrants. Since 1939, not including illegal immigrants, over 100,000 Jewish immigrants had entered the country."

According to a standard work on the Middle East, in 1918, Palestine had a population of about 700,000 of whom 10% were Jews, rather less were Christian Arabs and over four-fifths were Muslim Arabs. It is also pointed out that, whereas in 1918, the Arabs outnumbered the Jews by ten to one, by 1938 they only outnumbered them by two to one.¹

The tremendous increase in Jewish population in Palestine was undoubtedly the result of the persecution of Jews in Europe. As Earl Berger points out in his book *The Covenant and the Sword*:

"Zionism was a failure until Hitler came to power. Outside of East European Jewry few people were willing to go and actually live in Palestine. Between the 1880's and 1927 the

1. *The Middle East*, 1963, Europa Publications, p. 170.

Jewish population in Palestine rose from about 25,000 to just under 150,000 thereby forming one-seventh of Palestine's total population. Impressive as this accomplishment was Zionism was rapidly failing....Not only did immigration shoot up to over 60,000 in 1935 but membership in various Zionist and pro-Zionist organisations doubled and trebled. Jews everywhere were made aware of their vulnerability. No European Jewish community had seemed safer or farther along the road to assimilation than that in Germany. Now, not only were Jews being slaughtered, but those who escaped found it difficult to obtain refuge in the 'liberal democratic' countries only because, so it seemed, they were Jews....The Jews were determined to have a place of their own. In their eyes Nazism was the culmination of centuries of persecution; the Gentile could not be trusted....Hitler had made Jews everywhere aware of their Jewishness, of their vulnerability. That vulnerability had to be ended."

The moral argument regarding the creation of the State of Israel essentially rests on this view that the very survival of the Jews as a community necessitated the establishment of a Jewish State.

It is, however, difficult to see what the moral or legal grounds were for carving out such a State from Palestine which was essentially Arab. As Arnold Toynbee, in his *Study of History*, points out: "The Syriac parochial state of Judah, from which Jewry was derived, had been one of a number of Hebrew, Phoenician, Aramaean and Philistine communities." It is true that while "Judah's sister communities lost their identity as well as their statehood as a result of fatal injuries which the Syriac society had sustained from successive collisions with its Babylonian and Hellenic neighbours the same challenges had stimulated the Jews to create for themselves a new mode of corporate existence (with the distinctively Jewish ethos and institutions — a meticulous devotion to the Mosaic law and a consummate virtuosity in commerce and finance) in which they had managed to survive the loss of their state and their country by preserving their identity as a diaspora (dispersion) among an alien majority and under alien rule." But this ability to survive or the persecution of Jewry does not give the Jews the legal or moral right to claim Palestine. The non-Jewish supporters of Israel in Europe are really appeasing their conscience for the past persecution of the Jews. It seems curious that the Arabs should be expected to wipe off the guilt-complex of the West. To quote again

from Arnold Toynbee:

"Of all the sombre ironies of history none throws a more sinister light on human nature than the fact that the new-style nationalist Jews, on the morrow of the most appalling of the many persecutions that their race had endured, should at once proceed to demonstrate, at the expense of Palestinian Arabs whose only offence against the Jews was that Palestine was their ancestral home, that the lesson learnt by Zionists from the sufferings which the Nazis had inflicted on the Jews was not to forebear from committing the crime of which they themselves had been the victims, but to persecute, in their turn, a people weaker than they were. The Israeli Jews did not follow in the Nazis' footsteps to the extent of exterminating the Palestinian Arabs in concentration camps and gas chambers; but they did dispossess the majority of them, to the number of more than half a million, of the lands which they and their fathers had occupied and cultivated for generations, and of the property that they were unable to carry with them in their flight, and thereby they reduced them to destitution as 'displaced persons'."

The Second Session of the General Assembly

The second session of the General Assembly established an *Ad hoc* Committee of the Whole on Palestine and referred to it the UNSCOP Report, the earlier proposal of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabian and Iraqi proposals calling for the recognition of Palestine's independence. The Arabs, as before, rejected both the majority and the minority plans. The Zionists were prepared to settle for the majority plan even though they characterised it as getting "half a loaf". Three sub-committees were appointed and various modifications were suggested with a view to arrive at an agreed solution. Ultimately, however, the majority plan submitted by UNSCOP was adopted by the General Assembly with some modifications. The plan of partition with economic union was adopted by vote — 33 in favour to 13 against and 10 abstentions. India voted against the plan, together with the Arab countries, and Afghanistan, Cuba, Greece, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The countries abstaining included several Latin American countries and Ethiopia, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. The other permanent members of the Security Council were in favour of the plan of partition.

The text of the partition plan is contained in resolution 181 (II)A and was adopted on 29th November, 1947. The resolution also provided for the establishment of a 5-member UN Palestine Commission consisting of Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and the Philippines. This Commission was to take over the administration of Palestine in the interim period before the attainment of independence by the two States.

The Security Council was asked to supplement the authorisation of the General Assembly by taking measures, if necessary, under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter to empower the Commission to exercise in Palestine the functions assigned to it by the Resolution. The Council was also requested to determine as a threat to peace any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the Partition Resolution.

The changes brought about in the Resolution with regard to the UNSCOP majority plan mainly concerned the question of boundaries, transition period and implementation. The proposed Jewish State was to be reduced in size from 6,000 to 5,500 sq. miles and was to include approximately 55 per cent of the total land area of Palestine. The city of Jaffa was to be transferred to the proposed Arab States together with some 500,000 acres in the Negev, in the vicinity of the town of Beersheba as well as along the Mediterranean Sea and the Egyptian frontier. The mandate was to terminate not later than 1st August, 1948, by which time Britain was to withdraw all its armed forces. The independent Arab and Jewish States and the special regime in the city of Jerusalem were to come into existence two months after the British military evacuation but not later than 1st October, 1948.

It might be desirable to point out here that one of the sub-committees set up by the *Ad hoc* Committee on Palestine had recommended three draft resolutions for consideration of the *Ad hoc* Committee. The first draft resolution would have the General Assembly request the International Court of Justice for an Advisory opinion on various legal aspects of the problem of Palestine and the capacity of the United Nations to take action in this regard. The second draft resolution called for the establishment of a unitary and independent state of Palestine with safeguard for minorities. The third draft resolution would have the General Assembly recommend that the countries of origin should take back Jewish refugees and dis-

placed persons belonging to them and that those who cannot be so repatriated should be absorbed by the members of the United Nations on a quota basis.

In the Committee, India supported reference to the International Court of Justice of only the question whether the UN was competent to enforce or recommend any plan of partition contrary to the wishes, or adopted without the consent of the inhabitants of Palestine. Since India favoured a federal solution, India remained neutral on the second resolution urging the establishment of a unitary state; and she supported the third resolution on the question of displaced Jews in Europe.

The General Assembly, however, voted upon the Partition Plan as proposed by the First Sub-Committee. As pointed out above, India voted against it.

It may be interesting to also indicate how voting in the UN on this crucial issue was said to have been managed by some Great Powers. The diplomatic correspondent of *The Observer*, London, in Washington, Susan Strange, later described the process of voting on this subject in a contribution to *The Year Book of World Affairs* (London, 1949). She said:

"The final explanation why the partition decision was accepted after all by the Assembly lies, unmistakably, in the record of the voting of the last few days. In the *Ad hoc* Committee, the partition plan needed only a majority of the fifty-seven members; in the Assembly it needed two-thirds. On the first occasion, the vote was twenty-five for, thirteen against and seventeen abstentions, with two absent (i.e. twenty-five to thirty-two). The final vote, by the same fifty-seven delegations was thirty-three for, thirteen against, ten abstentions and one absent. The Arabs have not, I think, proved their case conclusively, but it is at least more than likely that some pressure from Washington was exerted to bring this about. It definitely was not done in New York, but through the foreign embassies abroad. Some delegations, like that of New Zealand, changed from abstention to agreement rather than leave the Assembly deadlocked. The Philippine delegation, on the other hand, which had first of all abstained, saying flatly it could not support any proposal for the political disunion and

the territorial dismemberment of Palestine, suffered a change of delegate with a 'change of instructions' from home and voted 'yes'. The two influences together accounted for the difference.

"Finally, a ruling of President Aranha (Brazil voted for partition but would have preferred a federal plan if possible) clinched the question. There were two chances before that final plenary session to return the entire problem to the *Ad hoc* Committee which then would have worked on its own as a sort of rump Assembly. An Iranian resolution, using M. Chamoun's 'six principles' harked back to the federal plan. A Colombian resolution wanted another try at compromise. Deciding that the partition resolution had to be voted on first, the President left no further chance for second thoughts. The roll call began."

After the Adoption of the Plan

After the partition decision was taken, the Arab Higher Committee condemned it as null and void and announced that it would not co-operate in its implementation but would request the British Government to hand over Palestine forthwith to "its Arab peoples". Thereafter, sporadic attacks against the Jews began on November 30, 1947 and gradually turned into organised country-wide warfare. The goal appeared to be to induce the Zionists by force of arms to accept a final political settlement on Arab terms. In the first half of January, 1948, some 2,000 volunteers crossed the border from Syria under the sponsorship of the Arab League. For the Arabs, therefore, the struggle for political independence had been reduced essentially to a military undertaking. The Zionists, on the other hand, had got their right to independence confirmed in principle by the General Assembly. While extreme Zionists and the Jewish terrorist organisations still refused to accept as final anything less than a Jewish State comprising Palestine and Trans-Jordan, the more moderate elements appeared to be content to settle for the partition solution contained in the General Assembly Resolution.

Until the end of March, 1948, the Arabs with the aid of an estimated six to seven thousand volunteers from nearby countries appeared to be achieving their military objectives. But early in April,

the Israeli Haganah reversed the trend of battle and registered a chain of victories which placed in Jewish possession most of the important towns including Haifa, Tiberias, Safad, Jaffa, Acre and the bulk of the new city of Jerusalem. Mention should be made here of the massacre on 9th April, 1948 by Israeli extremist elements of hundreds of women and children in the Jerusalem Arab suburb of Dayr Yasin. This, coupled with the military defeats and lack of political leadership on the part of the Arabs, caused their general demoralisation.

By the middle of May, 1948, an estimated 200,000 Arabs had already fled their homes seeking sanctuary in neighbouring countries. When the Mandatory finally laid down its governmental authority there were no Arab political institutions to fill the void.

The Jews on their part had begun to establish their authority over the zones assigned to them by the General Assembly's Resolution. They consolidated their hold over the coastal plain and eastern Galilee, but their ability to retain the Negev was still in doubt. A provisional national council of 38 members, based on the estimated relative strength of the several political parties and groups (except the terrorists) elected a Provisional Cabinet of 13, with Ben Gurion as Premier and Minister of Defence. On 14th May, 1948, the Provisional Government issued its declaration of independence and announced the creation of the State of Israel.

Conflict in Palestine

On 15th May, units of the regular armed forces of Trans-Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt, together with a minimal force from Saudi Arabia, were sent to Palestine for combat with Israel. The Secretary General of the Arab League stated at that time that because of the end of the mandate there was no legally constituted authority to administer law and order and afford necessary protection of life and property. The conflict had been started by Zionist aggression and imperialistic motives. The Arab States proposed to restore peace and law and order and then hand over the Government to the Palestine Arabs. However, they failed to achieve their objective before the first U.N. Truce began on 11th June, for four weeks. Initially, the Arabs had a military advantage. However, with the lapse of time the Israelis were able to acquire arms from Europe and elsewhere. A number of Jewish veterans of World War II were also recruited in

the Israeli Army. The first Truce expired on 9th July, 1948 and thereafter, despite urgent appeals by the Mediator (appointed in terms of the General Assembly Resolution referred to above) hostilities were resumed. Israel, which had its principal ambitions satisfied, agreed to extension of the Truce but the Arabs did not. Another Truce was eventually concluded, to commence from 18th July, 1948, in response to a Security Council Resolution adopted under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter. During these ten days the military position of the Arabs worsened. Nevertheless, fighting in Palestine did not cease even with the entry into force of the second Truce. There was sporadic fighting and serious hostilities again commenced in October, 1948. The Israelis drove the Arab Liberation Army from the upper Galilee into Lebanon and on 15th October opened an offensive against the Egyptian front, running from Isdud to Beit Jibiran. On 20th October, they captured Beersheba and Beit Hanum cutting the Egyptian line of communication. On 22nd October, the cease-fire proposed by the Security Council was accepted by both sides. The uncertain truce lasted only till 19th November, when an Egyptian force attempted to relieve pressure on a besieged garrison by advancing from the Gaza Strip to the Narin. On 22nd December, the Israelis renewed their offensive and captured El Auja and Aub Aweigila and advanced towards Rafah and El Arish where they halted.

Although disregarded during the operations in the south and in the north, the Security Council's order of 15th July to the combatants to observe a truce was still in force at that time. Eventually, negotiations began on the Greek Island of Rhodes in January, 1949, and led to the conclusion of the General Armistice Agreements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria on the other. It may be added that Israel occupied the southern Negev, including the present site of the port of Eilat, after the Armistice Agreement with Egypt had been signed.

The Armistice Agreements and the Situation with regard to Eilat

As pointed out above, negotiations for the conclusion of general armistice agreements commenced in Rhodes from January, 1949 onwards. The Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement which was the first to be concluded set the pattern for the other armistice agreements. In the negotiations between Egypt and Israel, the points

of departure of the two parties were radically different. The Israeli delegation demanded complete withdrawal of Egyptian forces beyond the mandatory boundary. The Egyptians insisted on the terms of the Security Council Resolution of 4th November, 1948 when both sides were requested to withdraw from positions captured after 14th October, 1948. They demanded that Israel forces be withdrawn north of the Majdal-Faluja line, except for Jewish settlements south of it. Acceptance of this demand would have meant renunciation by Israel of the southern Negev, withdrawal from El Auja and Beersheba. On the initiative of the Acting Mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, an agreement was first reached between the parties not to renew hostilities. Later, the Armistice Agreement was eventually concluded on 24th February, 1949. One important bargaining point for the Israelis was that one Egyptian contingent, headed by Col. (now President) Nasser, had been surrounded at Faluja. Israel refused to allow evacuation of this contingent until a settlement acceptable to it was arrived at. Ultimately, after obtaining the demilitarisation of El Auja and its vicinity and the establishment of the Mixed Armistice Commission's headquarters there, Egypt tacitly admitted that Beersheba should go to Israel and signed the Agreement. It also appears that Egypt withdrew her claims to the southern Negev. This territory, it may be remembered, had been allotted to the Jewish state under the Assembly's Partition Plan of 29th November, 1947. However, Israel had not been able to extend its territory beyond Al Auja up to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. In the meanwhile, Jordan was claiming effective military control over this area and demanded that the southern Negev be allotted to it up to the Egyptian border. In this light, Israel sought to establish control over this area as rapidly as possible before concluding the Armistice Agreement with Jordan. From available accounts it appears that Israeli troops surreptitiously moved up to Um Reshresh (later renamed Eilat) and occupied it on 10th March, 1949.

It should be noted that this area was taken over after talks had commenced with Trans-Jordan (and the Lebanon) for the conclusion of armistice agreements. Israel used as bargaining points its military occupation of areas in the other Arab states and ultimately armistice agreements were arrived at with three remaining Arab states (Lebanon, Jordan and Syria). The armistice demarcation lines generally coincided with the mandatory boundaries excepting for certain departures (in the case of Syria and Jordan). There was provision made for demilitarised zones along the Syrian border and also special provision

certain border villages on the Israeli-Jordan armistice line. As stated by Dr. Ralph Bunche, the purpose of demilitarisation was to safeguard territorial rights until the final settlement, to separate the military forces which would be evacuated from the demilitarised zones and to make it possible for normal civilian life to be resumed.

Admission of Israel to the United Nations

Israel was admitted to the United Nations on 11th May, 1949. Israel's first application of 29th November, 1948 had not been accepted by the Security Council owing to a large number of abstentions. On 24th February, 1949, Israel applied again and the Security Council adopted a draft resolution proposed by the United States recommending Israel's admission by 9 votes to 1 (Egypt) and with one abstention (the U.K.).

The matter now went to the General Assembly for its concurrence. In the Assembly, the representative of Israel was put a number of questions by various representatives, relating to his government's position on the Assembly's decision to set up an international regime for Jerusalem (Resolution of 29th November, 1947), on the subject of Palestine refugees and on other related questions. The Israeli representative gave somewhat equivocal answers. This is shown by the statements of the representatives of El Salvador and Belgium to the effect that, as they were not satisfied with the answers of the Israeli representative concerning his country's readiness to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, they would have to abstain from voting. Despite this, on 11th May, 1949, the General Assembly, by 37 votes to 12, with 9 abstentions, admitted Israel to membership in the United Nations. Besides the six Arab States, Afghanistan, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Iran and Pakistan voted against this resolution. It may also be useful to cite here the following preambular paragraph from the resolution:

"Recalling its resolutions of 29th November, 1947, and 11th December, 1948, and taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of the Government of Israel before the *Ad hoc* Political Committee in respect of the implementation of the said resolutions."

The resolution of 11th December, 1948, referred to above,

provides *inter alia* for the right of Palestine refugees to repatriation and compensation.

The extent of Israeli territory as compared to the area allotted to the Jewish State by the Assembly Resolution No. 181(II)A may be mentioned. Under the partition plan in the General Assembly resolution, the Jewish State was to get approximately 5,500 sq. miles of the territory of the Palestine, which as a whole was 10,423 sq. miles. The present area of Israel, according to the latest figures available, is said to be 7,993 sq. miles, that is to say 45% in excess of that authorised by the U.N. Resolution.

India and Israel

India recognised Israel on 17th September, 1950. No diplomatic relations were established though Israel was permitted to have a Consul at Bombay. It was also stated on behalf of India at this time that the recognition of Israel did not mean endorsing the Israeli position regarding its boundaries.

In this connection, the following report in *The Hindu*, which explained the Indian position, may be of some interest:

"India's decision, it is emphasised, does not affect her feelings of friendship towards the Arab countries and India will always value the friendship of Egypt and other Arab States.

"India and Egypt, it is pointed out here, had differed over the Korean question and the recognition of Communist China, but this fact has not affected in any way their friendly relations. India, it is stated, would continue to work for full justice and humane treatment of Arab refugees and would exert her influence to secure justice to these refugees.

"The recognition of Israel, it is officially stated, does not mean that there is no difference between India's attitude and that of Israel over questions like the status of Jerusalem and Israel's frontiers. These questions would be judged by India on merits and due regard would be given to Arab claims.

"A message from Alexandria, earlier, stated:

"India has told Egypt that she will continue to support Arab questions in the United Nations even if India decides to recognise the State of Israel.

"This was announced here to-night by Egypt's Acting Foreign Minister Ibrahim Farag. It was in reply to an Egyptian request about Indian recognition of Israel." (*The Hindu*, 18th September, 1950).

V

THE CONTINUING CONFLICT

Partly as a result of the manner in which Israel was brought into being and partly as a result of the behaviour of the new Israeli State, a continuing state of tension and conflict between the Arab countries and Israel became the dominant feature of West Asian politics after 1948. What was more, the use of force and direct military confrontation became an accepted method of improving one's bargaining position. The Israelis continued to have the advantage in such armed show of force and the Arabs smarted under a sense of defeat. Most of the questions, which were time and again discussed in the United Nations, related to the observance of the Armistice Lines.

1951

On 18th May, 1951, the Security Council adopted a resolution (S/2157) by 10 votes to none, with one abstention (the U.S.S.R.). The Resolution referred to the various complaints of Syria and Israel and to the reports submitted by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). It may be noted that the Chief of Staff and the Chairman of ISMAC (Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission) had on a number of occasions requested the Israeli delegation to cease all operations in the demilitarised zone pending an agreement under the aegis of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Council also specifically found that aerial action taken by Israeli forces on 5th April, 1951, as well as "any aggressive military action by either of the parties in or around the demilitarised zone which may be established, constitutes a violation of the cease-fire provision in the Security Council Resolution of 15th July, 1948, and are also inconsistent with the Armistice Agreements and the Charter provisions."

On 11th July, 1951, Israel requested a Security Council meeting to consider the question of "restrictions imposed by Egypt on the passage of ships through the Suez Canal." Israel claimed that these

restrictions were inconsistent with the Armistice Agreements as also with the principle of the freedom of seas especially as contained in the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. The Egyptian Representative argued that his country was exercising a right of war as it still maintained the status of a belligerency *vis-a-vis* Israel. He also referred to the various legal aspects of the matter touching upon rights of belligerency and the like. The Representative of India hoped that the Security Council would not formally take up the question which was a complicated one involving national rights and obligations and of international law. He agreed that the Security Council was not the most appropriate body to adjudicate on questions involving complicated legal issues. Ultimately, a resolution was adopted by the Council on 1st September, 1951, (S/2322) by a vote of eight in favour, none against and three abstentions (China, India and the U.S.S.R.). The Resolution declared that Egypt could not continue the practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel and that Egypt should terminate restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound. Egypt, however, refused to comply with the resolution pointing out that the resolution was only recommendatory.

1953

In 1953, the Security Council had occasion to consider the so-called Qibya incident. It was alleged by Jordan that, on 14th October, 1953, a battalion-scale attack had been launched by Israel on the village of Qibya in Jordan. Several buildings had been destroyed and the loss of life amounted to more than 42 Arab civilians. On 24th November, 1953, the Council adopted a resolution (S/3139/Rev 2) by nine votes to none with two abstentions (Lebanon and the U.S.S.R.). Part 'A' of the Resolution stated that the reported action at Qibya "and all such actions" constituted a violation of the Cease-fire provisions and were inconsistent with the Parties' obligations under the General Armistice Agreements and the Charter. The Council also expressed "the strongest censure of that action..." and called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent "all such actions in the future." Part 'B' of the Resolution took note of the fact that there was substantial evidence of the crossing of the demarcation line by unauthorised persons often resulting in violence and requested the Government of Jordan "to continue and strengthen the measures which they are already taking to prevent such crossings."

In 1953, the question of Israeli work on the west bank of the river Jordan in the demilitarised zone was also taken up at the instance of Syria. The Israeli Representative gave an undertaking on behalf of his Government to suspend the work pending examination by the Security Council and a unanimous resolution was adopted on the initiative of the Representative of France to the effect that the Council noted with satisfaction the statement made by the Representative of Israel (S/3128, 27th October, 1953).

The Security Council proceeded with its examination of the question but could not reach any conclusion by the end of 1953. In the course of the debate the U.K. Representative pointed out that the Report of the Chief of Staff and the various statements made in the Council had clearly established the following facts:

- "(1) that the Palestine Electric Corporation had begun to dig in the demilitarised zone a canal which would take water to a power station on Israel territory;
- (2) that, being informed of the work some time after it had started, General Bennike had asked the Government of Israel to ensure that the authority which had started the work should be instructed to suspend working in the zone so long as agreement had not been arranged; and
- (3) that, after an exchange of communications with General Bennike, the Government of Israel had not complied with that request."

(U.N. Year Book, 1953, p. 229.)

The U.K. Representative endorsed the position taken by General Bennike and regretted the fact that Israel had ignored his request. However, the Western Powers did not want to condemn Israel explicitly for this action and instead proposed a vaguely worded resolution (S/3151/Rev 2). This draft was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. on the grounds of its inadequacy.

1955

In 1954 as a test case Israel sought to send a cargo boat *Bat Galim* through the Suez and the UAR confiscated the ship and cargo.

The Security Council considered the matter during five meetings in 1954 and two further meetings in January, 1955. No resolution was adopted by the Council.

On 29th March, 1955, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution proposed by France, the United Kingdom and the United States relating to condemnation of an attack by Israel against the Egyptian armed forces in the Gaza Strip on 28th February, 1955 (S/3378). The facts of the case briefly were that on 28th February, Israeli armed forces had crossed the Armistice Line east of Gaza and attacked an Egyptian military camp resulting in the killing of 39 persons and injury to another 32. The Security Council Resolution was couched in strong terms and referred to the finding of the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission that the attack had been pre-planned and had involved the use of regular Israeli armed forces. Two paragraphs may be cited from the Resolution:

"(The Security Council) condemns this attack as a violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Security Council resolution of 15th July, 1948, and as inconsistent with the obligations of the parties under the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel and under the Charter;

"Calls again upon Israel to take all the necessary measures to prevent such actions;"

The 1956 Crisis

The year 1956 began with a Security Council resolution (19th January, 1956) relating to the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Line. According to a Syrian complaint, Israeli armed forces had attacked the Syrian armed forces on Syrian territory east of lake Tiberias on the night of 11/12th December, 1955. In the course of the debate in the Council all members of the Council "condemned the attack launched by Israel against Syria on 11th December, 1955, criticised Israel's policy of retaliation and warned Israel that another transgression would compel the Council to consider what further measures under the Charter were required to maintain or restore the peace." (U.N. Year Book, 1956, p. 4.)

It was pointed out by some members (Australia, China, Cuba,

France and Britain) that the Israeli attack was not justified even though there had been illegal Syrian interference with Israeli activities in the area of lake Tiberias. Iran, the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia took the view that there was no relation between the two as the report of the UNTSO Chief of Staff had not referred to such incidents prior to the Israeli attack.

The Security Council Resolution (S/3538) was strongly worded and condemned the Israeli attack. The resolution added that interference by the Syrian authorities with Israeli activities on lake Tiberias "in no way justifies the Israeli action."

The Security Council also adopted two resolutions on 4th April, 1956 (S/3562 and Corr. 1) and on 4th June, 1956 (S/3605). These resolutions were based upon the reports of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the degree of compliance with the General Armistice Agreement. According to the report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Israel had not agreed to U.N. Military Observers investigating certain incidents on the Jordan-Israel sector. In another report the Chief of Staff of UNTSO pointed out that the Israeli interference inside the demilitarised zone on the Syrian Armistice Line went beyond what was needed for the protection of the civilian population and that his request to Israel that the works be dismantled had been disregarded.

The Tripartite Aggression

The Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 was ostensibly brought about by Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal. But the attack represented something deeper — an attempt to resuscitate western presence in West Asia. When President Nasser, on 26th July, 1956, announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, India expressed sympathy for Egyptian aspirations and appreciated the larger significance of the Egyptian action. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal, Prime Minister Nehru declared, was symptomatic of the weakening of the domination by European Powers over West Asia which had lasted for over a hundred years. "Asia is on the march, and is emerging to take its rightful place in world affairs," he said. The old relationship between the West Asian countries and Europe was changing and ought to change, said Mr. Nehru, but the question was whether it should change through war or through peaceful means.

Mr. Nehru repeatedly made clear that the foremost consideration must be to strive for a "calmer atmosphere and rational outlook". Thus, when the Menzies Mission planned to visit Cairo, India, in spite of her disagreement with that plan, urged the Egyptian Government to receive the Mission. India would be very happy, said Shri Krishna Menon, if negotiations with Egypt were started on any plan and added that "any attempt at conciliation deserves India's support."

Notwithstanding the failure of the Menzies Mission India tirelessly worked to bring about peaceful negotiation. India not being a member of the Security Council could only press her diplomatic efforts outside, meeting and discussing alternative compromise proposals with Britain, France, Egypt and other important countries as well as with the United Nations Secretary-General. Finally it was the Indian proposal which formed the basis for the six principles laid down in the Security Council resolution namely, free and open transit, respect for Egyptian sovereignty, insulation from the politics of any country, fixation of tolls by agreement between Egypt and the users, a fair proportion of dues to be allotted to development and unsolved disputes between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company to be settled by arbitration. Having worked all along to keep the problem on the negotiating table, India was happy with the unanimous adoption of the Security Council resolution.

However, India found herself deceived of her optimism by the sudden Israeli aggression on Egypt on 29th October, 1956, followed by the Anglo-French invasion two days later. The reaction of the Government and people of India to this triple aggression on Egypt was quick and vigorous. Nehru branded Israeli action as a case of "clear, naked aggression." As to the Anglo-French action, Nehru said: "In the middle of the 20th century, we are going back to the predatory method of the 18th and 19th centuries." But, added Nehru, there was a difference now; there were self-respecting, independent nations in Asia and Africa which were not going to tolerate this kind of incursion by the colonial Powers. He condemned the trend towards a revival of colonialism as indicated by the use of force by the Great Powers against weak nations. India took a forthright stand in condemning "this record of unabashed aggression and deception" jointly and severally by Israel, Britain and France. India openly declared that "her sympathies are with Egypt".

When hopes of Security Council intervention were foiled by

the Anglo-French veto, India actively supported the efforts to bring about an emergency session of the General Assembly as provided for in the Assembly's "Uniting for Peace Resolution" [377(v)]. In the General Assembly which met on 1st November, 1956 to consider the situation arising out of Israeli and Anglo-French aggression, India supported the resolution sponsored by the United States which urged immediate cease-fire by all parties, halting of movement of military forces and withdrawal of forces behind armistice lines. The resolution was adopted by the Assembly on 2nd November, 1956. India repeatedly insisted that vacation of aggression should be unconditional saying that "we do not think that the parties who have committed aggression can lay down the condition upon which they will withdraw". The Assembly also passed on 4th November, 1956, a 19-nation Asian-African resolution, piloted by the Indian representative, which noted that not all parties had as yet agreed to cease-fire or to withdraw their forces and urged full compliance of the earlier resolution by all the parties. On the same day, the Assembly passed (with India fully supporting) a resolution requesting the United Nations Secretary-General to submit a plan for setting up a United Nations emergency force in the area to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities. India was a member of the 7-nation Advisory Committee established by the United Nations to advise the Secretary-General regarding the establishment and operation of the proposed emergency forces.

Again on 24th November, 1956, India, together with other 18 Asian and African nations sponsored a resolution pressing for the withdrawal of Israeli-Anglo-French forces from Egypt. The Anglo-French forces completed their withdrawal on 22nd December. India co-sponsored two further resolutions on 19th January and 2nd February, 1957, deploring non-compliance of United Nations resolutions by Israel. Israel completed withdrawal of its forces only in the first week of March 1957.

India was one of the 24 members of the United Nations which offered their forces for the United Nations Emergency Force and one of the ten countries from which forces were actually accepted. The Government of India made it clear that the force could not be in any sense a recognition of aggression i.e. it was not a successor to the Anglo-French forces, that it was not an occupation force, that the duty of the forces was to protect Egypt-Israeli armistice lines, and that the force was in Egypt with Egypt's consent.

Thus, throughout the period of the Suez crisis, the Government of India played a principled and constructive role. India felt vindicated when under mounting world pressure Israel vacated her aggression and civilian administration in Gaza was restored to Egypt.

The Position Taken by India in the U.N. in 1956-57

The role played by India in the 1956 crisis is widely known and hardly needs further elaboration. As already indicated India under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru fully supported Egypt's sovereign rights over the Suez Canal, opposed all ideas of enforced internationalisation of the Canal, criticised the formation of the Suez Canal Users Association and condemned the tripartite aggression. India also played a major role in the United Nations in order to restore peace in the region.

Speaking at the First Emergency Session of the General Assembly in November, 1956, the Indian representative stated that there had been released over Egypt and its people a manifestation of the law of the jungle instead of the law of peace and the law of nations as enshrined in the Charter. A mockery was being made of the Charter, and the organs of the United Nations were being affronted by aggression and invasion. This appalling state of affairs demanded an immediate remedy which would directly replace folly and inhumanity by peace and justice. The Indian representative then quoted Prime Minister Nehru:

"The sudden invasion of Egypt by Israel was a breach of the armistice and of the United Nations. It was clear and naked aggression. In such circumstances when every United Nations Member should have tried to stop the invasion, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to Egypt."

Speaking at the 567th Meeting of the Assembly, Shri Krishna Menon explained the position of India in relation to the nineteen-power draft Resolution (later adopted as Res. 999-ES-1) and made it plain that the developments in relation to Egypt had shocked "our country, our people and our government, indeed our part of the world." Shri Krishna Menon also added that India did not believe that parties which had committed aggression could lay down the

conditions under which they were willing to withdraw. The United Nations had requested them to withdraw as part of the termination of that aggression. India refused to accept the position that the invading forces could lay down conditions, ostensibly in the interest of the invaded party, because that would seem to justify the invasion itself; and that was a position which the Government of India was not prepared to accept.

Throughout the General Assembly discussion in 1956, India consistently urged that there should be first an unconditional withdrawal by foreign forces from Egyptian territory.

At the 665th Meeting of the General Assembly on 1st March, 1957, Shri Krishna Menon made a major statement on the West Asian situation. In explaining the position of the Government of India, he stressed that the question of withdrawal of the invading forces should not be mixed up with the history of the Palestine question. To quote his words:

"My objective in coming here is to place before the Assembly without any ambiguity the position of my Government on the subject matter of this resolution and the central issue which it covers. First of all, let me state what that issue is. That issue is not the Israel-Arab dispute. That issue is not all those procedures that arise from the establishment of the mandate in Palestine or from the resolutions of 1947, or from the Armistice Agreements of 1949, or from the series of Security Council resolutions. That issue is one and one only; that a Member State, namely Egypt, was invaded by three countries, namely the two powerful empires of the United Kingdom and France, and Israel, which, in disregard of the principles of international morality and law, invaded the territory of Egypt. Afterwards, however, the United Kingdom and France made recompense for their action by their obedience to the resolutions of the United Nations with far greater promise than this smaller and newer country has shown."

Shri Krishna Menon also referred to the views of the Canadian delegation that the crisis in West Asia should be utilised "to solve what is called the Middle East problems." Shri Menon pointed out that while India held the view that there must be a solution to this somehow, some time, "it can only be found in cooperation and in terms of

co-existence and of the recognition of the legitimate rights of the sovereignties of people. What is more, it has to be a gradual process." He went on to say:

"To try to use the invasion, the fruit of the invasion as a part of this book of invasion with the chapter of settlement is incongruous. Therefore, any such attempt that the Canadian Government seems to be so insistent upon, to try and build into this problem a specific solution, is to try to mix oil and water — and they will not mix."

Shri Krishna Menon also pointed out that things have to be taken in their stride and

"any attempt to try to bite off more than we can chew at the present time and to go away from the fundamental problem that is before us — this item that is before us is not the Arab — Israel question — would not be advisable."

The Question of Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran

Israel tried to raise the question of navigation through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba as an integral part of the cease-fire arrangements of 1956. Israel sought to delay the withdrawal of its troops in order to secure certain guarantees regarding the right of free and innocent passage for shipping bound for Israel ports, through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. However, no such guarantees were given by the United Nations and ultimately the then Foreign Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, stated in the General Assembly on 1st March, 1957, that Israel would promptly and fully withdraw from the Sharm el Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip in compliance with the Resolution of 2nd February, 1957 (1125/XI). According to her, Israel had no interest in the land overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba, but her only concern was to ensure the right of innocent passage. She said that, on the understanding that several leading maritime powers were prepared to subscribe to the doctrine of free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits, Israel would withdraw fully from Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip. It may be pointed out that these unilateral declarations of policy by the "leading maritime powers" i.e. the U.S., the U.K., France, etc., could reflect only the views of the respective countries and was in no way a commitment of the United Nations.

Some Facts about Gulf of Aqaba

In 1957, at the 665th meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, the question of navigation rights through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba was discussed at length. Before indicating the position adopted by India it would be useful to describe certain facts regarding the Gulf of Aqaba, the Strait of Tiran and the Israeli port of Eilat.

The Gulf of Aqaba is the eastern of the two arms in which the Sinai peninsula separates the Red Sea at its northern extremity, the western arm being the Gulf of Suez. The Gulf of Aqaba is approximately 100 miles in length and varies in width between 3 miles on the narrow bay at its northern end and 17 miles at its widest point. The coast-line of the Gulf extends approximately 120 miles in Egypt, 94 miles in Saudi Arabia, 4 miles in Jordan and about 5 miles in Israel.

The mouth of the Gulf from the Sinai peninsula headland to the Arabian peninsula headland is about 9 miles in width. There are two islands at the mouth of the Gulf which narrows the access to the inner reaches of the Gulf and in fact create two entrances to it. The western and principal entrance passes between Tiran Island (which is in Egyptian control) and the Egyptian coast along the Sinai peninsula. The principal navigable channel at this point closely hugs (500 meters) the Egyptian coast at a point known as Ras Nasrani, to the south of which lies Sharm el Sheikh. Another island, Sanafir, lies two miles east of Tiran. The eastern entrance to the Gulf passes between the two islands and the Arabian mainland and is seldom used because of reefs which render navigation difficult except for small boats.

In terms of the Palestine Partition Plan approved by the U.N. General Assembly on 29th November, 1947, the contemplated Jewish State would have extended approximately up to the present position of Israel on the northern head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Though the description in the Plan of the boundaries of the Jewish State on the Gulf of Aqaba does not specifically mention Eilat or *Umm Reshresh*, the map enclosed with the Resolution includes the narrow strip of land on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba. This area includes Eilat.

As already indicated earlier, the Palestine Partition Plan envisaged the creation of a Jewish State and an Arab State in the territory

of Palestine, with Jerusalem being an international zone. However, this Plan as a whole was never implemented as a consequence of the hostilities which broke out in 1948-49. Israel occupied 40% more territory than was allotted to the proposed Jewish State under the Palestine Partition Plan and in contravention of U.N. Resolution establishing the State of Israel annexed a part of Jerusalem and declined to establish Jerusalem as an international city.

The Security Council Resolution of 4th November, 1948, called upon the parties to go back to the position of 14th October, 1948. Egypt wanted that the armistice negotiations should take the Resolution as the starting point to which Israel objected. Ultimately, Egypt withdrew to the boundary line of the mandatory territory of Palestine. The Egypt-Israeli General Armistice Agreement was signed on 24th February, 1949. At that moment, although the Egyptians themselves were not in occupation of the area around Eilat, this area was in occupation of the Arab Legion of Jordan. The Israelis took this area by force on 10th March, 1949. It is because of this contravention of the Security Council Resolution of 4th November, 1948, that the Arabs did not and do not accept the validity of this occupation. The narrow strip on the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, including Eilat falls within the area in possession of Israel, i.e. on the Israeli side of the Armistice demarcation line between Israel and Jordan and Israel and Egypt.

Israel's occupation of this area on the northern head of the Gulf of Aqaba has continued since 10th March, 1949, and the port of Eilat was established as a harbour on 25th June, 1952. The United Arab Republic sought to regulate and control, in a detailed manner, shipping bound for Israel between the time when the harbour of Eilat was established and the tripartite aggression on the U.A.R. in 1956. Israel had protested to the Security Council in January, 1954, regarding interference by Egypt with shipping proceeding to the Israeli port of Eilat. However, owing to the veto by the Soviet Union, no resolution was adopted on this complaint.

After the tripartite aggression on Egypt, UNEF was stationed at Sharm el Sheikh as well as along the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Line. So, the question of U.A.R. interfering with the shipping bound for Eilat did not arise till May, 1967, when the UNEF was withdrawn and U.A.R. troops took control of Sharm el Sheikh.

India's position on Gulf of Aqaba

Speaking in the U.N. General Assembly on 1st March, 1957, Shri Krishna Menon made two important points regarding the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. First, he pointed out that the entrance to the Gulf was 9 nautical miles and both Egypt and Saudi Arabia claimed a 12 mile limit for territorial waters. The Strait of Tiran was, therefore, within the territorial waters of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Shri Krishna Menon pointed out that the exercise by the U.A.R. of its sovereign rights in its territorial waters, which were in its sovereign territory, was not an act of belligerency. Shri Menon drew attention to Article XVII of the Law of the Sea which stated that:

- "1. The Coastal State may take necessary steps in its territorial sea to protect itself against any act prejudicial to its security...
3. The coastal State may suspend temporarily in definite areas of its territorial sea the exercise of the right of passage."

The second point which Shri Krishna Menon made was that the Gulf of Aqaba is an inland sea. Shri Menon referred to the fact that France claimed the Bay of Cancale to be territorial although its entrance was 17 miles wide. The Hudson Bay in Canada had an entrance of 50 miles and Canada claimed it to be a territorial bay. Shri Menon referred to many other such situations to suggest that the Gulf of Aqaba with an entrance 9 miles wide was an inland sea.

It is, however, important to note that Shri Krishna Menon in his statement of 1st March, 1967, did not rule out the possibility of arrangements for navigation through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba which recognised the sovereign rights of the U.A.R. and made such navigation subject to U.A.R.'s consent. Shri Menon said:

"This does not mean that in the interests of international peace, there is no obligation upon any party concerned, including my own country, to assist in such ways as are possible to maintain good behaviour. My good friend, the representative of the United States referred to the fact that the Japanese ships — and I suppose Russian ships — sail up to Hudson and, therefore, there is freedom. But that is a freedom subject to consent.

Mr. Lodge invites me to his apartment and I go there but that does not mean that I have the right to occupy it."

Again in another part of his statement, Shri Menon stated:

"My country — and the Arab nations do not like us to say this — hopes and trusts and looks forward to the time when whatever the rights and wrongs of the Israeli-Arab disputes, these problems will be resolved in some form so that the Arab countries can turn their attention to economic development and when the vast quantity of money that comes from the international world for the arming of the State of Israel will also be diverted to the development of under-developed area. This is our hope; but to express a hope and to work for it is not to deny the sovereign rights of someone else...."

Shri Arthur Lall, who addressed the U.N. General Assembly on 4th March, 1957, reinforced the position stated by Shri Krishna Menon. Regarding the Gulf of Aqaba, Shri Arthur Lall observed that the International Law Commission itself had reserved consideration of the legal position of such waters because of the complicated position involved. Regarding the Strait of Tiran, which was the only navigable entrance to the Gulf, Shri Lall pointed out that on the basis of existing law and practice it formed the territorial waters of Egypt. Navigation through this access to the Gulf could, therefore, only be arranged with Egypt's consent. Shri Lall drew attention to the Montreaux Convention governing the use of the Bosphorus and the Dardenelles and referred to the rights of Turkey to refuse passage to merchant vessels belonging to countries in a state of war with her. In this context, he recalled that the Armistice Agreement of 1949 did not put an end to the state of war between Egypt and Israel. All this did not, Shri Arthur Lall continued, exhaust the considerations involved. The representative of Colombia had pointed out that a State had rights arising out of its inherent obligations to ensure its own security and thus, apart from the existence of a technical state of war and the right which Egypt had in that way, there were the inherent rights of Egypt in the Straits and those rights could not be in dispute.

It should also be mentioned that from 1948 onwards, U.A.R. exercised its right over the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. In July, 1951, a British ship s.s. *Empire Roach*, carrying weapons tried to circumvent the restrictions but was forced to comply with the

formalities. So also the American ship *Albion* bound for Aqaba. In January, 1954, an Italian ship *Maria Antonia*, which did not comply with the regulations, was sent back.

In 1956, when this matter was discussed at great length in the General Assembly, no decision could be taken in favour of Israel. The forcing of the issue was avoided by stationing of the UNEF along the ADL, including Sharm el Sheikh. But, at the same time, the Secretary-General of the U.N. stated in his report to the General Assembly on 26th February, 1957, that the UNEF was not to be used to enforce a solution for any political or legal controversy. India made it quite clear that, while in their view the Gulf was an inland sea and the Strait of Tiran territorial waters, the issue of passage through Strait of Tiran remained an open issue to be decided in the context of U.A.R.'s sovereignty.

Tension Continues

The uneasy peace in West Asia continued to be disturbed frequently by small-scale military ventures. Given below are some examples of such eruptions of violence and the stand taken by the United Nations on these occasions.

1961

On 1st April, 1961, Jordan complained to the Security Council that a military parade, which Israel planned to hold on 20th April in the Israeli part of Jerusalem, would be a violation of the General Armistice Agreement and a defiance of the decision taken by the Mixed Armistice Commission on 20th March, 1961, to the effect that a dress rehearsal for the parade (held on 16-17th March, 1961) had been a breach of the Armistice Agreement. According to Jordan, a parade would also be an act of military provocation and endanger international peace and security. On 11th April, 1961, the Security Council adopted a Resolution (S/4788) by which it endorsed the decision of the Armistice Mixed Commission of 20th March, 1961, and urged Israel to comply with its decision.

1962

Consequent on fighting in the Lake Tiberias area in March, 1962, Syria and Israel both complained to the Security Council, each charging the other with acts of aggression. On 9th April, 1962, the Council adopted a resolution, submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (S/5111) by ten votes to zero with one abstention (France). Operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Resolution may be cited here:

"The Security Council.....

2. Reaffirms the Security Council resolution of 19th January, 1956, which condemned Israeli military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, whether or not undertaken by way of retaliation;

3. Determines that the Israeli attack of 16-17th March, 1962, constitutes a flagrant violation of that resolution and calls upon Israel scrupulously to refrain from such action in the future."

By operative paragraph 7, the Council also called upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to co-operate with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and urged that all steps necessary for re-activating the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full use of its machinery be promptly taken. It may be recalled here that Israel had generally boycotted the Mixed Armistice Commission from 1951 onwards.

1966

On 16th November, 1966, the Council met at the request of Jordan. The facts of the case briefly were that on 13th November, 1966, Israeli armed forces, supported by jet fighters and tanks, had crossed the demarcation line and inflicted heavy damage on Jordanian lives and property. This was confirmed by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO in his report of 18th November, 1966.

On 25th November, 1966, the Security Council by a vote of 14 in favour, with none against and one abstention (New Zealand)

adopted a resolution (S/RES/228) which condemned Israel in clear terms. The following operative paragraphs may be cited in this connection:

"The Security Council.....

2. Censures Israel for this large-scale military action in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan;

3. Emphasizes to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts."

The Problem of Refugees

One of the critical issues in the West Asian tangle is the problem of Palestine refugees. It is necessary to state in brief the genesis of this problem and the position taken by India on this issue.

As a consequence of the establishment of the State of Israel, hundreds of thousands of Palestine Arabs had to flee from the country. The number of such refugees, at present, exceeds a million, the bulk of whom are in Jordan and the rest mostly in Syria, Lebanon, and the U.A.R.

India has consistently supported the right of the Arab Palestine refugees to return to their homes. India's stand is consistent with what the U.N. General Assembly has regularly endorsed. The recognition of the right of the refugees to repatriation and compensation was contained in Resolution 194 (iii) of 11th December, 1948. Paragraph 11 of this resolution reads:

"Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments of authorities responsible;

"Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations."

It may be mentioned that the mandate of the League of Nations had stipulated that the Jewish National Home in Palestine should not in any way prejudice the rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants to their lands. The United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also recognise the right of each people to its own country and its right to live in its own home. (Article 13 and 14(2) of "Declaration of Human Rights" U.N. Resolution 217(iii) of 10th December, 1948).

Year after year, the U.N. General Assembly has been adopting resolutions reiterating that paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (iii) of 11th December referred to above should be implemented. The following paragraphs from the General Assembly Resolution 2154(xxi) adopted by the Assembly on 17th November, 1966 may be cited, as they are generally typical of corresponding provisions in earlier and later provisions of the Assembly on the subject.

The General Assembly

"Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1st July, 1965 to 30th June, 1966...

"1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution 194(iii) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

"8. *Calls upon* the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to intensify its efforts for the implementation of

paragraph 11 of Resolution 194(iii) and to report thereon as appropriate and not later than 1st October, 1967"

The Israelis, however, argue that as far as the problem of the Arab Palestine refugees is concerned, "the responsibility of the Arab Governments is three-fold. Theirs is the initiative for its creation. Theirs is the onus for its endurance. Above all, theirs is the capacity for its solution": (Abba Eban's speech at the U.N., 1957). These charges have been carefully investigated by no less an authority than the historian Arnold Toynbee. The Arab-refugees did not certainly flee from Palestine because they were asked to do so by the neighbouring Arab Governments. They merely left because their lives were endangered by the Israelis and their property seized. "No one thinks that the European Jews, who got out of Germany, at that time (when Hitler came to power) forfeited their legal rights to their property as a result of having managed by prudence and foresight to save their lives and their families' lives by getting out in time. In 1940, when the Germans invaded, several million French people from North France fled to the South for the same reasons that the Arab population of the war zone in Palestine in 1948 fled from Palestine." (Arnold Toynbee in a lecture in January, 1961). For the Israelis to further argue that it is the Arab Governments who are responsible for the continuance of the problem and that it is for them to solve it certainly has no legal basis. The suggestion, of course, is that the refugees be settled in Arab countries and the problem thus solved. This depends on the willingness and economic capacity of the Arab Governments and on the acceptance of such a solution by the refugees themselves. The Arab Governments are not prepared to take the necessary measures nor are the refugees willing to settle permanently anywhere else than in Palestine.

India has, consistently, supported the U.N. resolutions and the right of the refugees to have an unfettered choice either to return to their homeland or to compensation. Thus, the representative of India, speaking at the Twentieth Session of the General Assembly on this problem, stressed that the condition of the refugees had remained unchanged for the last 17 years. India appreciated the aspirations of the Palestine refugees to return to their homes. India also took the position that the U.N. was responsible for the partitioning of the country and that the rights of the refugees to choose between repatriation and compensation, which had been clearly recognised in Resolution 194, should be respected. India also supported the

continued functioning of the UNRWA which has now been extended to 30th June, 1969.

Despite its own economic difficulties, India has always endeavoured to make some contribution towards solving the problems of the Palestine refugees. Thus, for the year 1950-60, India contributed goods worth \$269,510 to UNRWA. For the years 1961-62, India contributed 240 tons of sugar valued at \$40,000. From 1960 onward, India has been contributing 100,000 rupees annually in the form of goods in consultation with the Commissioner-General of UNRWA.

India has consistently supported the U.N. resolutions and the right of the refugees to have an unhindered choice either to return to their homeland or to compensation. This the representative of India, speaking at the Tenth Session of the General Assembly on the Palestinian Question, stated that the resolution of the refugee problem of the Palestine refugees is a matter of international concern and that the right of the refugees to choose between repatriation and compensation, which had been clearly expressed in the U.N. resolutions, should be respected. India also supported the

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VI

The Crisis of 1967

Disturbing signs of new threats to the uneasy peace in West Asia were visible from the beginning of 1967 as there was a steady deterioration of the situation on the Israeli-Syrian frontier. Before discussing Indian policies in regard to the various issues in the 1967 crisis, it is necessary to recount in brief the developments leading to the war. On 7th April, 1967, serious fighting broke out between Israel and Syria over the question of cultivation rights in the demilitarized zone between the two States. Although a cease-fire was quickly brought about, tension continued to increase. The Israelis kept complaining of the terrorism and sabotage by El Fatah, which the Israelis alleged, operated from Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the U.N. Secretary-General, in his report dated 19th May, 1967 to the Security Council, said that "although allegations are often made, to the best of my knowledge, there is no verified information about the organisation, central direction and originating source of these acts which have occurred intermittently in the vicinity of Israel's lines with Jordan, Lebanon and Syria....."

Another reason for the increased tension was the highly provocative and threatening statements reported to have been made by the Israeli leaders. At the same time, there were reports of Israeli troop concentrations over the Syrian border. Syria, fearing an imminent attack from Israel, held urgent consultations with the United Arab Republic under the UAR-Syria Mutual Defence Agreement which had been signed in November, 1966.

Subsequent developments are well known and it is not necessary to give a chronological account of events. In the entire crisis, there were four main issues on which the Government of India took a stand, consistent with the policies adopted in the past and in pursuance of the general principles governing India's foreign policy. The four issues were:

- (i) Withdrawal of UNEF;
- (ii) The right of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran;

- (iii) Responsibility of Israel for "escalating the situation into an armed conflict," and
- (iv) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Arab territories.

Withdrawal of UNEF

On 16th May, 1967, General Fawzi, Commander-in-Chief of the U.A.R. army sent a letter to the UNEF Commander, Gen. Rikhye, asking for the withdrawal of the UNEF from the eastern borders of U.A.R. From the letter it was not clear whether the UNEF withdrawal was intended to be all along the line from the Gaza Strip to the Gulf of Aqaba. U Thant discussed the matter with the representatives of countries providing contingents to UNEF and informed the U.A.R. Government that the proper procedure would be for the U.A.R. Government to address the Secretary-General regarding UNEF and not the Commander of UNEF who functioned under him. On 18th May, 1967, a letter was received by U Thant from the U.A.R. Government asking for the removal of UNEF entirely from the U.A.R. territory and the Gaza Strip. After consultations with the U.N. Advisory Committee on UNEF, the Secretary-General decided to terminate UNEF's presence.

When the UNEF was established in 1956, the U.N. General Assembly resolution clearly envisaged the establishment of UNEF on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation Line. Israel, however, refused to accept UNEF on Israeli territory on grounds of national sovereignty. Egypt accepted UNEF subject to Egyptian sovereignty. When the U.A.R., in exercise of their sovereignty and on the basis of the clear understanding between the U.A.R. and the U.N., asked for withdrawal of UNEF, the Secretary-General had no alternative but to withdraw it. Before doing so, as already stated, the Secretary-General consulted the 7 countries contributing contingents to UNEF as also the U.N. Advisory Committee on UNEF and only thereafter decided to withdraw UNEF. Moreover, before ordering withdrawal, the Secretary-General asked Israel if she would agree to the stationing of UNEF on the Israeli side of the line; but Israel refused. Further, after U.A.R. had demanded withdrawal of UNEF, in exercise of their sovereign rights, U.A.R. troops moved to the A.D.L., thereby eliminating the buffer zone, which left no alternative for the Secretary-General but to order withdrawal, because it was not the

intention that UNEF should fight U.A.R. troops in order to continue to remain in U.A.R. territory against U.A.R. wishes. Israel was not justified in criticising the Secretary-General as Israel had since 1956 refused to co-operate with UNEF while Israeli troops, according to the Secretary-General, "patrolled alongside the line and now and again created provocation by violating it." Just as Israel exercised its sovereignty in withholding its consent to station UNEF in her territory, so did the U.A.R. in asking for its withdrawal.

The Rationale of Indian Attitude

A very different view regarding the propriety and procedure followed for UNEF's withdrawal has been taken by some other countries, particularly Israel. According to the Israeli view, as stated by Foreign Minister Abba Eban in the U.N. General Assembly on 19th June, 1967, the U.N. Secretary-General acceded to the U.A.R. request without reference to the Security Council of the General Assembly, without consulting Israel, without carrying out the procedures indicated by his predecessor, without heeding the protesting voices of some of the permanent members of the Council and without seeking to delay this in order to prevent belligerency and a dangerous confrontation. It is necessary to restate the Indian position on these issues and the basis on which India adopted that position. The first point to be remembered is that the U.N. General Assembly at its first emergency special session on 4th November, 1956, had requested the U.N. Secretary-General to submit a plan for the setting up of an emergency force with the consent of the nations concerned. The then U.N. Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, in his report of 6th November, 1956 to the General Assembly had said that:

".....the Force, if established, would be limited in its operations to the extent that *consent* of the parties concerned is required under generally-recognised international law. While the General Assembly is enabled to *establish* the Force with the consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be *stationed* or *operate* on the territory of a given country without the *consent* of the Government of that country."

It may also be stated that the understanding reached between the U.N. Secretary-General and the Government of India regarding

the participation of the Indian contingent in the UNEF contained the following two salient points:

1. It is understood that the Force may have to function through Egyptian territory. Therefore, there must be Egyptian consent for its establishment.
2. The Force is a temporary one for an emergency. Its purpose is to separate the combatants, namely, Egypt and Israel, with the latter withdrawing as required by the resolution." (U.N. Documents A/3302/Add. 4/Rev. 1)

Jawaharlal Nehru, speaking in Parliament on 19th November, 1956, had said:

"We made it clear that it was only if the Government of Egypt agreed that we would send them (Indian contingent to the UNEF). We are not prepared to agree to our forces or any forces remaining there indefinitely."

It may also be recalled that the UNEF was introduced into U.A.R. territory on the basis of an agreement reached in Cairo between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of Egypt. They agreed that UNEF should continue on the U.A.R. territory until there was continuing consent to its presence and that the U.A.R. had the right to withdraw this consent and to ask for UNEF's withdrawal.

Another question raised in regard to the UNEF's withdrawal is whether the Secretary-General should have referred the matter to the Security Council or the General Assembly. It is pertinent to note that the Assembly resolution approving the guiding principles for the organization and functioning of UNEF established an Advisory Committee on UNEF under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. The Advisory Committee was empowered to request the convening of the General Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters arose which, in its opinion, were of such urgency and importance as to require consideration by the Assembly itself. The Secretary-General referred the U.A.R. request to the Advisory Committee and the Committee did not refer the matter to the General Assembly.

Israel herself had never agreed to the stationing of UNEF on her side of the line. As a matter of fact, as early as 7th November, 1956, the Prime Minister of Israel, in a speech in the Israeli Parliament, had stated:

"On no account will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force, no matter how called, on her territory or any of the territories occupied by her."

The U.N. Secretary-General, in his report to the U.N. General Assembly of the 24th January 1957, suggested that the Force should have units also stationed on the Israeli side of the Armistice Demarcation Line. In particular, he suggested stationing of units of the Force at El-Auja which was a demilitarized area under the Egyptian-Israeli Joint Armistice Agreement and which the Israelis had occupied by force. The U.N. General Assembly resolution No. 1125(XI) of 2nd February, 1957, called for placing the Force "on the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line." However, Israel did not agree to have the Force within its territory. This was specifically stated by the U.N. Secretary-General's report of 9th October, 1957 to the 12th session of the General Assembly. Also, before agreeing to the U.A.R. request for UNEF's withdrawal on 18th May, 1967, U Thant raised the question of stationing UNEF on the Israeli side of the line but the Permanent Representative of Israel declared this to be entirely unacceptable to his Government.

It was thus that U Thant, in his statement to the U.N. General Assembly on 20th June, 1967, pointed out that "despite the intent of the General Assembly resolution that U.N. troops should be stationed on both sides of the line, Israel always and firmly refused to accept them on Israeli territory on the valid ground of national sovereignty. There was, of course, national sovereignty on the other side of the line as well....." U Thant also mentioned in this statement that "moreover, for all these 10 years the Israeli troops regularly patrolled alongside the line and now and again created provocations by violating it."

In view of these facts it is evident that India's view that the action taken by the Secretary-General was correct, is legally, morally and politically fully justified.

India's Attitude

On 18th May, 1967, the Prime Minister, Shrimati Indira Gandhi, received a verbal message from President Nasser communicated through the Indian Ambassador in Cairo. In brief, the message referred to the various statements which were made by the Israeli Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and the Chief of Army Staff indicating that preparations were being made for an attack on Syria. The message indicated that the Israeli intention was to change the Government of Syria through pressure and perhaps even by invasion. In the circumstances, the U.A.R. wanted to declare openly that it would come to Syria's help if attacked by Israel. The U.A.R. had consequently taken necessary measures to deter the Israelis from any aggressive designs against Syria or U.A.R. The message added that while the U.A.R. did not wish to increase tension in the area, considering their past experience, especially during the Suez crisis, they felt it necessary to take precautions against any possible Israeli attack on an Arab country.

A reply was sent to President Nasser's message through the Indian Ambassador in Cairo on 19th May, 1967. The reply indicated the deep concern of the Government of India at the dangerous situation which had developed and India's anxiety at the nature of statements recently made by the Israeli leaders. The reply added that India agreed with the U.A.R. that no country should interfere in the internal affairs of another country. In view of the attack which Syria feared from Israel and in the context of the U.A.R.-Syrian Mutual Defence Agreement, India fully appreciated the reasons why the U.A.R. had had to institute precautionary measures. The Prime Minister, however, expressed the hope that peace would be maintained and noted with gratification that it was not the intention of the U.A.R. to increase tension in the area but that the measures it had taken were in the interest of preparedness and precaution against a possible attack on an Arab country. This message reiterated the respect and regard which India had for President Nasser personally and in the aims and principles which India shared with the U.A.R.

On the question of UNEF's withdrawal, the Foreign Minister of India stated in the Lok Sabha on 25th May, 1967:

"The Government of India have always supported the UNEF's activities and believe that its presence on the Israeli-U.A.R.

border has helped in maintaining peace in the area. We would, however, like to state clearly that we appreciate the reasons which have impelled the U.A.R. to ask for the withdrawal of UNEF. When the UNEF was stationed in the U.A.R., it was with the consent of the U.A.R. Government and the UNEF could not continue to remain in the U.A.R. territory without the Government's continuing consent. India could not be a party to any procedure which would make UNEF into an occupation force; nor could the Government of India agree to UNEF's continued presence in the U.A.R. in the absence of the latter's consent and in any case Indian troops could not remain part of UNEF without U.A.R.'s approval. This is also in keeping with customary international law, the U.N. General Assembly resolution on the subject and the understanding reached between the late Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, the then U.N. Secretary-General, and the U.A.R. Government."

The Gulf of Aqaba

The basic facts regarding the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran and the position taken by India on this in 1957 have been indicated earlier. When in May 1967 the U.A.R. forces took control of Sharm el Sheikh and the Government of U.A.R. announced the closure of the Gulf for shipping to Israeli ports, India had to view the situation in the light of her earlier stand and also the facts of the situation in the light of international law and practice. However, India's efforts right up to 4th June, 1967, were directed towards gaining a breathing spell and finding a *modus vivendi* within the framework of U.A.R. sovereignty.

The position taken by India was stated by the Foreign Minister in the Lok Sabha on 25th May, 1967:

"So far as the Government of India are concerned, we have taken the position as far back as 1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba is an inland sea and that the entry to the Gulf lies within the territorial waters of the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia. We adhere to this view."

It should be remembered that even the British and the American positions on the question of Gulf of Aqaba have been equivocal although they emphasized the rights of innocent passage. It is true that

in 1957, the U.S.A. and the U.K. strongly expressed the view that the Gulf was an international waterway; at the same time, however, Mr. Dulles, speaking at a press conference on 26th March, 1957, said:

"I think that it is the fact that a certain amount of shipping is or shortly will be in fact passing through the Straits, although I also think that it is important to get a decision by the International Court of Justice as to what the legal rights of the parties are.....it would be very helpful, I think, and it should be helpful also from Egyptian standpoint, to get a decision on that matter. And consideration is now being given to ways and means of seeking an advisory opinion on that matter from the International Court of Justice."

Ten years later, Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, while speaking in the British Parliament, said: "I am bound to say that there is a case which the Arabs can deploy; it is a case which has not only plausibility but legality and force."

The position regarding the Gulf when the present crisis broke out was:

(a) U.A.R. was not a party to any agreement recognising the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway or guaranteeing the freedom of passage to Israeli ships.

(b) There was no universally recognised rule of international law on freedom of navigation applicable to such bodies of water as Aqaba.

(c) The status of this body of water is still a matter of controversy. The U.S. State Department's publication *Digest of International Law*, released by the Department of State in April, 1965, (Volume IV, page 233) containing a letter from the Secretary of State dated 15th January, 1963, to the Attorney-General sets forth the view of the Department regarding the extent of territorial waters and the closing width of bays. On Aqaba, the letter states as follows:

"The Gulf of Aqaba and the exact status of this body of water is still a matter open to controversy."

It had been pointed out by some that according to para 4 of

Article 16 of the General Convention on the Territorial Seas (1958), Israeli ships had a right of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. The point to remember, however, is that no Arab State was a party to this Convention nor was India. Moreover, even according to this Convention, the right of passage is not an absolute right but remains subject to the security requirements of the concerned State.

Again, the General Assembly did not recognise, much less accept, the conditions which Israel attempted to attach in 1957 to its withdrawal from Sharm el Sheikh.

President Nasser, in his statements before the conflict, while objecting to Israeli shipping and other ships carrying strategic material for Israel, raised no objection to other innocent passage.

Thus, Foreign Minister Chagla reiterated on 25th May, 1967, the position that India had taken in 1957.

Israeli Aggression

The third important issue is the one of placing responsibility for escalating the situation into an armed conflict. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in her statement in the Lok Sabha on 6th June, 1967, said:

"I do not wish to utter harsh words or use strong language. But on the basis of information available there can be no doubt that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed conflict, which has now acquired the proportions of a full-scale war."

The Prime Minister made her statement on the basis of the U.N. Secretary-General's report on 5th June, 1967 to the U.N. Security Council. In this report, the first mention by U Thant regarding offensive action was to Israeli aircraft violating U.A.R. air space at 0800 hours on 5th June, 1967 over Gaza and Al Arish. The Arab counter-action against Israel was indicated in this report as having taken place after 0800 hours. Subsequent developments and information have more than confirmed that Israel committed clear aggression. Israel itself scarcely bothers to deny that it started shooting first. On the contrary, the Israeli Ambassador in London, Mr. Aharen

Renez, was reported by the British newspaper *Guardian* on 8th June, 1967, to have "confessed freely at an all-party meeting of MP's (British) last night that it was Israel which had fired the first shot in the Middle East war."

It will be recalled that on 2nd June, 1967, a statement was issued in the name of General de Gaulle after a French Cabinet meeting in which it was said that "the country which is the first to use arms, wherever that be, will neither have her (French) approval nor her (French) support." In another statement issued on 22nd June after a French Cabinet meeting, de Gaulle said that ".....France condemns opening of hostilities by Israel."

The American magazine, *Time*, in its issue of 23rd June, 1967 (page 20) says:

".....On the day before the guns opened up, the Israeli Cabinet met secretly to discuss whether to launch a 'pre-emptive' attack before the gathering Arab armies struck. Abba Eban argued for further diplomatic efforts. Defence Minister Moshe Dayan insisted that the safety of the nation would not permit delay. Dayan carried the day. The attack was authorised by a vote of 16—2, the only nays being cast by the left-wing socialists."

Foreign Minister Chagla, speaking in the U.N. General Assembly on 20th June, 1967, said:

"Mr. President, the fact that Israel struck the first blow is incontrovertible. The concept of a preventive strike or a preventive war, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter. Nobody denies that there are many disputes between Israel and her Arab neighbours, and that these have remained unsolved through the last two decades. Was it these disputes, perchance, that Israel was trying to solve through a war of her choosing? If it was, then its attack was as much on the Arabs as on the principles enshrined in Article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter. The Charter states in its Article 2 paragraph 4 unequivocally that 'all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political independence of any State.'

The only permissible exception to this prohibition is in case of armed attack as provided in Article 51. And, as I have just indicated, the circumstances for Article 51 being operative in favour of Israel certainly did not exist in the present instance. What Israel has done is to confront the world with a *fait accompli* to attempt to impose a new *status quo* and to achieve a new balance of power in that region. In these circumstances, Israel now demands a new Middle East settlement, on its own terms. Its terms, it claims, must be accepted in advance, if a peace settlement in the areas is to be arrived at. If its demands are not accepted, it threatens to consolidate its ill-gotten territorial gains. These manoeuvres of Israel are intended to force the international community to acquiesce in what must be called a perpetuation of this new *status quo*."

Vacation of Aggression

Finally, there is the question of withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Arab territories. It is worthwhile to quote at length from the Indian Foreign Minister's statement to the U.N. General Assembly of 21st June, 1967:

"Leaders of Government, the armed forces and public opinion of Israel have recently made public statements to the effect that some of the territories of U.A.R., Syria and Jordan, which they occupy now, will not be vacated by them under any circumstances whatsoever. As regards certain other territories, also at present under their occupation, they have graciously indicated that they would be prepared to consider vacating them but only after certain conditions have been met by the Arab Governments, and indeed by the international community. The latest and the most defiant in this series of statements is that by Mr. Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel. He told *The Jerusalem Post* and I quote: 'If the General Assembly were to vote by 121 to one in favour of Israel returning to the armistice lines tomorrow, Israel would refuse to comply with that decision. This has been made clear to the major powers.'

"On 12th June, 1967, in a policy speech made in the Knesset, but quite explicitly addressed to all nations of the world,

Mr. Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel, said and I quote: 'Be under no illusion that the State of Israel is prepared to return to the situation that reigned up to a week ago..... We are entitled to determine what are the true and vital interests of our country and how they shall be secured.'

"All this bears out what the Permanent Representative of India had said on 9th June, 1967, in the Security Council and I quote: 'You Mr. President, and all my colleagues in the Council here, have read enough history to know what to expect next. The aggressor, having occupied all its military vantage positions, all its objectives—Sharm el Sheikh, Gaza, Jerusalem, the Western bank of the Jordan River, and now the heights of Galilee, will, after a show of reasonableness in negotiations, offer to split these gains half and half — perhaps.'

"Mr. President, it is a universally recognised and honoured principle of law that the gains of aggression must not be permitted to remain with the aggressor. The United Nations was based on this principle. The founding fathers of its Charter had not written the Charter so that the scourge of war could be considered as an investment by anyone who was strong enough to overcome his neighbours. Faith in the cardinal principle that disputes can be solved only through peaceful means must not be allowed to be eroded. The international community, therefore, cannot acquiesce in Israel keeping the fruits of its conquest."

India has consistently held that no aggressor should be permitted to enjoy the fruits of aggression or to use the advantages gained through aggression in order to settle political issues from a position of bargaining strength. Soon after the Israeli attack on her Arab neighbours, India's representative in the Security Council on 5th June, 1967, proposed a draft resolution calling upon the combatants to cease fire and withdraw to the positions held by them before commencement of hostilities, i.e. on 4th June, 1967. It is important to note that India proposed this resolution when there was absolutely no indication as to which side would have the military and territorial advantage in the hostilities. India's proposal was based on a principle which she herself had followed in 1965 when she withdrew from territory which she held in Pakistan and Pakistan-held Kashmir.

India at the U.N.

During the discussions in the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly, the representative of India had stressed this principle. On the basis of U Thant's reports of 19th and 27th May, discussions took place in the Security Council. Two draft resolutions, one by the United States and the other by the U.A.R., were under consideration. The U.S. draft, while apparently worded in an innocuous manner, was totally unacceptable to the U.A.R. as, in its preamble, it referred to U Thant's request that the parties concerned "exercise special restraint to forgo belligerence". The U.S. representative, in his statement to the Council, made it clear that by this reference to forgo belligerence, he meant that the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba should be open to Israeli and other international shipping. The implication was that the U.S. considered that the U.A.R. restriction on navigation rights in the Gulf was an act of belligerence which must be forgone. Moreover, the U.S. draft did not specifically refer to the reactivation of the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission and the strictures passed by U Thant regarding Israeli non-participation in the EIMAC.

The U.A.R. draft, on the other hand, in its preamble, referred to the unilateral denunciation by Israel and its flagrant violation of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement and said that this was responsible "for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East...." The U.A.R. draft also did not refer to belligerence. The U.A.R. draft was unacceptable to the United States and other Western countries but the draft was in keeping with U Thant's report and India, therefore, supported it.

At the same time, India's representative at the United Nations informally circulated an Indian draft resolution which aimed at supporting U Thant's recommendations contained in his reports to the Security Council and urging all parties concerned to exercise restraint in order to avoid actions which could increase tension. India's initiative met with favourable response and it was hoped that in the Security Council meeting scheduled for 5th June, 1967, significant progress would be made in this regard.

These efforts were, however, frustrated as certain Western powers insisted on denying U.A.R. sovereignty over its territorial waters.

The draft resolution proposed by India on 5th June, 1967 calling upon the combatants to cease fire and withdraw to the positions held by them before the commencement of hostilities has been referred to above. Though the resolution had the support of Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, it was opposed by some Western Powers who wanted only a simple cease-fire. On 6th June, 1967, the Security Council unanimously adopted a simple cease-fire resolution *as a first step* but no cease-fire took place as a result of this resolution. At the request of the Soviet Union, an emergency meeting of the Security Council was called on the 7th June, 1967, and another resolution was unanimously adopted demanding of all the Governments concerned, again *as a first step*, to cease fire by 20.00 hours G.M.T. on 7th June, 1967. India's representative, while giving support to the resolution, reiterated that the cease-fire should be regarded only as a first step, although as a most important step. The Indian representative added that India along with some other members of the Security Council would have preferred a resolution which also asked for withdrawal of forces to the 4th June positions. Such a linking of the cease-fire with withdrawal would have been in keeping with the past practice of the Security Council based on the sound principle that the aggressor should not be rewarded with the fruits of its aggression. This is also a most important tenet, India's representative said, in the interest of international peace and the basis on which peace can be built in West Asia.

After the resolution of 7th June, Israeli hostilities with Jordan and U.A.R. ceased. However, Israel launched a massive attack against Syria and the Security Council adopted yet another resolution on 9th June demanding that hostilities should cease forthwith. As even this did not stop the hostilities between Israel and Syria, on 12th June, the Security Council adopted yet another resolution — its fourth — demanding cease-fire and prohibiting all forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire and asking the troops to return to the 10th June position. Thereafter, hostilities ceased but a flood of refugees from areas occupied by Israel, west of the River Jordan, commenced. The Security Council, therefore, on 15th June passed its 5th resolution calling upon Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas occupied by Israel and to facilitate their return. The resolution asked for scrupulous respect for humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian personnel contained in the Geneva Convention.

Following this the Security Council was asked to consider a U.S. draft resolution and a Soviet draft resolution. The Soviet resolution was voted upon and defeated. Thereupon the Soviet Union asked the Secretary-General to convene a special emergency session of the General Assembly and after obtaining the concurrence of the majority of the members of the United Nations, including India, convened the emergency session on 17th June.

The Foreign Minister of India, speaking in the Special Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly on 21st June, 1967, strongly urged the need for a return to peace in the area which should be a lasting peace; the essential first requisite for this, however, was the return of the armed forces to the positions they held before the commencement of the hostilities. He further urged that a special representative of the Secretary-General may be appointed to help reduce tension in the area and to ensure the safety and security of the civilian Arab population under Israeli occupation, and facilitate the return of those who were forced to leave their homes. He proposed that the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation should be enlarged and strengthened in order to ensure strict compliance with the various provisions of the General Armistice Agreement.

The Indian Foreign Minister urged these immediate steps on the basis of certain cardinal principles. These principles are: first, it is not open to a country to start a war merely because it feels that a threat to its security exists. If such a threat exists, the Charter prescribes various courses of action open to it, including recourse to the Security Council. Secondly, no aggressor can be permitted to retain the fruits of aggression. Thirdly, it is not permissible for a country to acquire territory of another state in order to be able to bargain from a position of strength. Finally, rights cannot be established, territorial disputes cannot be settled, boundaries cannot be adjusted through armed conflict.

On the 4th July, 1967, the U.N. General Assembly voted upon a resolution which was co-sponsored among others by non-aligned countries and India. The essence of this resolution was that the U.N. General Assembly should call upon Israel to withdraw its armed forces to the positions held prior to the outbreak of the hostilities on the 5th June, 1967, while all other matters which are extremely complex and have a long history — the state of belligerence between the Arab States and Israel, the question of navigation rights through the Gulf of Aqaba

and Suez — we left it to the Security Council for solution and adjustments. This resolution obtained 53 votes in favour, 46 against, and 20 abstentions.

There was another resolution proposed by Latin American countries. This resolution differed from that co-sponsored by India as it coupled withdrawals with the settlement of these complicated issues and thus became, as our Permanent Representative put it, "a formula for bargaining from a position of strength by Israel". Our Permanent Representative also pointed out that the Latin American draft ignored the history of West Asia during the last 20 years. If "the Arab States", our Permanent Representative said, "have refused to change their attitude (on belligerence, Suez and Aqaba) for the last twenty years, is it fair to ask them to do so now, when enemy armies occupy vast chunks of their territory? Is it right for this Assembly (U.N. General Assembly) to tell the Arab States that Israel could not withdraw its armed forces as long as the Arab States do not side by side recognise Israel, do not end the state of belligerency, do not agree to maritime passage, in fact a host of conditions....? Our Permanent Representative also mentioned that it was a cardinal principle of the U.N. Charter that force should not be used for settling disputes and that the United Nations should not recognise any advantage, territorial or otherwise, gained through the use of force. For these reasons, India voted against the Latin American resolution.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that this brief account of the evolution of India's policy towards West Asia would have indicated that India's stand on the various issues involved has been consistent and in accordance with the principles of international law and justice. It would also have been seen that the evolution of this policy has taken into account the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs and the profound sympathy in India for the struggle for independence and self-assertion of the Arabs in general. The foundations of this policy were laid by Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and other leaders of India's independence movement and the policy has been continued since independence.

Along with its broad sympathy for the Arab cause, the one persistent and consistent endeavour of independent India's foreign

policy has been the achievement and promotion of peace. However, if peace has not been maintained in West Asia, this has been in spite of India's efforts. In 1967, both before the commencement of hostilities and after the cease-fire, India tried and continues to try to find the basis on which a just, stable and enduring peace can be found in this area of crucial importance to India. But the peace which India desires is not a peace imposed by military might; a peace which does not take into cognizance the legitimate rights of the nations and peoples concerned; a peace which allows the aggressor the fruits of aggression; a peace which ignores the basic principles of international law and conduct and which violates the Charter of the United Nations. Such an imposed peace cannot be a lasting peace but only an interregnum between hostilities; and renewed hostilities would be all the more bitter and dangerous.

The underlying spirit of India's policy was expressed by the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, in the early years of freedom. Dwelling on the policy of non-alignment and its implications, Prime Minister Nehru related this to the Indian stand on the Palestine question and said:

"To give the House an instance of how we acted, take the Palestine affair which has given rise and will give rise to a great deal of trouble. We took up a certain attitude in regard to it which was roughly a federal State with autonomous parts. It was opposed to both the other attitudes which were before the United Nations. One was partition which has now been adopted; the other was a unitary State. We suggested a federal State with, naturally, an Arab majority in charge of the Federal State but with autonomy for the other regions — Jewish regions.

"After a great deal of thought we decided that this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem, but the only real solution of the problem. Any other solution would have meant fighting and conflict. Nevertheless, our solution — which, as the House will remember, was the solution given in the minority report of the Palestine Committee — did not find favour with most people in the United Nations. Some of the major powers were out for partition; they, therefore, pressed for it and ultimately got it. Others were so keen on the unitary state idea and were so sure of preventing partition

at any rate or preventing a two-thirds majority in favour of partition that they did not accept our suggestion.

"When during the last few days somehow partition suddenly became inevitable and votes veered round to it, owing to the pressure of some of the great powers, it was realized that the Indian solution was probably the best and an attempt was made in the last 48 hours to bring forward the Indian solution, not by us but by those who wanted a unitary State. It was then too late. There were procedural difficulties and many of the persons who might have accepted this solution had already pledged themselves to partition. And so ultimately partition was decided upon by a two-thirds majority, with a large number abstaining from voting, with the result that there is trouble in the Middle East now and the possibility of a great deal of trouble in the future.

"I point this out to the House as an instance, that in spite of considerable difficulty and being told by many of our friends on either side that we must line up this way or that, we refused to do so, and I have no doubt that the position we had taken was the right one and I still have no doubt that it would have brought about the best solution."

In later statements as well, Jawaharlal Nehru had occasions to emphasise that the policy of India with regard to the question of Palestine was one based strictly on the merits of the case. This policy had been adopted and followed regardless of the fact that other people might be displeased with the particular position India has taken. Explaining this aspect of the matter, Prime Minister Nehru, in an address before the Indian Council of World Affairs on 22nd March, 1949, stated:

"Today international questions are looked upon from the point of view of how they will affect some future conflict, with the result that we find groupings on either side forgetful of the actual merits of the case. And a country like India which talks in a different language is looked upon as a nuisance in every way; unfortunately, not only as a nuisance, but every group suspects it of joining hands with the opposite group. But now, I think, there is a certain amount of realization by other countries that we really mean what we say. It is not

some deep game or plot and we mean to consider these questions on their merits, and of course merits include other factors also in relation to which we consider such questions. Take our attitude in regard to two or three recent issues — Korea, Palestine and atomic energy."¹

Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 14th August, 1958, Nehru stated:

"Ever since Israel came into existence, it has been a source of constant irritation to the Arab countries. The invasion of Egypt by Israel two years ago is fresh in our memory. Apart from this, there is the big problem of the old Palestine refugees. The Arab countries have looked upon Israel as an outpost from which their freedom might at any time be threatened. Israel, on the other hand, fears the Arab countries which surround it. There can be no real peace in the area till this difficult problem is settled in a satisfactory way. Naturally settlement can be reached only with goodwill of the countries of this area. There can be no settlement by war which, if it occurs, may well become a major war. I do not suggest that any attempt should, or can, be made to deal with this problem now. The question should not be raised at this stage, but will have to wait for some time. Only when the other problems of West Asia have advanced towards a solution and the passions have cooled to some extent can this difficult problem be tackled."

The relevance of these remarks of Jawaharlal Nehru to the present situation is obvious.

An Afro-Asian Approach

It is also important to note that Indian policy towards Palestine has been in accord with the position taken by a number of other Asian and African non-aligned countries. The communique issued after the 1955 Bandung Conference subscribed by 29 Asian-African countries stated that:

"1. In view of the existing tension in the Middle East, caused by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that

1. Jawaharlal Nehru: India's Foreign Policy; Selected Speeches, September 1946-April, 1961 (page 46).

tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question."

The joint statement of the then Prime Minister of India, the President of Yugoslavia and the President of Egypt issued at Brioni on 20th July, 1956 reaffirmed the Bandung Resolution in the following terms:

"The situation in Palestine is particularly one of danger to world peace. The Heads of Governments support the resolution of the Bandung Conference in this regard."

On 14th November, 1956, the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India issued a joint statement in New Delhi which *inter alia* referred to the tripartite aggression on Egypt that year. After noting with satisfaction the impressive expression of world opinion against the aggression on Egypt it was stated:

"The Prime Ministers, however, view with regret that these armed forces have not yet been withdrawn and that various conditions have been laid down by the Governments of the aggressor countries which, according to them, should be fulfilled prior to withdrawal. The Prime Ministers strongly disapprove of any such conditions being laid down and consider such reservations as contrary to the directions of the United Nations General Assembly. They are of the opinion that the resolutions of the General Assembly should be implemented in their entirety forthwith, and all foreign forces should be withdrawn from Egyptian territory."¹

The extract cited above makes it clear that the four Prime Ministers strongly disapproved of any attempts to attach conditions to the withdrawal of troops from Egypt. (This viewpoint is again to be found in the position taken up by India in the Security Council and the Emergency Session of the General Assembly regarding the

1. Upon the suggestion of the Prime Minister of Indonesia, a meeting of the Colombo Powers was held between 12th and 14th November at New Delhi to consider more especially the tripartite aggression on Egypt as well as situation in Hungary. The Prime Minister of Pakistan could not attend "owing to other pre-occupations."

present West Asian crisis). Prime Minister Nehru emphasised this point in the Lok Sabha on 15th November, 1956, where he pointed out that:

"The first question that arises in Egypt at the present moment in regard to the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly is that of the withdrawal of the Anglo-French and the Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. This is a dangerous issue because if there is any attempt not to withdraw, there is likely to be a resumption of hostilities which, I think, will be on a bigger scale than earlier."

The First Non-aligned Nations Conference, Belgrade, 1961

The first Non-aligned Nations Conference held in Belgrade in September 1961 was attended by 25 countries including India with three Latin American countries represented by observers. Paragraph 10 of the "Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries" reads as follows:

"The participants in the Conference condemn the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their full support for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and Resolutions of the United Nations."

The Second Non-aligned Nations Conference, Cairo, 1964

The declaration of the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries, adopted at Cairo, in October, 1964, stated that:

"The Conference condemns the imperialistic policy pursued in the Middle East and, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, decides to:

- (1) endorse the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland, and their inalienable right to self-determination;
- (2) declare their full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism."

Mo. Jaf
Meanwhile Indian
public opinion
towards the Arabs
has changed &
the policy of
not of line with
Majority Indian
Opinion.

It will be seen from this brief survey of India's attitude to the Palestine problem that the position adopted by India in 1967 in the West Asian crisis is not an innovation or departure from the fundamental tenets of India's policy. The basis of that policy was laid down by Mahatma Gandhi and the leaders of India's struggle for independence. And independent India has continued to recognise and support the legitimate rights of the Arabs in Palestine. At the same time, India has also recognised as a fact that the State of Israel has come to exist. India fully recognises the deep-rooted sentiments on either side which make it clear that any enduring settlement in West Asia can be evolved only after passions have cooled down. As pointed out by Jawaharlal Nehru, solutions to other aspects of the West Asian crisis would have to be arrived at first before the climate can be created in which a meaningful solution to the basic problem could be found. The question of the legitimate rights of the Arab refugees from Palestine, which have been recognised year in and year out by the U.N. General Assembly, on the basis of its resolution 194 (iii), constitutes a matter of the utmost urgency and their implementation would do much to relieve the tension in that area. Equally, the fact that Israel has occupied much more territory than was contemplated under the original General Assembly resolution 181(ii)A of 29th November, 1947, should also be borne in mind, along with the question of the use of waters of the River Jordan. These are all ancillary to the main problem but are nevertheless important and their solution could lead the way to a resolution of the underlying conflict itself. It is no doubt extremely important to strive for peace and co-existence in West Asia. But to attempt to foist a permanent solution in West Asia on the basis of Israeli occupation of vast areas of its Arab neighbours, is to fly in the face of the U.N. Charter and it is certain that no such settlement can endure for long.

It is India's hope that not only in the Arab-Israeli conflict but in all other such conflicts, present and future, independent nations of the world, particularly those who have been victims of aggression in the past will stand by the principle that aggression must not be allowed to pay. In the imperfect world in which we live, aggressive forces of various kinds would have to be discouraged continuously by firm and effective action on the part of the world community and by well-articulated world opinion. Only by doing so can we hope to achieve international peace and co-existence.

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO UK. MISSION NEW YORK

TELNO 5704

23 OCTOBER 1967

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ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 5704 OF 23 OCTOBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON NEW DELHI MOSCOW PARIS
TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 2795 (NOT TO DELHI): MIDDLE EAST.

WE WERE SORRY TO LEARN OF QUOTE DISTURBING RUMOURS THAT AMONGST
THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR CONTINUES TO BE
MORE ARAB THAN THE ARABS. UNQUOTE. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF,
AS THE MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CLOSEST TO THE UAR, INDIA
WERE UNNECESSARILY TO COMPLICATE THE TASK OF THE NON-PERMANENT
MEMBERS IN SEEKING AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION.

2. THE PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY WOULD, IF RECOMMENDED, BE
PREPARED TO SPEAK TO THE ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER. WE ARE,
HOWEVER, NOT SURE THAT THIS WOULD BE EFFECTIVE SINCE THERE IS
NO INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY AND PARTHA-SARATHI HAS MRS. GANDHI'S
CONFIDENCE AND IS QUITE PROBABLY REFLECTING HER VIEWS. WE WOULD
BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ADVICE AND TO KNOW WHETHER YOU WOULD
RECOMMEND AN APPROACH AT A HIGH LEVEL IN DELHI?

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IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
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TO FOREIGN OFFICE
23 OCTOBER 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2834 OF 23 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 5704: MIDDLE EAST.

I SHOULD MUCH PREFER TO HANDLE THIS IN NEW YORK WITH PARTHASARATHI DIRECT. I THINK IT WOULD MAKE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE INDIAN MISSION HERE MORE DIFFICULT IF ANYTHING WERE SAID IN NEW DELHI, AND I DOUBT IF PARTHASARATHI'S ACTIVITIES HAVE A MALICIOUS INTENT. IF WE DO REACH A POINT WHERE ANY APPROACH IN NEW DELHI MIGHT HELP, I WILL TELEGRAPH ACCORDINGLY, BUT IN THE MEANTIME I HOPE NOTHING WILL BE SAID THERE OR IN LONDON.

F.O. PASS NEW DELHI 65, MOSCOW 486, PARIS 467, TEL AVIV 490 AND AMMAN 356.

LORD CARADON

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2831 23 OCTOBER

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2831 OF 23 OCTOBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV
AMMAN AND SAIGON TO CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 2795.

MIDDLE EAST.

WE LEARNED SUBSEQUENTLY THAT LAST FRIDAY PARTHASARATHI (INDIA)
PRESENTED A DRAFT RESOLUTION TO THE AFRO-ASIAN AND LATIN MEMBERS
OF THE COUNCIL. THIS DRAFT RESOLUTION IS SET OUT IN M.I.F.T.

2. WE FIRST HEARD OF THIS FROM RUDA (ARGENTINA) WHO CAME TO TELL
US ABOUT IT AT ONCE AND ON SATURDAY MORNING BERARD (FRANCE)
CAME TO SPEAK TO ME ABOUT THIS DRAFT. IT WAS NOT TILL THIS MORNING
THAT I KNEW THAT IT HAD BEEN WIDELY DISTRIBUTED.

3. I HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT.

(A) PARAGRAPH 1 (I) : THE DATE SHOULD BE OMITTED.

(B) PARAGRAPH 1 (V) : WE THINK THAT REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS (THE INTENTION PRESUMABLY IS TO REFER
TO THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION AND THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS)
SHOULD BE DROPPED, SINCE WE DONT WANT A MERE RETURN TO THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENTS.

(C) PARAGRAPH 1 (VII) : WE THINK THAT THE PHRASE "IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS" SHOULD BE DROPPED SINCE THIS WOULD
TIE ACTION TO OLD RESOLUTIONS WHICH MAY NOT NOW BE WORKABLE.

(D) PARAGRAPH 2 : THE WORDS "AND REPORT TO THE COUNCIL WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS" SHOULD BE DROPPED.

4. APART FROM THESE CRITICISMS WE THINK THAT THE PRESENTATION
AND BALANCE OF THE RESOLUTION ARE BAD (BUT COULD WITH RE-DRAFTING
BE IMPROVED).

5. NEVERTHELESS THE DRAFT DOES INCLUDE SOME USEFUL PROVISIONS. THE
/REQUIREMENT

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REQUIREMENT THAT RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE "OBLIGATORY" IS TO THE GOOD, AND THE CALL FOR TERMINATION OF "THE STATE OR CLAIM OF BELLIGERENCY" IS CLEAR ENOUGH. THE CLAUSE ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IS WELCOME PARTICULARLY BECAUSE IT IS NOT TIED TO THE SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

6. I SHALL TRY TO SUMMARISE THE REACTIONS TO THE INDIAN INITIATIVE. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS THROUGH THE DAY AND I HAVE MYSELF SEEN RIAD (UAR), RIFAI (JORDAN), RAFAEL (ISRAEL) AND KUZNETSOV (USSR). I HAVE ALSO HAD A DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY AND MALITZA (RUMANIA).

7. THE AMERICANS REACTED VERY STRONGLY AGAINST THE INDIAN TEXT AND HAVE BEEN URGING CANADA AND DENMARK TO OPPOSE IT AMONGST THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS. THE AMERICANS HAVE ALSO BEEN WORKING ON THE LATIN AMERICANS AND HAVE SEEN RIAD AND EL-FARRA (JORDAN). (THEY STILL HOPE THAT THE ARABS MAY BE CONTENT WITH SOME STATEMENT ABOUT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY INSTEAD OF A REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL). THEY ARE URGING THAT MORE TIME IS REQUIRED AND ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE INDIAN DRAFT WILL BE ERODED OUT OF RECOGNITION AMONGST THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS. THE JAPANESE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (TSURUOKA) AND THE WESTERN NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AND TO SOME EXTENT THE LATIN NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS TOO HAVE BEEN INDIGNANT THAT THE INDIANS SHOULD HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE AND DISTRIBUTED THEIR TEXT PRIVATELY BEFORE THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENDEAVOUR TO REACH A COMMON CONCLUSION. WHEN THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS MET AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF HEATED TALK. RUDA (ARGENTINA), WITH BRAZILIAN SUPPORT, STARTED TO AMEND THE INDIAN TEXT AND THE DANES SAID THAT THEY WOULD PREPARE A TEXT OF THEIR OWN. THE CANADIANS ARE THINKING OF GOING BACK TO THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL (PUT FORWARD BY PAUL MARTIN IN HIS SPEECH TO THE ASSEMBLY) IN FAVOUR OF SENDING THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH A MINIMUM MANDATE. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS SHOULD MEET AGAIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF WEDNESDAY 25 OCTOBER.

8. BERARD (FRANCE) AND RIAD (UAR) AND RIFAI (JORDAN) AND THE
/RUMANIANS

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RUMANIANS AND KUZNETSOV (USSR) ALL MAINTAINED THAT THE INDIAN DRAFT WENT FURTHER THAN ANYTHING THE ARABS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT, AND THEY WERE SURPRISED WHEN I TOLD THEM THAT NOT ONLY HAD WE SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO PARTICULAR PROVISIONS BUT ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THE DRAFT WAS FAR FROM THE BALANCED TEXT WHICH WE THOUGHT ESSENTIAL. BOTH RIAD AND RIFAI SAID THAT REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL WAS VITAL AND KUZNETSOV WAS AT PAINS TO MAKE CLEAR TO ME THAT THE USSR HAD NOT AGREED TO THE OMISSION OF THE DATE (5 JUNE).

9. RAFAEL SPOKE STRONGLY AGAINST THE DRAFT BUT IT WAS INTERESTING THAT HE PERSONALLY ARGUED IN FAVOUR OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE PROVIDED HE WAS NOT SADDLED WITH ANY MANDATE OR THAT THE PURPOSE STATED SHOULD BE SOMETHING LIKE 'WITHDRAWAL IN PEACE TO SECURE AND AGREED FRONTIERS'.

10. THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY SAID THAT HE HIMSELF WAS PREPARED TO DELAY THE DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE ASSEMBLY FOR A SHORT PERIOD BUT THAT HE COULD NOT ON HIS AUTHORITY POSTPONE THE DEBATE FOR LONG. I URGED HIM AT LEAST TO GIVE TILL NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS TO PROCEED AND HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

11. MOST OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS, BACKED BY A WISH TO SEE PROGRESS AMONGST THE GENERAL MEMBERSHIP, WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO FIND A BALANCED DRAFT WITH A GOOD DEAL OF SUBSTANCE IN IT. KUZNETSOV ON HIS SIDE IS ANXIOUS, I FEEL SURE, TO WORK FOR
/AGREEMENT

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AGREEMENT (BUT ONLY ON TERMS WHICH THE UAR WILL ACCEPT). THE AMERICANS AND THE CANADIANS WILL DO THEIR BEST TO GET AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE TO A MERE PREAMBULAR STATEMENT OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. IN THE END I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO SEE A COMPROMISE ARRIVED AT BY KUZNETSOV AND GOLDBERG BUT THE GAP IS STILL BIG. WE ON OUR SIDE CONTINUE TO STRESS THE URGENCY AND ARGUE FOR A ATRULY BALANCED DRAFT CLEARLY STATING THE MAIN PRINCIPLES, TOGETHER WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. I THINK THAT THE CONSISTENT AND IMPARTIAL LINE WE HAVE TAKEN IS BEGINNING TO HAVE SOME EFFECT.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 484, PARIS NO. 465, AMMAN NO. 353,
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TELNO. 2851

24 OCTOBER 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2851 OF 24 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, MOSCOW, PARIS AND SAO PAULO AND BEIRUT.

MY TELNO. 2839: MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

THE COUNCIL THIS EVENING OPENED WITH THE EXPECTED EXCHANGE OF RECRIMINATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND ISRAEL ON THE SHELLING OF SUEZ AND THE SINKING OF THE EILAT. THE UAR CALLED FOR THE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AND CHAPTER VII MEASURES AGAINST HER. SPEAKING IN

SUPPORT OF THE UAR THE SOVIET UNION INTRODUCED ORALLY A DRAFT RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL AND CALLING UPON HER TO PAY COMPENSATION. AS EXPECTED JORDAN SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THE UAR AS DID INDIA (ALTHOUGH INDIA ALSO EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE SINKING OF THE EILAT AND ASKED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION).

2. I SPOKE AFTER THE UAR AND ISRAEL TO DEPLORE THE DELAY WHICH HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE AND URGE THE NEED TO PASS URGENTLY A FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION. BOTH CANADA, ARGENTINE AND ALSO ETHIOPIA AND INDIA SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THIS. GOLDBERG INTRODUCED A RESOLUTION CALLING

FOR THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR BOTH SIDES TO OBSERVE IT SCRUPULOUSLY. HE ADDED THAT NEW STEPS WERE NEEDED TOWARDS A DURABLE PEACE AND THE U.S. WERE READY TO SUPPORT THIS.

3. IF EITHER RESOLUTION HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO A VOTE TONIGHT WE COULD CLEARLY HAVE VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE AMERICAN TEXT: AND ABSTAINED ON THE SOVIET TEXT WHICH WOULD HAVE FAILED FOR LACK OF 9 VOTES. IF THEY ARE PRESSED TO VOTE TOMORROW MORNING WE CAN FOLLOW THE SAME COURSE. BUT EVEN IF THE U.S. TEXT IS PASSED WE

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SHOULD CLEARLY INSIST THAT THIS SHOULD BE ONLY AN INTERIM MEASURE AND SEEK TO SET THE COUNCIL, NOW THAT IT HAS BEEN CONVENED, TO WORK URGENTLY ON DRAWING UP THE FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION APPOINTING A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR SO LONG.

4. THIS IS I BELIEVE THE WISH OF MOST OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AND GOLDBERG SAID TONIGHT THAT HE THINKS THE TIME HAS COME TO GO AHEAD WITH A BALANCED RESOLUTION. BUT THERE ARE STILL SNAGS.

F.O. PASS TEL AVIV 497, AMMAN 361 MOSCOW 490, PARIS 471 AND
SAVING TO CAIRO 178 AND BEIRUT 98.
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Mr. P. M. S. A. D.

With the compliments of

A.A. Middle East

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24 OCTOBER 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2843 OF 24 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND SAUVING TO BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

MY TELNO. 2831: MIDDLE EAST. (F2:42)

THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT TODAY (BEFORE WE HEARD THIS EVENING THAT THE U.A.R. HAD CALLED FOR AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL) WAS THE NEW INITIATIVE TAKEN BY FOREIGN MINISTER TABOR OF DENMARK. IN PREPARATION FOR THE MEETING OF NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FIXED FOR TOMORROW AFTERNOON (25 OCTOBER) HE HAD WORKED ON A NEW DRAFT RESOLUTION AND HAD BEEN IN CONSULTATION WITH RIAD (U.A.R.) AND RAFAEL (ISRAEL). TABOR TOOK AS THE BASIS FOR HIS DRAFT THE LONGER DRAFT RECENTLY GIVEN TO US BY GOLDBERG (MY TELNO. 2767). BUT HE HAD EXTENDED AND STRENGTHENED THE OPERATIVE CLAUSES OF THAT DRAFT. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD OBTAINED THE APPROVAL OF RIAD FOR THE WHOLE TEXT WITHOUT MENTION OF A DATE (5 JUNE) BUT WITH A PHRASE COVERING WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED DURING THE RECENT CONFLICT. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE DRAFT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO RAFAEL SUBJECT ONLY TO RAFAEL'S OBJECTION TO THE PASSAGE ON WITHDRAWAL. BUT HE HAD NOT YET CONSULTED EBAN WHO WAS NOT DUE IN NEW YORK FROM WASHINGTON UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING. TABOR WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO GIVE US OR ANYONE ELSE THE TEXT OF HIS DRAFT SINCE HE DID NOT WISH ANOTHER DRAFT TO BE CIRCULATED BEFORE HE HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION WITH ALL THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TOMORROW.

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2. I LATER SAW GOLDBERG WHO AGREED WITH ME THAT TABOR WAS WORKING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. INDEED, GOLDBERG CLAIMED THAT HE HAD ENCOURAGED TABOR TO TAKE THIS INITIATIVE.

3. EARLIER TODAY I SAW PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) WHO WAS VERY SORE WITH ME AND OTHERS WHO HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THE SO-CALLED INDIAN DRAFT AND PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THAT DRAFT BEFORE ALL THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN ABLE TO SEE IT AND TO COME TO A CONCLUSION ABOUT IT. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE HAD NOT DISTRIBUTED THE DRAFT TO ANYONE OTHER THAN NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS. HE WAS ALSO UPSET THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT I HAD DESCRIBED THE INDIAN DRAFT AS AN ARAB DRAFT. THIS HE DENIED, THOUGH WE HAVE REASON TO KNOW THAT THE DRAFT WAS PREPARED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF ARAB DELEGATIONS. CERTAINLY THE WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INDIAN DRAFT DID HARM, BUT WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE NEW DANISH INITIATIVE (WHICH WE EXPECT TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE CANADIANS AND, WE HOPE, BY THE LATIN AMERICANS TOO) WILL HELP TO GET THINGS BACK ON THE RAILS.

4. WE HOPE THAT THE RECRIMINATIONS BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL AT TONIGHT'S MEETING OF THE COUNCIL WILL NOT SET EVERYTHING BACK. IT MAY BE, ON THE CONTRARY, THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WILL MAKE THE COUNCIL MORE ANXIOUS TO TAKE A FIRST STEP URGENTLY IN THE DIRECTION OF A SETTLEMENT.

F.O. PASS M AMMAN 360, MOSCOW 488, PARIS 469, TEL AVIV 494, AND SAVING TO BEIRUT 96 AND CAIRO 175.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0023Z 25 OCTOBER
RECD 0055Z 25 OCTOBER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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U.N. DEPT.
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81 (A)

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By Bag. SAVING TELEGRAM
NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 44 Saving.

10 October 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

p.c. 12/5/69.

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 44 Saving of 10 October,
Repeated for information Saving to UKMIS New York, Washington, Moscow, Cairo, Paris, Tel Aviv, Amman.

West Asia.

Azim Husain, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, asked me to call on 10 October on another matter. He then raised the West Asia situation. He appeared to be talking fairly casually and at random. His points in a brief conversation were as follows:-

- (a) Indian Government were delighted at the announcement of Sir H. Beeley's visit to Cairo. Dr. Fawzi had told them that it was Nasser's intention to seek to reopen diplomatic relations with Britain. Indians believed that this would be greatly in the interests of a solution to the West Asia problem. Husain himself, who has served with Beeley, believes that he is a singularly good choice to explore the situation and alleges that he is very highly thought of by Nasser's circle.
- (b) Indian Government believe that time is running out for a solution. If the problem is not solved during the present session in New York, it may drag on indefinitely. The result would be growing instability in the Arab countries and the probability that the 'moderates' would be displaced by extremists.
- (c) The U.A.R. Government is, according to Indian understanding, firmly in the moderate camp at present and will go a long way to get a settlement, provided face can be saved. The problem is to get the Israelis to accept a U.N. solution at all. This will require both constructive and firm action by the Security Council and pressure from the U.S. But the Americans seem to have less sense of urgency about West Asia than would be desired. Was it not open to us to galvanise the U.S. into activity? In any case one good result of a resumption of relations between Britain and the U.A.R. might be that Her Majesty's Government, understanding the limits of the Arab position, could bring pressure on both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. towards a realistic solution in the Security Council.

- 2. That was about all. I answered non-committally, while expressing pleasure at the constructive tone in which Husain had spoken. We agreed to keep in touch on this matter when either had anything likely to be of interest to the other.

Mr. Freeman.

Recd. 11 October.

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27 OCT 1967

1A

India & Mid East

W

DAILY TELEGRAPH

LONDON DAY BY DAY

Princely Propaganda

THE "trade union" the Indian princes set up in August to protect their privy purses is at last moving into action with a publicity drive. This has been launched on the eve of this weekend's committee session

of the All-India Congress at Jabalpur. The abolition of the princely pensions, as recommended by a Congress working committee, is one of the main items on the agenda.

The former rulers' propaganda comes in the form of handsomely printed brochures and booklets, packed with extracts from newspaper editorials and statements by prominent people favouring their cause.

"Breach of Faith" is the title of the chief hand-out. Like the others, it names no editorial source but only the printers—a co-operative organisation.

Times

Peacemaker's reward

I GATHER from Indian sources in London that Mrs. Gandhi must have received an unpleasant surprise when the news of the latest clash in the Middle East reached her last Saturday. It came only a matter of hours after she had left Cairo optimistic that her peacemaking mission had been a success.

Mrs. Gandhi arrived in Cairo on Thursday, October 19, and had a series of talks with President Nasser. He was very cordial, and at his own request had luncheon at the Indian embassy on Friday with an all-Indian menu. It was, he told Mrs. Gandhi, his first meal outside the Presidential Palace since the June war.

At 9.30 a.m. on Saturday she left to a 21-gun salute—usually reserved for heads of state—and arrived in New Delhi six hours later—just after according to *Al-Ahram*, the Port Said Naval Command gave the all clear to the patrolling Egyptian boat to "engage" the Israeli destroyer Eilat "if necessary".

At 5.28 a third boat—again according to the U.A.R. version—opened fire on the Eilat—after they claimed it had violated territorial waters. By this time, Mrs. Gandhi, was at a meeting at Jabalpur, in central India.

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ARCHIVES No. 57
27 OCT 1967

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South Asia Dept

B3/16

C.O.



With the compliments of

FOREIGN OFFICE

PA W

LONDON, S.W.1.

20. October 1967



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1904/3/67

British Residency,
BAHRAIN.

RESTRICTED

5 October, 1967.

(7c)x

Indian Consular Work in the Gulf

Please refer to your letter 1901/67C. of 23 September. ①

2. Shaikh Issa has in fact made some minor concessions to the Indians on the lines reported to you by Mr. Kapur. I enclose a copy of Tony Parsons letter 1903/67 of 17 April and its enclosure, which will put you in the picture. B133/4
Revised

3. A copy of this letter with enclosures goes to Simon Nuttall in Abu Dhabi, Ronald Boyle in Doha and Donald Pragnell in Muscat, and without enclosures to Michael Weston and to Ken Oldfield.

(M.R. Melhuish).

T.J. Clark,
DUBAI.

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B3/16
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South Asia Dept.


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


LONDON, S.W.1.

12. October 1967.

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H. B. M. POLITICAL AGENCY,
TRUCIAL STATES,
DUBAI

23 September, 1967

(1901/670)

Indian Consular Work in the Gulf

I received this morning a visit from Mr. Kapur, First Secretary (Consular) at the Indian Embassy at Baghdad. He told me, among other things, that Shaikh Easa had agreed that the Indian Trade Agent in Bahrain could carry out minor consular work, such as attesting signatures or emigration documents from the Indian Government.

2. Mr. Kapur did not say whether you had agreed to this arrangement and, not wishing to show too much interest as he was accompanied by the Indian Trade Agent in Dubai, I did not ask him. I should be grateful if you would let me know what has been agreed in case this forms a precedent for a request from the Indian Trade Agent here for similar freedom.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to Ken Oldfield at the Agency in Bahrain and to Michael Weston in Arabian Department.

(T. J. Clark)

M. R. Melhuish Esq.,
Residency,
Bahrain

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78



Mr J. Waterfield wdt 7/10

PL 31/1

British High Commission,

New Delhi

6 October 1967

Dear Sir,

Middle East

(77)

In my letter PL 31/1 of 26 September I promised that we should be reporting later on the visit of the U.A.R. Deputy Premier, Mahmoud Fawzi, to India.

2. Fawzi visited Delhi from 24 to 27 September, but we have been able to glean very little about his visit. His presence here attracted little attention in the press and although he had conversations with Mrs. Gandhi and Swaran Singh I am afraid that we have not, so far, obtained any information at all on what passed.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to Spears in North and East Africa Department, Foreign Office.

*yours ever
John Waterfield*

(J. P. Waterfield)

Pa. 12/1/67

W. L. Allinson, Esq., MVO,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.



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British High Commission,
New Delhi.

26 September, 1967.

PL 31/1

Ray
Mr Turner has not
yet read his copy.
Has it gone?
4/10

Ray → *Copy to Mr Turner NEW UN*
Eastern Day FO

Dear Sir, → *Mr Russell consult with Mr Turner*
to see if we can give
further guidance
Wb28/9

Middle East

... I enclose a copy of a minute by David Cole giving an account of a discussion on the Middle East which he had with Azim Husain, the Secretary (E.A. II) in the Ministry of External Affairs, on whom he called on 21 September. The record of the High Commissioner's conversation with T.N. Kaul, referred to in Cole's paragraph 6, was enclosed with Slater's letter PL 31/1 of 5 September to Allinson. Since Cole's minute was written Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, the U.A.R. Deputy Premier, arrived on 24 September and has had talks with Mrs. Gandhi and Swaran Singh, who will lead the Indian U.N. Delegation. We shall report more fully on Fawzi's visit later.

2. I am sending copies of this letter to Speares, North and East African Department, Foreign Office; Youde at the U.K. Mission, New York; Williams in Moscow and Gilmore in Washington and I enclose two extra copies.

yours ever.

John Waterfield

(J.P. WATERFIELD)

W.L. Allinson, Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

P.O. 12/5/67



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77 (A)
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Reference.....

H.E. 22/9
Head of Charge *Orw* ix
Middle East

Record of conversation with
Mr. Azim Husain on 21 September

When I paid my first call on Mr. Azim Husain yesterday afternoon he ended a conversation about generalities with a long dissertation on the problem of a settlement in "West Asia".

2. Mr. Husain said that the situation was causing his Government acute concern, particularly in view of the serious damage the closure of the Canal was imposing on India's material interests. India had been doing everything possible to exercise a "moderating" influence on the U.A.R. and to encourage them and the other Arabs to adopt a flexible and realistic attitude. But the prospects now seemed pretty bleak. The Foreign Minister had received a communication from Mr. Eban setting out Israel's basic position. This communication included the following ~~basic~~ points:

- (a) Israel no longer considered herself bound by the 1949 settlement
- (b) Israel was not prepared to accept guarantees from the United Nations or from the "Great Powers"
- (c) The Arab countries must negotiate separately and individual agreements with Israel.

The implication in these points and elsewhere in the communication was that Israel was prepared to give very little away on borders.

3. This Israeli attitude was so unforthcoming that it seemed to destroy all hopes of a settlement and could only greatly embitter the problem for the future. It would also weaken the position of the moderates in Cairo amongst whom President Nasser himself must now be included. The only hope was that the other powers could induce Israel to adopt a more flexible attitude. The Indians had already had exchanges with the Americans which Mr. Husain led me to believe had not been very productive.


4. Mr. Husain mentioned that there had also been discussions in London between the Foreign Office and the Acting Indian High Commissioner: but he would also like to keep in touch with us here. He mentioned, in this context that the British proposal for a mediator was quite unacceptable to the Arabs.

5. Mr. Husain obviously recognised that I had been out of touch with affairs for some weeks but he nevertheless went ahead in what turned out to be a fairly lengthy dissertation of the present position as he saw it through Indian eyes. I felt that, particularly during the early part of his remarks when he was talking about India's efforts to apply a moderating influence on the Arabs, he was trying in a rather defensive way to justify to me India's recent Middle Eastern policy. Later on, he was clearly trying to invoke my interest in the proposition that attempts must be made to persuade the Israelis to adopt a more flexible attitude. It was left that we might have a further conversation later on if that seemed likely to be useful.

6. I have since seen the High Commissioner's record of his discussion with Mr. Kaul on the 30 August. The line taken by

/Mr. Husain

Mr. Husain seems to be fairly closely in accord with remarks made to the High Commissioner by Mr. Kaul.



(D.L. Cole)

22 September 1967

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

P.U.S.

Mr Hunt

~~Mr Duff~~ ←

MR. Edmundo

Mr Purcell

P. Copy 5/10/67
W New Delhi

Wt 27/9

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ARCHIVES No. 57
26 SEP 1967

SE 2/2

New Delhi (76)

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE
FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE INDIAN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N.
HELD AT THE CARLYLE HOTEL ON FRIDAY,
22 SEPTEMBER, 1967 AT 4.20 p.m.

Present:

The Rt. Hon. George
Brown, M.P.

Mr. G. Partha-
serathi

Lord Caradon

Mr. P.T. Hayman

Mr. T.F. Brenchley

The Middle East

Mr. Brown asked the Indian Permanent Representative what immediate progress could be made with the Middle East problem in the United Nations. Mr. Gromyko's speech at the General Assembly did not seem to be very helpful.

2. Mr. Parthaserathi agreed that Mr. Gromyko had not been forthcoming but he thought that Mr. Goldberg's speech had been equally unhelpful. He had appeared to use a rather different formula on the subject of withdrawal than had been used in the "Dobrynin Draft Resolution" in July. The Indian Permanent Representative

/went

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went on to say that according to information that he had received from Mr. Gromyko two days ago the Russians were prepared in principle to accept the "Dobrynin Resolution" as the basis of negotiation provided that this was acceptable to the Arabs. This meant that they would adhere ^{strictly} to the formula contained in the Resolution and would not ^{for example} agree that ships under the Israeli flag could use the Suez Canal.

3. Mr. Brown noted that Mr. Gromyko had made no mention of the Tito proposals in his speech.

4. Mr. Parthaserathi said that he did not think that the Tito proposals could form a basis for negotiation since they were not acceptable to the Americans.

5. Mr. Parthaserathi said that he hoped that Mr. Brown would see the Egyptian Foreign Minister as soon as he arrived. His attitude would be crucial. The other Arab representatives would be waiting for him to express his views.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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6. Mr. Brown said that he intended to see Mahmud Riad as soon as possible. He was pleased to learn from Mr. Parthaserathi that there was a chance for making progress.

7. Mr. Parthaserathi agreed with Mr. Brown in saying that the Security Council was the right forum for the Middle East problem to be discussed but the discussion must take place on the basis of some concrete proposal. It was no good just referring the matter in general to the Security Council.

Vietnam

8. Mr. Parthaserathi said that the Indian Government had recently been in touch with Hanoi. In his view Hanoi would respond favourably to an initiative once there had been a cessation of American bombing. Was Mr. Brown thinking of taking any further initiative in this matter such as for example convening the Geneva Conference as one of the co-chairmen?

9. Mr. Brown replied that if he received an assurance from some highly placed North Vietnamese source /that

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that talks would follow if the Americans stopped the bombing he would take action. It would very much strengthen his hand however if Hanoi were to go further than this and would give a pledge that their own military activities ^{in South Vietnam} would cease also. This kind of assurance was ~~really what~~ was needed before real progress could be made.

10. Mr. Parthaserathi promised that there would be further communication with Hanoi on this matter.

P.T.F.
22/9/67

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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25 SEP 1967

BY BAG SAVING TELEGRAM

RABAT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TEL.NO. 14 - SAVING - 22 September, 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 14 Saving of 22 September. Repeated for information Saving to Belgrade. No. 1.

TITO PLAN

The Yugoslav President's special envoy, M. Petar Stambolic, visited Morocco from 14 to 18 September as the bearer of a personal message from Tito to King Hassan. The Moroccan Government have held their cards very close to their chest and have revealed nothing about the visit, not even a communiqué. M. Stambolic on the other hand, in a statement made on his departure, said that a close similarity of view had become apparent in his discussions with the King on the Middle East crisis and the Yugoslav proposals for its solution. For the rest, he merely underlined the friendly relations that existed between the two countries and expressed the hope that they would continue to develop further.


2. Repeated for information Saving to Belgrade No. 1.

Mr. WALKER

R. 25 September 1967

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27/9

No.

SOUTH ASIA SEPT

e.o.

With the compliments of

NORTH AND EAST AFRICAN
DEPARTMENT.

Reference to previous correspondence:

Copies also sent to:



FOREIGN OFFICE

21 SEPTEMBER, 1967.

Emperor Will Visit India Soon

ADDIS ABABA, Thursday, (ENA)

— His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie I this morning accepted an invitation to visit India.

The Emperor had previously been invited to visit India, by the former president of India, H.E. Mr. Radhakrishnan. Now the new President, H. E. Dr. Zakir Husain, has renewed the invitation which the Emperor accepted.

The date of the state visit will be fixed later. The invitation was presented to His Imperial Majesty today by the Indian ambassador to Ethiopia, H.E. Mr. K.L. Mehta at an audience at the Grand Palace.

The Emperor also received today Mr. Goenka, an Indian industrialist who is here to see the progress made by the new woollen factory at Gefersa.

Later this morning His Imperial Majesty gave an audience to two parliamentarians who are leaving for Geneva to attend the conference of World Parliament Union. The two MPs are the Hon. Shashorasha Zewde Attero and the Hon. Ato Tadesso Taye.

Pa B
12/1/67

PL 31/1

PL 31/14/9



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW DELHI.

Reg: Entirely recommending to the Dept

Copies to No. 2 Admin Dept For

Eastern Dept For

Civil & Crim Dept } c.o. Wt 8/1

NEWSPAPER DEPT

Dear Sir,

13:9

(68) In our telegram No. 1840 of 31 August, the High Commissioner reported a recent conversation with T.N. Kaul in which the latter betrayed awareness that Indian policy in the Middle East had reached an impasse and that something should be done to secure the reopening of the Canal. I now enclose a copy of the High Commissioner's minute regarding this conversation.

.....

2. The U.S. Embassy have told us that Ambassador Bowles had a conversation with Azim Husain on 30 August, during which the latter took a somewhat similar line. Husain opened the subject by saying that the Government of India "under-scored" (Ambassador Bowles' wording) the recent solution to the Middle East crisis proposed by the USSR and the USA "although the solution had not been acceptable to the Arabs". Husain went on to say that the present deadlock was regrettable, that the great powers must do something to resolve it, and that the Government of India would be prepared to associate themselves with any constructive moves in this direction. President Nasser, claimed Husain, was disposed to seek a solution but his problem was that he did not know what terms the Israelis wanted. Could Ambassador Bowles, as a result of his recent visit to Washington, say what the Israeli terms were? Bowles' reply was non-committal.


3. Husain was apparently not specific as to how much help could be expected from India in the search for a solution and both we and the Americans are somewhat sceptical about how seriously this apparently helpful attitude can be taken.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Gilmore in Washington, the Heads of Chancery at the U.K. Mission, New York and Moscow, and I enclose two extra copies.

Yours ever

D. Slater.

W.L. Allison Esq.,
South Asia Dept.,
Commonwealth Office.



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Middle East Crisis

During a cocktail conversation with T.N. Kaul on 30 August the talk turned to West Asia. Mr. Kaul said that the present situation was becoming intolerable to India and, he supposed, to Britain. Could we not concert our efforts to get the Canal reopened. Nasser was in a moderate mood but was being driven into a corner by Algeria and Syria. He was in danger of collapse if he was not helped out of his difficulties. The Indian view was that he could be replaced only by a successor who would be far more difficult to deal with. I said that I had discussed that morning with the Foreign Secretary the problem of the canal, but I had formed the impression that, in the Government of India's view, they could do little at present. 'Well, we should be able to', said Kaul, 'and so should you'. But he gave no indication of what GOI (or ourselves) should do; and I doubt if he knows. Altogether I am inclined not to take these remarks too seriously. They probably link up with Apa Pant's views. But inside MEA Kaul is apt to be somewhat flighty in his ideas and, though he is far more reportable than Dayal, I guess that for the moment Dayal's view is that of the Department. Moreover Kaul may well be prompted by the wish to mobilise opinion and effort to save Nasser - as I suspect Pant is. Whether any sort of identification with such a purpose is a British interest I leave others to determine.

2. I must add that throughout this conversation Kaul adopted an unusually relaxed and warm attitude and I was left wondering whether this had rather more than personal significance. He may be one of those who now realises that recent Indian foreign policy has been totally self-defeating, and I think we should watch for any further signs that he may be trying to clear his lines to us.

JOHN FREEMAN.
August 31, 1967.

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22
O/o SE 2/114

Mr. Duff ⑦
73

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BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

1 September, 1967.

PA 1
13/9
Dear Hunt,

Separate
note

Call on New Indian Foreign Secretary

As forecast in my telegram No. 1785 (not to all) I called on the new Indian Foreign Secretary, Rajeshwar Dayal, on 30 August, partly as a courtesy on his assumption of office, and partly to discuss the various outstanding matters. 4:9

④ We discussed events at Peking, the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty and Security Assurances for India, the situation in the Middle East and Indo-Pakistan relations; I enclose as Annexes a separate record on each of these subjects. Dayal did not raise with me the question of the British Indian Ocean Territories. I was grateful to have the benefit of the guidance on the Middle East contained in Commonwealth Office telegram No. 1854 and for the documents on the Non-Proliferation Treaty enclosed with Allinson's letter of 25 August to Simons.

The call was in many ways unsatisfactory. Dayal was entirely friendly and relaxed, but he was tight-lipped to a most unusual degree. Although I talked with him in all for nearly an hour he said little of substance and fully answered none of my questions. It will need rather more experience of dealing with him to explain this reticence. He said several times that he had not yet had the chance to read himself into the picture; and this may be the whole explanation - though he has now been at his desk for ten days. On the other hand, I gained the impression that he is dismayed and depressed at his early recall from Paris and we cannot overlook the possibility that he is not yet trying. He showed no signs of being hostile to Britain or of resenting in any way my approach to him on such a wide front. Indeed he could hardly have been more charming and in personal terms we took up a warm relation where it had been interrupted by his posting to Paris. But he just would not talk with any semblance of expansiveness on business matters.

/ I am sending ..

R.C.C. Hunt Esq., CMG,
Commonwealth Office.

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ARCHIVES No. 57
- 7 SEP 1967

SE 2/24

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2.

I am sending a copy of this letter, with all Annexes, to Dean in Washington and am also sending copies, enclosing only the Annexes which will be of interest to them, to Lord Caradon in New York, Harrison in Moscow, Reilly in Paris, Beeley in Geneva, Twist in Rawalpindi and Daniell in Cairo.

Yours ever

John Freeman

JOHN FREEMAN.

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ANNEX C

CONVERSATION WITH THE NEW INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY:

30 AUGUST, 1967.

MIDDLE EAST

I began by asking how the Indians viewed the present situation and how they thought progress might be made. Mr. Dayal replied that the situation seemed to be one of stalemate in which it was difficult to see what India could usefully do. Of course India wanted the Canal reopened, but it seemed impossible to expect that this could be achieved in present circumstances.

I said that, though the urgency of the British need was less desperate than that of India, we could not believe that such a defeatist attitude was the best we could do. At least we could try to create the climate of diplomatic opinion in which compromises might become easier. Did he not feel that India, too, could play a part in this? With every indication of pessimism Mr. Dayal acknowledged that India could, adding: 'Really we think that the only course is to play this situation by ear at present and try to use our influence if we see a possibility of doing so effectively.'

I said that this seemed reasonable enough, but that it would do no harm to try to rough out the melody in advance. H.M.G. suspected (with the utmost caution and very speculatively) that both parties to the main deadlock might prove to be a little more flexible than they cared to admit in public. There was evidence that the official view was not entirely monolithic either in Israel or the Arab States. If so, it was surely desirable for as much constructive discussion as possible to take place between all the major interested powers to establish the basis of a practical settlement.

Mr. Dayal agreed, but said that he did not see that any power other than the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could play much part. I disagreed, pointing out that, while the main elements of a possible settlement were beginning to appear, their priority was still unclear. One useful task in which Britain and India had joint interests was reminding the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (no less than the Israelis and the Arabs) that the reopening of the Canal must have a very high priority.

/In general...

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-2-

● In general I drew as necessary on paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of C.O. Tel. No. 1854. Mr. Dayal took it all affably and lethargically and made virtually no further comment of substance, beyond saying that things might be clearer after the Arab summit meeting had concluded.

It was noticeable that he gave no hint of wishing to impress on me the views of Ambassador Pant as recorded in C.O. Tel. No. 1883. The nature of the conversation was such that he could easily have done so had he wished.

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CONFIDENTIAL-GUARD

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO. 2163

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
5 SEPTEMBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL AND GUARD

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2163 OF 5 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV
AMMAN BEIRUT AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST.

WHEN I WAS SEEING ARTHUR GOLDBERG THIS MORNING ABOUT OTHER
MATTERS I HAD A HURRIED WORD WITH HIM AS I WAS LEAVING ABOUT
THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON THE MIDDLE
EAST WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD SEEN THE
INDIAN AND YUGOSLAV AMBASSADORS YESTERDAY AND THAT THEY BOTH
SEEMED TO FAVOUR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FAIRLY SOON
IN ORDER TO GET A GENERAL RESOLUTION VERY ROUGHLY ON THE LINES
OF THE GROMYKO/GOLDBERG TEXT AS A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ACTION
TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. GOLDBERG SAID IN REPLY THAT THE SORT OF
RESOLUTION WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD WAS BEING DISCUSSED AMONGST
THE SO-CALLED NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WAS SOMETHING LIKE THE TITO
PLAN AND LIKELY TO BE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE. HE ALSO SAID THAT IN
SPITE OF FURTHER ENQUIRIES IN MOSCOW THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSE
AT ALL FROM THE RUSSIANS.

2. I GATHERED FROM WHAT HE SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (OR
POSSIBLY HE HIMSELF) HAS NOW LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR PRESSING
AHEAD ON THE LINES AGREED IN THE TALKS UNDERTAKEN IN WASHINGTON
LAST MONTH. IF INDEED THE RUSSIANS ARE HOLDING BACK AND IF THE
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ARE THINKING OF SOMETHING MORE FAVOURABLE

/TO

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U.K.MIS. NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 2163 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

- 2 -

TO THE ARABS THAN THE GROMYKO/GOLDBERG TEXT THEN INDEED IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE ANY EARLY PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT I STILL THINK THAT THERE IS JUST A CHANCE THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MAY JOIN TOGETHER TO PRESS BOTH THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS TO GET A RESOLUTION FROM THE COUNCIL BEFORE LONG ON THE LINES WHICH WERE CONTEMPLATED IN THE WASHINGTON TALKS.

F.O. PASS PARIS 362 MOSCOW 371, TEL AVIV 390, AMMAN 259, BEIRUT 154 AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO 85.

LORD CARADON

SENT. AT 05/2035Z
RECD. AT 05/2037Z.

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS].

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ADVANCE COPIES SENT:


EASTERN DEPT.

P.O. @ 12/5/69.

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CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY U.K. MISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 2159

4 SEPTEMBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2159 OF 4 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV WASHINGTON
CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT AND UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST.

I SAW PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) TO-DAY TO DISCUSS SEVERAL
SECURITY COUNCIL MATTERS (HE IS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL FOR
SEPTEMBER).

2. ON THE MIDDLE EAST HE INTENDS TO EMBARK AT ONCE ON
CONSULTATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. HE IS IN FAVOUR
OF ATTEMPTING TO GET A GENERAL RESOLUTION ACCEPTED IN THE COUNCIL
SOON TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT (WE SHOULD
GET ON WITH THE DRAFTING OF SUCH A RESOLUTION). HE SPOKE IN
FAVOUR OF THE TITO PROPOSALS AND THOUGHT THAT THE GENERAL
RESOLUTION SHOULD INCORPORATE THE BEST ELEMENTS OF THE SO-CALLED
NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION, AND THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION
AND THE GROMYKO-GOLDBERG DRAFT. HE EMPHASISED THAT THERE WOULD
BE NO POSSIBILITY OF ARAB OR COMMUNIST AGREEMENT TO THE PASSAGE
OF ISRAELI SHIPS THROUGH THE CANAL AT THIS STAGE BUT I GATHERED
THAT HE THOUGHT IT JUST POSSIBLE THAT THE GENERAL RESOLUTION COULD
CONTAIN A CLAUSE IN FAVOUR OF FREEDOM OF PASSAGE ON INTERNATIONAL
WATERWAYS. ON THE QUESTION OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO GO
TO THE MIDDLE EAST HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE GREAT
DIFFICULTIES IN AGREEING ON TERMS OF REFERENCE (THOUGH HE ADMITTED
THAT AT ONE TIME HE HAD SPOKEN IN THE COUNCIL IN FAVOUR OF
THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE).

3. I LATER HAD A TALK WITH THE NEW YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR
(VRATUSA) WHO SPOKE ON MUCH THE SAME LINES. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH
YUGOSLAVIA HAD NO INTENTION OF PUTTING FORWARD THE TITO PLAN
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL HE INTENDED TO BE ACTIVE IN EARLY
CONSULTATION WITH MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. WHAT WAS WANTED WAS EARLY
ACTION IN THE COUNCIL RATHER THAN THE ASSEMBLY AND WE SHOULD
WORK FOR A RESOLUTION SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION
AND THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION. HE HAD NOTHING AGAINST THE

/ SENSE

P.O. 2/10/67

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U.K.MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 2159 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

SENSE OF THE GROMYKO-GOLDBERG DRAFT BUT SINCE IT WAS KNOWN THAT THE ARABS WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT WHEN IT WAS FIRST PUT FORWARD WE SHOULD LOOK FOR NEW WORDING RATHER THAN MAKE ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTIES FOR THE ARAB MODERATES BY MAKING THEM SWALLOW EXACTLY WHAT THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY REJECTED. WHAT WE MUST AVOID, VRATUSA EMPHASISED, WAS A CONTINUED DRIFT WITHOUT SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION WHICH WOULD SERVE ONLY TO CONSOLIDATE ISRAELI OBSTINACY. AS TO THE REFUGEES HE WOULD BE IN FAVOUR OF PROVIDING IN THE GENERAL RESOLUTION FOR A U.N. COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE WHOLE QUESTION AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS (THOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT WE MUST FIRST SEE WHAT GUSSING HAS TO SAY).
4. VRATUSA IS FORTHCOMING AND FRIENDLY AND I THINK WE MAY FIND HIM HELPFUL.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 370, PARIS 361, TEL AVIV 388, CAIRO 88, AMMAN 257, BEIRUT 152 AND UKDEL NATO 20.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0128Z/5

RECD 0200Z/5

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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FDW C 023

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R 051552Z

FM ASOLHY

TO RR AZFLUK 92105

GRPS 175

BT

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
- 5 SEP. 1967

SE2 2

ADDRESSED TO F.O. TELEGRAM NO. 989 OF 4 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR ~~INFORM~~
~~EEEE~~ FOR INFORMATION TO:

AMMAN, BENGHAZI, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT,
TRIPOLI, RABAT, TUNIS, CAIRO, ALGIERS, BEIRUT,
BELGRADE, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, U.K. MISSION NEW YORK,
H.C. ADEN, PARIS, U.K. DEL NATO PARIS,

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 316 TO BELGRADE.
PRESIDENT TITO'S PROPOSALS.

AT A CABINET MEETING ON SUNDAY, 3 SEPTEMBER THE ISRAEL FOREIGN ~~MINISTER~~
~~EEEE~~ MINISTER IS REPORTED TO HAVE REJECTED PRESIDENT TITO'S PROPOSALS
FOR SOLVING THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM. MR. EBAN IS SAID TO HAVE
CHARACTERISED ~~PROEEE~~ PRESIDENT TITO'S EFFORTS AS BEING AIMED QUOTE
NOT TO SAVE THE PEACE BUT TO SAVE THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS FROM MAKING
PEACE UNQUOTE WITH ISRAEL. PRESIDENT TITO'S INITIATIVES WERE BEING ~~PE~~
~~EEE~~ BEING PURSUED OVER ISRAEL'S HEAD AND ANY PEACE PLAN WHICH WAS NOT
CONDITIONAL ON THE CONSENT OF BOTH SIDES VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF
SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF STATES QUOTE WHICH YUGOSLAVIA ONCE
CHAMPIONED UNQUOTE.

2. ISRAEL HAD RECEIVED NO DIRECT INFORMATION ABOUT THE TITO PLAN
BUT KNEW OF IT FROM VARIOUS SOURCES SINCE IT HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN
BELGRADE, CAIRO, NEW DELHI AND ELSEWHERE. ISRAEL'S OUTRIGHT OPPOSIT-
ION TO THIS PLAN WOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL GOVERNMENTS
WITH WHICH ISRAEL HAD DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

CROSEC

BT

GRPS 175

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Pa. 2/15/67

En Clair

TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 989

4 September 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 989 of 4 September
Repeated for information to:

Amman, Benghazi, Bahrain, Jedda, Khartoum,
Kuwait, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, Cairo,
Algiers, Beirut, Belgrade, Washington,
Moscow, U.K. Mission New York, H.C. Aden,
Paris, U.K. Del NATO Paris.

Your telegram No. 316 to Belgrade.

President Tito's proposals.

At a Cabinet meeting on Sunday, 3 September the Israel Foreign Minister is reported to have rejected President Tito's proposals for solving the Arab/Israel problem. Mr. Eban is said to have characterised President Tito's efforts as being aimed 'not to save the peace but to save the Arab Governments from making peace' with Israel. President Tito's initiatives were being pursued over Israel's head and any peace plan which was not conditional on the consent of both sides violated the principles of sovereignty and independence of States 'which Yugoslavia once championed'.

2. Israel had received no direct information about the Tito plan but knew of it from various sources since it had been published in Belgrade, Cairo, New Delhi and elsewhere. Israel's outright opposition to this plan would be brought to the attention of all Governments with which Israel had diplomatic relations.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1102Z 4 September

Recd 0216Z 4 September

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Eastern Dept.



77777

REGISTRY

REPETITION OF TELEGRAMS

YT 4

No.

(1) TELEGRAM SECTION,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

(Date) 5.9.67

(Despatched) 18.58 M.

Please repeat to the posts shown below telegram No. 989
from/to TEL AVIV / F.O. dated 4.9.67

NEW DELHI No. 1921 (Date) 5/9

No.

No.

No.

No.

No.

(Signed) [Signature]

En clair.CodeCypher

(Dept.) S.A.D.

(Date) 5.9.67

(2) DIVISION CONCERNED (FOR ARCHIVES).

(For use in Communications Department.)

Draft telegram:

To: NEW DELHI No. 1921

No.

No.

(Date)

Following received from Tel Aviv
sent to

telegram No. 989 of 4/9

repeated

begins:

[Here insert from A to B of attached
telegram.]


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Cypher/Cat A

NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 1840 31 August, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL



Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 1840 of 31 August
Repeated for information to:- Washington
U.K. Mis New York, Moscow.

Cairo telegram No. 7 Saving to Foreign Office
Arab/Israel.

When I discussed Middle East situation with new Indian Foreign Secretary on 30 August, Dayal did not in any way reflect the attitude of the Indian Ambassador. (The full text of my interview on this and other subjects follows in my letter to Hunt by bag leaving 1 September).

2. However in discussion with Kaul on 30 August, he betrayed awareness that Indian policy on the Middle East had reached impasse, and that something should be done to secure re-opening of the Canal. Kaul's interest in the subject is understandable, as he is a close personal friend of Pant, but I do not think it would be prudent to take it too seriously.

3. Please repeat further as required.

Commonwealth Office pass to Washington 109,
U.K. Mis New York 23 and Moscow 24.

Mr. Freeman Sent 0717Z 31 August, 1967

Recd 0818Z 31 August, 1967

[Repetition to Moscow, referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts]

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S.A.D.

P.O. @ 12/1/68

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bbbbb

S.A.D.

SE 2/2

YTC/1

TELEGRAM SECTION
Room 124 K.C.S.
Communications Department

* Please send copies of the following telegram


* Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

[*delete as applicable]

N^o 1840 from Telhi — 31. 8. 67

TO:

Arab/Israel dispute distribution




(Signed)

(Department)

(Date)

Action taken in Communications Department:

(Initials) 

(Date) 2/9/67

AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION

REC ED IN
ARCH 11-57
30 AUG 1967
582/21

(67)

Pl. copy saving to N. Delhi
[Signature]

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CYPHER/CAT +A+.

PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2796

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

29 AUGUST 1967.

P.O. [Signature]

12
15
61

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2796 OF 29 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO,
MOSCOW AND BELGRADE AND SAVING TO UKDIS GENEVA AND CAIRO.
FOLLOWING FROM TOMKINS.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 2780: MIDDLE EAST AND U.N.

SISCO INFORMED ME TODAY THAT THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED
ON HIM TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF TITO'S IMPRESSIONS ABOUT HIS RECENT
TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THAT TITO HAD RETURNED
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION
BASED ON THE RESPECT OF RIGHTS OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.
HE CLAIMED TO HAVE DISCOVERED CERTAIN NEW ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION
WHICH COULD JUSTIFY INITIATIVES BY THE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS.
TITO'S IDEAS WERE STILL RATHER VAGUE BUT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE
TO COME FORWARD FAIRLY SOON WITH SOME PRECISE SUGGESTIONS
ABOUT HOW TO GET THINGS MOVING.

2. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT, THOUGH HE HAD STRESSED THAT THIS
WAS ONLY A PERSONAL IMPRESSION, THAT TITO WAS AIMING AT A
SOLUTION LINKING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL LINKED TO THE EVENTUAL
RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND AN END OF BELLIGERENCY. THE AMBASSADOR
HAD MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE FORMAL RENUNCIATION OF
BELLIGERENCY WOULD CREATE INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE
ARABS SO LONG AS ISRAELI FORCES REMAINED ON ARAB TERRITORY
AND SISCO THEREFORE ASSUMED THAT THE ARABS AND PRESUMABLY
TITO, WERE THINKING MORE IN TERMS OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL
FOLLOWED BY QUIET ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD BRING THE SITUATION
BACK APPROXIMATELY TO WHERE IT WAS ON JUNE 4. ONCE THIS HAD
BEEN ACHIEVED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO GET A SIMULTANEOUS

/END TO

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WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2796 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

- 2 -

END TO BELLIGERENCY AND ARAB RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL PLUS IMPROVED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE GULF OF AQABA AND SUEZ. IT STILL SEEMS, HOWEVER, THAT THE ARABS CANNOT ACCEPT ISRAELI-FLAG SHIPS IN THE CANAL.

3. OTHER POINTS DISCUSSED WITH THE AMBASSADOR WERE ACTION IN THE U.N. THE YUGOSLAVS ARE OPPOSED TO CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION IN THE ASSEMBLY. THEY THINK THAT IT WILL DEGENERATE INTO A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE WHICH WILL ONLY HAVE THE RESULT OF EXPOSING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES RATHER THAN BRINGING THEM CLOSER TOGETHER, AS IT DID LAST TIME. THEY THEREFORE PREFER THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND AGREE WITH THE AMERICANS THAT CAREFUL PREPARATION IS NECESSARY. IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY INTEND TO BE VERY ACTIVE.

4. SISCO WAS NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC THAT MUCH WOULD COME OF THIS YUGOSLAV INITIATIVE. HE ^WTOUGHT THAT TITO WAS STILL TRYING TO PULL NASSER'S CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE. HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY HOPE OF THE ISRAELIS AGREEING TO WHAT SEEMED TO BE THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF TITO'S PLAN, WHICH WAS UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. BUT HE IS RESERVING JUDGEMENT UNTIL HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO STUDY TITO'S IDEAS IN DETAIL.

F O PASS UKDEL NATO 240 MOSCOW 210 BELGRADE 1 AND SAVING
TO UKDIS GENEVA 38 AND CAIRO 22
SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 2328Z/29 AUGUST 1967.
RECD AT 2329Z/29 AUGUST 1967.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Reference.....

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Mr. Moore

Eastern Dept.

Titos visit to the
Middle East

I attach a copy of a telegram from the Canadian Embassy in Cairo sent to me yesterday by Mr. Lee of Canada House. This seems generally to confirm the lines of the reports contained in Washington telegram No. 2728 to Foreign Office and Sir R. Beaumont's record of conversation with the Italian Charge d'Affaires on 23 August. But the Canadian report goes further, in setting out not only the UAR view, but also the Indian. Of course, the Indians would be concerned to put the Arabs in the best possible light and no doubt the advantage of showing the Israelis to be the only unreasonable parties has not escaped them. Moreover, it appears from the Canadian telegram, that the Indians may be genuinely worried about President Nasser's position if things drag on. Nevertheless, it is of particular significance that the Indians should be taking the line that the Security Council should make an early move on the lines generally agreed between ourselves and the Americans since India is President of the Council next month.

2. You may think it worth sending parts of the Canadian telegram to Washington and New York, anyway?

3. Mr. Lee asked for any comments we had on the Canadian report and I shall be grateful to know if you have any.

Anne Warburton.

(A.M. Warburton)
24 August, 1967

cc: Mr. Hayman

Mr Duff

The Canadian telegram attached is of considerable interest. I hope the Canadians in Delhi have told the BBC about it, but I don't think - unless you advise otherwise - we need telegraph a summary to Delhi before the BBC sees Deyal.

WA 25/8

Thanks. Now

see also Cairo telegram No. 7

Saving,

25/8

*Canada House have
said the tel is for
London only.
WA 24/8*

*R Enter on SE2/2
25/8/67*

P.O. 25/8/67



FM CAIRO AUG 22/67 CONFIDENTIAL - UK. Cdn. Eyes ONLY.

TO EXTER 1164 IMMED

INFO LDN EMB PARIS NATOPARIS ROME PRIORITY TT WASHDC PERMISSNY CAN-
FORCED PRIORITY DE OTT TT DELHI MCOW PRIORITY DE LDN TT TAVIV
BERUT PRIORITY DE PARIS TT BERN PRIORITY DE GNEVA
BAG BGRAD DE LDN TERAN DE OTT
TITO AND MIDEAST SETTLEMENT

APA PANT, INDIAN AMBASSADOR, GAVE ME A BRIEF ACCT LAST NIGHT OF 40
MINUTE CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH PRESIDENT TITO ON AUG 17. TITO APPEA-
RED SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO, DAMAS-
CUS AND BAGHDAD, AND, ACCORDING TO PANT, IS PREPARED TO FOLLOW THEM
WITH DISCUSSIONS IN MCOW, WASHDC AND ELSEWHERE IF THIS WERE LIKELY
TO LEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN THE ARAB CAPITALS HE VISITED
(INCLUDING DAMASCUS) HE FOUND A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF
A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. APPARENTLY PANT HAD QUESTIONED HIM ON THE
SYRIAN ATTITUDE, WHICH, ACCORDING TO TITO, DESPITE THE PUBLIC POSTU-
RING OF GOVT LEADERS, WAS NOT RPT NOT MUCH DIFFERENT THAN THAT IN
CAIRO AND BAGHDAD.

2. PANT CONFIRMED THAT TITO HAD COME TO CAIRO ARMED WITH A LET FROM
PRESIDENT JOHNSON, WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A GLOSS ON THE USA
ATTITUDE TOWARD THE SOVIET-USA AMENDMENTS TO THE YUGOSLAV RESLN,
AND QUOTE EXPLANATION OF THE USA VOTE UNQUOTE AS PANT PUT IT. THIS,
OF COURSE, HAD BEEN ONE OF THE MATTERS TITO HAD DISCUSSED IN THE THREE
CAPITALS. HOWEVER, HIS OWN VIEWS ON A SETTLEMENT (AND THEY WERE NO RPT
NO MORE THAN VIEWS AT THIS STAGE) HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT, BEING

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PAGE T 1164 CONF

BASED ON TWO ESSENTIALS; A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES TO THE LINES THEY OCCUPIED ON JUNE IN RETURN FOR A 4-POWER OR SECURITY COUNCIL GUARANTEE OF ISRAEL'S FRONTIERS, FOLLOWING WHICH HE SEEMED TO HAVE IN MIND A SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT SETTLING SUCH PROBLEMS AS, FREEDOM OF SHIPPING IN THE STRAIT OF TIRAN, USE OF THE SUEZ CANAL BY ISRAELI SHIPS, REFUGEES AND CESSATION OF A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY BY THE ARAB STATES.

*Low on the
taken hole!*

3. FROM A TALK WHICH PANT HAD EARLIER YESTERDAY WITH UAR FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD HE SAID IT WAS CLEAR UAR AUTHORITIES WERE PREPARED (EVEN EAGER) TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE KIND PROPOSED BY TITO. HOWEVER, THEY WERE UNWILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES PUBLICLY WITHOUT SOME IDEA OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE ISRAELIS AND SOME INDICATION OF WHAT THE OTHER SIDE ALSO WOULD ACCEPT. AS FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD PUT IT WHAT DID THE ISRAELIS WANT?

4. PANT SAID THERE WAS A SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IN THE USA AND ELSEWHERE WHICH BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO USE IN ATTEMPTING ANY SETTLEMENT UNTIL THE YEAST SPAWNED BY THE WAR HAD BEGUN TO WORK IN THE ARAB WORLD. ONE DIFFICULTY HE SAW WITH THIS THEORY WAS THAT THE CULTURE THE CREATED MIGHT GROW BEYOND THE CONTROL OF ALL OF THOSE WHO GENUINELY WISHED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE MIDEAST PROBLEMS. THERE MIGHT BE THROWN UP IN EGYPT AND ELSEWHERE UNSTABLE REGIMES INCAPABLE OF ACHIEVING ANY SETTLEMENT LET ALONE A LASTING ONE. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN EGYPT WAS A GOOD CASE IN POINT. THE INTERNAL SITUATION WAS DEVELOPING VERY RAPIDLY. THERE WAS EVERY EVIDENCE OF A SERIOUS STRUGGLE FOR POWER

PAGE 1154 CONF

BEING CARRIED OUT BETWEEN MOHIEDDINE AND ALI SABRY AND POSSIBLY OTHER FACTIONS AS WELL. THE RESULT WAS A POLARIZATION WHICH DEROGATED FROM NASSERS AUTHORITY AND COULD ONLY LEAD TO A STEADY DETERIORATION OF LAW AND ORDER THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE TO THE LONG-TERM ADVANTAGE OF ANY OF THE POWERS INTERESTED IN STABLE CONDITIONS IN THE AREA OR LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DURABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND ARAES.

5. FOR THESE REASONS THE INDIAN GOVT DID NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE IT WAS ^{WISE} TO ALLOW MATTERS TO DRIFT. THEY CONSIDERED SOME ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN NOW IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM. THEY WOULD FAVOUR A SUBSTANTIVE RESLN BASED ON THE USA-USSR COMPROMISE OR SOMETHING LIKE IT, FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER RESLN APPOINTING ONE OR MORE REPS OF THE SECCN WHO COULD EXAMINE WITH BOTH SIDES SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS SUCH AS SHARM EL SHEIK, A UN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE MIDEAST, ISRAELI USE OF THE SUEZ CANAL, AND REFUGEES. HE KNEW FROM HIS TALKS WITH UAR MINISTERS AND MOST RECENTLY FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD, THAT UAR WOULD ACCEPT SUCH AN APPROACH, AND INDEED, WOULD WELCOME A DECISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THIS SCORE WHICH WAS IMPOSED UPON THEM.

6. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE ALGERIANS ARE STILL QUITE INTRANSIGENT. THE ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR A FEW DAYS AGO IN THE PRESENCE OF HEIKAL AND OTHER HAD BREATHED FIRE AND BRIMSTONE AND TALKED OF CONTINUING THE FIGHT. HEIKAL EVIDENTLY HAD CHALLENGED HIM, ASKING HOW THIS WAS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED? ALGERIA WAS DISTANT FROM ISRAEL. HOW DID THE ALGERIANS PLAN TO FIGHT? FROM WHENCE WOULD COME THEIR LOGISTIC SUPPORT? THE QUESTIONS

0004

PAGE FOUR 1164 CONF

WENT UNANSWERED. IN PANTS VIEW EGYPT WAS CENTRAL TO THE CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL AND COUNTRIES LIKE ALGERIA MOROCCO SAUDI ARABIA AND SENEGAL WERE NOT RPT NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED AND BY FACT OF GEOGRAPHY PROBABLY NEVER COULD BE.

7. PANT SEEMED DOUBTFUL THAT THE BAGHDAD MINISTERIAL MTGS HAD PRODUCED ANY USEFUL RESULT, EXCEPT PERHAPS AN AGREEMENT TO CUT DOWN UPON THE AMOUNT OF GOODS IMPORTED FROM QUOTE UNFRIENDLY UNQUOTE COUNTRIES. THE OTHER MEASURES, SUCH AS A THREE MONTH STOPPAGE OF OIL HE THOUGHT WERE QUITE UNLIKELY TO BE AGREED, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE THERE WAS SO LITTLE COMPATABILITY IN THE ECONOMIES OF THE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES INVOLVED, QUITE APART FROM THEIR POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. HE EVEN DOUBTED THAT THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD MEET AS SCHEDULED ON AUG 26. IN THIS I HAD STRONG IMPRESSION HE WAS REFLECTING FOREIGN MINISTER RIADS VIEWS. HE ADDED HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ALGERIANS AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS HAD SUGGESTED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MTG BE POSTPONED UNTIL MID-SEP, WHICH WOULD, OF COURSE, CONFLICT WITH THE OAU HEADS OF STATE MTG, DUE TO BE HELD IN KNSHA SEP 9-13. IN PANTS OPINION MTG OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND SUBSEQUENTLY ARAB HEADS OF STATE IN KHARTOUM WOULD NOT RPT NOT CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CENTRAL PROBLEM, WHICH WAS NOT RPT NOT BOYCOTTING WESTERN COUNTRIES BUT ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT OF ARAB DIFFERENCES WITH ISRAEL. AND ON THIS NOTE HE RETURNED TO THE THEME THAT THE REAL PROBLEM DID NOT RPT NOT AT THIS STAGE SEEM TO LIE IN CONVINCING THE ARABS DIRECTLY CONCERNED OF THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, BUT IN PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS AND IN KNOWING

...5

PAGE FIVE 1164 CONF

MORE ABOUT WHAT THEY MAY OR MAY NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT. I THINK HE HAS
A POINT AND THIS SEEMS TO BE A STRONG ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF APPOIN-
TING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A REP OF THE SECCEN WHO CAN START THE LONG
AND WEARY PROCESS OF EXPLORING POSITIONS AND NARROWING DIFFERENCES

STARNES???



British High Commission,

NEW DELHI

18 August 1967

PL 31/1

Dev Tony

Middle East Crisis

In paragraph 3 of John Waterfield's letter of 11 August, he mentioned that the French Ambassador was due to see Mr. Chagla on 11 August.

2. The High Commissioner has since seen M. Daridan who reported that his interview was depressing. Chagla was aware of the importance for India of securing the re-opening of the Suez Canal but was bereft of any idea as to what he could do to secure this. There are recurrent rumours that Chagla may shortly be replaced, but we have not had any reliable information about the name of his likely successor.

3. According to the press Marshall Tito saw the Indian Ambassador in Cairo on 17 August and gave him a message for Mrs. Gandhi about the latest developments in the Middle East crisis. According to one press report the Yugoslav President would have liked Mrs. Gandhi to go to Cairo herself, but did not insist "as he appreciated the difficulties the Indian Prime Minister had to deal with at home".

4. If it is true that Mrs. Gandhi declined an invitation to be present in Cairo, this would go some way to confirm our impression, reported in John Waterfield's letter, that the Indian Government is no longer quite as anxious to be prominent in the pro-Arab camp.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Gilmore in Washington and Youde in the U.K. Delegation to the United Nations, New York.



J. M. S.

Thurman Spring R. M. S.

(A. M. Simons)

Mr. Simons

22/8

Reg. 11. copy to Mr. Turner NEW & UNDEPT CO

Eastern & NA Affairs 1/10

W. H. Duff

p. a. @ 12/1/68

A. A. Duff, Esq., CMG, DSO, DSC,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACT

HINDUSTAN TIMES

3.8.67

12. 115
MA 1
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
23 AUG 1967

SE2/2

THE HINDUSTAN TIMES

Vol XLIV No 213

New Delhi Thursday August 3 1967

UNDIPLOMATIC DIPLOMACY

New Delhi's reaction to the Israeli aide memoire expressing regret over the incidents during the Arab-Israeli war in which Indian troops serving under UNEF were killed or wounded is, to say the least, ungenerous and undiplomatic. The aide memoire was delivered on June 15, a bare ten days after the incidents. India's reply, handed over last Tuesday to the Israeli Consul, summoned specially from Bombay to receive the note, makes heavy weather of the fact that the regrets were not "expressed earlier."

The reply takes great pains to make a peevish point: that the Israeli representative to the Security Council, far from expressing regret for the incidents, chose to ignore the "very clear and specific charges" made by the Indian delegate at the Council's debate. This is contrasted with Israel's "prompt" apology for the accidental loss of American lives caused by Israeli fire during the conflict.

There are several inconvenient facts which the note chooses to ignore, some of them suggested by the note itself. New Delhi refers in its aide memoire to the fact that, at the UN debate, Mr Parthasarathy "condemned the treacherous and brutal attacks on Indian personnel by

Israeli action." Faced with such a serious charge, delivered immediately after the incidents, what was the Israeli delegate expected to do? His anxiety may at the very least have been to ascertain the truth from his Government. Israel's expression of regret came soon after—the aide memoire of June 15. If New Delhi can take more than six weeks to hold its own inquiry into the incidents, which is explained as the reason for the delay in sending its reply to the Israeli note, Tel Aviv's expression of regret was surely not belated if not made on the spot at the Security Council.

What is even more worrying about New Delhi's attitude to Israel is the fact that the Israeli aide memoire expressing regret was kept back from the public after its arrival. Nor have its contents been revealed even now, though our reply to it was delivered with all the sense of occasion reserved for protest notes exchanged with unfriendly nations. In cavilling at Israel's apology and in maintaining, despite its expression of regret its posture of unnecessary hostility, the Government of India seems more concerned with justifying its earlier stand, even at the expense of antagonizing a nation that has made persistent efforts to win our friendship.

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STOP COPY

104

CYPHER/CAT A AND By BAG

PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

TEL NO. 1854 24 AUGUST 1967 (SE 2/2)

R. M. - U.S. 20/8

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO NEW DELHI TELEGRAM NUMBER 1854 OF 24 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO UK MISSION NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON. MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1843 (NOT REPEATED): CALL ON INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY.

WE WOULD NOT WISH YOU AT THIS STAGE TO ENGAGE IN ANY SPECIFIC LOBBYING ON THE SUBJECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST BUT CONSIDER THAT THERE MIGHT BE ADVANTAGE IN DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT IN GENERAL TERMS WITH MR. DAYAL.

2. FULLER GUIDANCE IS ON ITS WAY TO YOU BY BAG LEAVING ON 29 AUGUST ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION GENERALLY AND THE ANGLO/AMERICAN EXCHANGES ABOUT A POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO WHICH PARAGRAPH 6 OF WATERFIELD'S LETTER PL. 31/1 TO DUFF OF 8 AUGUST REFERS. BUT IF THIS DOES NOT REACH YOU IN TIME YOU MAY DRAW ON THE MATERIAL EMBODIED IN THE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING FOUR PARAGRAPHS.

THE ISRAEL POSITION.

3. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 14 AUGUST THE ISRAEL MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MADE IT CLEAR THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT DECLARE HER PROPOSALS IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT INTENDED TO KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF A RETURN TO THE SITUATION OF BEFORE 5 JUNE AND THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM MUST BE REGARDED AS PERMANENTLY UNDER THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ISRAEL WHO WOULD GUARANTEE ACCESS FOR ALL TO THE HOLY PLACES. THERE ARE HOWEVER DIFFERING OPINIONS WITHIN THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT. GENERAL DAYAN AND MR. ALLON THE MINISTER OF LABOUR, HAVE BOTH PUBLICLY ADVOCATED PERMANENT ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK TERRITORY OF JORDAN. MORE MODERATE ELEMENTS REPRESENTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD SETTLE FOR LESS. AND IT IS NOT TO BE EXCLUDED THAT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE AND REASONABLE, TO WHICH WE SHALL CONTRIBUTE WHENEVER WE CAN, WILL HAVE SOME EFFECT.

THE ARAB POSITIONS.

4. NO UNIFIED ARAB POSITION SEEMS TO HAVE EMERGED FROM THE MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS IN KHARTOUM FROM 1 - 5 AUGUST AND

/THE

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CONFIDENTIAL

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1854 TO NEW DELHI

-2-

THE PROSPECTS OF AN ARAB SUMMIT SEEM UNCERTAIN. SOME DIVISIONS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING BETWEEN

(A) THE MORE EXTREME ARAB COUNTRIES SUCH AS ALGERIA AND SYRIA WHO FAVOUR CONTINUING THE WAR USING GUERILLA TACTICS AND APPEALING TO THE CHINESE FOR HELP IF NECESSARY

(B) THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC WHICH SEEMS FOR THE TIME BEING CONTENT TO LET THE SYRIANS AND ALGERIANS MAKE THE RUNNING

(C) THE MODERATE GROUP.

IF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IS EXERTED IN A GENERALLY MODERATED DIRECTION A SITUATION MIGHT EVOLVE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ARABS OR SOME OF THEM TO MOVE TOWARDS SOME SORT OF PERHAPS LIMITED SETTLEMENT UNDER U.N. AUSPICES.

THE SOVIET UNION.

5. PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPHS 15 - 22 OF INTEL NUMBER 23 OF 16 AUGUST FOR OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT.

6. WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED TO LEARN HOW THE INDIANS VIEW THE PRESENT SITUATION AND HOW THEY CONSIDER PROGRESS MIGHT BEST BE MADE. OUR VIEW IS THAT IT MIGHT BE BEST FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT A COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OPENS. THIS WOULD INCORPORATE A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON LINES AGREED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. BEFORE THE EMERGENCY SESSION ADJOURNED IN JULY, TOGETHER WITH PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE. THE U.S./U.S.S.R. AGREEMENT (THE QUOTE DOBRYNIN RESOLUTION UNQUOTE) WAS ON LINES QUITE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WE SUPPORTED AND THE COMMUNISTS OPPOSED. IT AFFIRMED AS PRINCIPLES WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT DELAY BY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THEM; ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WITHOUT DELAY BY ALL IN THE AREA THAT EACH HAS THE RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT THEREWITH; AND FORESAW EFFORTS, USING A U.N. PRESENCE, THE PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY OF REFUGEES AND FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. FOR THE TIME BEING IT SHOULD PERHAPS BE LEFT TO THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ

CONFIDENTIAL

/CANAL

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COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1854 TO NEW DELHI

-3-

CANAL MIGHT BE GIVEN SOME PRIORITY IN THE BRIEF OF THE U.N. REPRESENTATIVE.

7. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION WE WISH WITHOUT ADVERTISING THE FACT OR MAKING THE RUNNING TO MOBILISE AS MUCH INTERNATIONAL OPINION AS POSSIBLE BEHIND THE CONCEPT THAT IN THE COMMON INTERNATIONAL INTEREST THE CANAL SHOULD BE OPENED AS A RESULT OF CONCESSIONS BY BOTH SIDES IF NECESSARY IN ADVANCE OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT.

8. ALTHOUGH YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT DISCLOSE IT TO MR. DAYAL, WE HAVE BEEN HAVING BILATERAL EXCHANGES WITH THE AMERICANS ABOUT A POSSIBLE DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD THE INDIANS IN GENERAL TERMS WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN (AS IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE). FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THE AMERICANS HAVE SHOWN THE TEXT TO THE ISRAELIS IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN THEIR AGREEMENT TO IT. THE ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES THAT THEY OBJECT STRONGLY TO THE TEXT. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE NOT BEEN TOLD SPECIFICALLY THAT THERE IS A TEXT ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH, GERMANS, CANADIANS AND SOME OTHER ALLIES ARE TO SOME EXTENT AWARE OF WHAT IS AFOOT.

CROSEC SENT 1905Z 24 AUGUST

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A.E. & D.D.

ccccc

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr ~~Huff~~
Mr Allison

Middle East Crisis.

I have discussed the question of whether Mr Freeman should approach the Indians, and if so what he should say, with Mr Waller N & E. Africa Dept & Mr Winchester Eastern Dept. Also with Mr Turner NE & our Dept. The two F.O. depts are now considering what guidance should be given - Eastern Dept is concerned with the Middle East in general & N & E.A. Dept with the Canal.

I have asked Mr Winchester to get in touch with Mr Allison when a time has been decided.

R.N. Russell
22/8

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
23 AUG 1967
SE 2/2

See also minutes
at -/55

Tel sent. Ph
WA 24/8
22:8
pa. @ 2/5/8

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TOP COPY

63

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 1785 21 August, 1967

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 57 22 AUG. 1967
8E2/2

(55) Waterfield's letter PL31/1 of 8 August to Duff.
Call on new Indian Foreign Secretary.

I propose to call on Dayal in the near future and to take advantage of the opportunity to raise with him the subject of security assurances for India (your telegram No. 1819).

2. I could also discuss with him the situation in the Middle East. If you would wish me to do this, I should be grateful for an up-to-date assessment of the present position there and of our current objectives. It would also be useful if you could let me know whether there are any specific points which I could make.

Mr. Freeman Sent 1400Z 21 August
Recd 1451Z 21 August

Separate Minute

W 22/8

*See also -/55, -/57, -/58,
-/59, & -/61.*

*~~the Winston~~
Fed (193)*

*P.O. 12
1/1
or.*

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F.O. Far Eastern Dept.
Eastern Dept.
U.N. Dept.
D.I.S. M.O.D.

WWWWW

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BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

11 August 1967.

PL 31/1

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
15 AUG. 1967

SE2/2
(4)

Dear Tony,

Arab/Israel Conflict: Report of Gift of
Indian Ammunition to the U.A.R.

14/8

In my letter PL 31/1 of 25 July, I reported that circumstances had made it inappropriate for Arthur Wooller in Bombay to get any further information about the alleged gift of Indian ammunition to the U.A.R.

- ... 2. I now enclose copy of a news item from the right-wing Bombay weekly "Current" which implies that a consignment of arms or ammunition may have been shipped in the s.s. "BHADRAVATI".
3. We told the American Embassy, who, this time, showed much less interest.
4. I am sending copies of this letter, with enclosure, to Wooller in Bombay and Gilmore in Washington.

Pa. 10 2/5/67

yours ever,
John.

(J.P. WATERFIELD)

A.A. Duff, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.S.C.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

S.S. "Bhadravati"

"loaded for Suez"

The Scindia Steam Ship "BHADRAVATI" was in the Bombay Docks last week and was reported to be "loaded for Suez".

What was the cargo which was Suez-bound?

Was this cargo of a mercantile nature, if so what was the name of the consignee in Suez?

If the cargo being so shipped was at the level of Government to Government, what was the nature of this cargo?

Is the Government of India shipping arms and/or ammunition to the U.A.R.? If so it would be the right of Parliament to know.

CURRENT
5 AUGUST

CONFIDENTIAL

See - 1/63

(61)

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 57
15 AUG. 76/
SE2/2



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

11 August, 1967.

PL 31/1

Dear Tony,

1. Send this up to
N. Stevens, F.O.

Middle East Crisis

2. Mr. Hunt
3. Enter

(55)

In my letter PL 31/1 of 8 August, I reported various indications which we had picked up about current Indian thinking on the Middle East Crisis. Since then there have been a number of other developments.

14/8

2. When the High Commissioner saw Haksar, the Head of the Prime Minister's Secretariat, yesterday, they had a brief discussion on the Middle East. Haksar took very much the same gloomy line as C.S. Jha in his conversation with the High Commissioner, reported in my last letter; the U.A.R. were keeping the Canal closed and the Government of India did not see that they were in a position to do very much about it. Haksar suggested that the attitudes of both Algeria and Syria were obstacles in getting the canal reopened, but on further reflection he said that after all Russian influence in Syria was strong enough to make the Syrians see reason and that therefore it might be Algeria which was the real stumbling-block.

3. The French Ambassador is due to see Mr. Chagla today, but on 9 August he called on T.N. Kaul, the Secretary (I) in the Ministry of External Affairs. The Ambassador has told the High Commissioner that Kaul suggested that France was in a good position to mediate between the Israelis and the Arabs; the Ambassador commented that it seems that Kaul did not appreciate that France's standing with the Israelis was not particularly good at the moment.

4. According to the press, a number of left-wing and Muslim organisations held a "National Conference in support of the Arab Peoples Struggle against Imperialism" in Delhi yesterday. Mrs. Gandhi sent a message to the Conference in which she is quoted as saying that the policies of the Government of India "are directed towards securing peace and stability in West Asia consistent with the just and legitimate aspirations of the Arab people". This message seems to be slightly more moderate in tone than some of her previous statements.

5. We deduce from the above that the Indian Government may be moving, albeit somewhat tentatively, away from their previous policy of blind support for the Arabs towards a more neutral position of simply wishing to see the Middle East problem solved. Possibly the damage to India's interests caused by the closure of the Canal is at last beginning to be realised by India's policy makers. We still think that it would be unrealistic to expect the Indians to take any firm initiative in the matter; Kaul's conversation with the French Ambassador seems to indicate that the Indian Government are hoping that someone else will do the actual work. But at least there are rather more signs than there have been of Indian interest in a solution, and one which will not be entirely at the expense of the Israelis.

6. I am enclosing two copies of this letter and sending copies to Gilmore in Washington and Youde at the U.K. Mission to the United Nations, New York.

pa 2/1/68

yours ever,
John

A.A. Duff, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.S.C.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

(J.P. WATERFIELD)

Restricted

PL82/1.



R. M. Purcell Esq.,
South Asia
Dept.,
Commonwealth

Mr. Hutt Office.

12
8:8

MA 11
8/8

With the Compliments
of the
British High Commissioner

August 4th 1962.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 57 5 AUG. 1962 SE 2/2

Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi.

Restricted

RESTRICTED



OFFICE OF THE BRITISH DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER,

1, HARINGTON STREET,

CALCUTTA, 16.

BY BAG

25 July 1967



Dear Sir -

I send herewith a copy of a report by the Duty Officer on the demonstration outside this Office on the evening of 24 July. The demonstration was organised by a Muslim called Syed Mohd. Ali who is a Municipal Councillor on the make. The only matter of interest arising from it is that the following day we were told by Inspector Dutta that he and his Police had heard the demonstrators saying that unless the British Government acceded to their demands by 13 August they would attack our Office building.

When asked how seriously he took this threat, Inspector Dutta said that he could not take the risk of not treating it seriously and will take adequate precautions. I understand that Syed Mohd. Ali has arranged another meeting for 13 August and we will therefore take certain elementary precautions for the safety of the building on that day. As it is a Sunday it is unlikely that many of our staff need be involved.

Yours sincerely

Mike

(E.H.M. COUNSELL)

J.P. Waterfield, Esq.,
British High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

ajg

3/1.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Muslim Demonstration - 24 July 1967

The expected procession duly turned up at 5.45 p.m. It was about 500 strong and was headed by a couple of standard bearers with black banners.

2. Having gone through the usual burnt offering ceremony, the effigies presumably being those of Prime Minister Wilson and President Johnson, to a chorus of Zindabads and Murdabads, the six leaders of the procession came to the gate to present the attached memorandum. The spokesman, Syed Mohd. Ali, said a few words, the gist of which being that the object of the procession was to let the High Commissioner and the British Government know the feelings of the 12 lakhs of Muslims in Calcutta about Israeli aggression in the Middle East and the Israeli possession of the Muslim Holy Places. This was done in a polite manner.

3. The leaders then went to the U.S. Consulate from which they returned in about ten minutes.

4. After a few more choruses of Zindabads and Murdabads, directed no doubt towards the Arabs and Israelis (plus U.K., U.S.A., etc.) respectively, the procession left in an orderly fashion. They had cleared out of Harington Street in about a minute, apart from half a dozen stragglers who were given a little verbal encouragement and shooing by Inspector Dutta.

5. The street was clear at 6.15 p.m., the whole proceedings having taken exactly 30 minutes. The effigies were still burning and the fire was extinguished by one of the durwans.

6. The affair was entirely peaceful and the leaders seemed to be in full control of it. Inspector Dutta provided the usual efficient Police service.

(J. HARRATTY)
25 July 1967

RESTRICTED

This gathering of demonstrators representing the Muslim citizen of Calcutta and suburbs demands :-

- 1).- That, the U.K. and the U.S.A. Governments must pressure the treacherous Israeli Government to restore Arab Jerusalem (Bait-ul-Muqqaddas) to Arab and support the demand of the Government of India in this respect.
- 2). That, Israel must compensate the Government of India for the loss of life and properties of the Indian personnel murdered by the Israeli invaders.
- 3). -That, Israeli must vacate its aggression from all the Arab territories and stop the inhuman treatment of the Arab refugees and prisoners of war.
- 4). That, the U.K. and the U.S.A. must resile from the position of support of Israel in its aggressive designs against the Arab countries and stop all their armaments deliveries and suppling of Nuclear know-how to the Israeli aggressors to be used against the Arabs.

Sgt. M. S. H.
24. 7. 67

(59)

See - 1/63

Pa. 12/1/63

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 8959

15 AUGUST, 1967

(UN POL. DEPT.)

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
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 8959 OF 15 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, AMMAN, TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST: U.N.

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HAVE THIS AFTERNOON TOLD US THAT THE FINANCIAL TIMES HAS A STORY THAT A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES COUPLED WITH OPENING OF SUEZ CANAL HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN OURSELVES, THE AMERICANS AND THE ISRAELIS. THEY ASKED US WHAT LINE THEY SHOULD TAKE AND WE SUGGESTED THAT THEY SHOULD DENY THE STORY. WE ARE DOING SO ALSO.

2. NEWS DEPARTMENT, IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CANAL THIS MORNING, SAID NON-ATTRIBUTABLY THAT THE NEXT STEP MIGHT WELL BE TO TAKE THE MATTER UP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS MIGHT HAPPEN BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BEGAN NEXT MONTH. THEY MADE NO REPEAT NO REFERENCE TO ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH ANYONE ABOUT THE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION.

SOSFA SENT 1907Z 15 AUGUST



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(58)

See - /63

p.o. 12/5/67

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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2642

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
15 AUGUST

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2642 OF 15 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, AMMAN,
MOSCOW AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST - UNITED NATIONS.

M.I.P.T.

SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH AND I DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST BRIEFLY
THIS MORNING WITH MR. RUSK. HE SAID THAT THE PERIOD OF THE RECENT
MEETING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAD REALLY BEEN ONE OF WAITING
AND WATCHING AND THAT IT WAS RIGHT THAT FOR A FEW WEEKS THERE-
AFTER FURTHER REFLECTION SHOULD TAKE PLACE. HE FELT STRONGLY
HOWEVER THAT WE WOULD NEED TO TAKE INITIATIVES FROM THE BEGINNING
OF SEPTEMBER SINCE OTHER WISE THERE WAS A RISK THAT THE SITUATION
WOULD TURN SOUR. IT WAS PROBABLY TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO WAIT
A LITTLE LONGER BEFORE TAKING ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
IN ORDER TO GIVE MORE TIME FOR THE YUGOSLAVS AND THE INDIANS
IN PARTICULAR TO MOVE FURTHER IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT WE
WOULD NEED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS IMPROVEMENT EARLY IN SEPTEMBER
BEFORE THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS RELAPSED AGAIN INTO DISILLUSION
AND EXTREMISM.

F O PASS TEL AVIV 113, AMMAN 101, MOSCOW 200 AND SAVING TO
UKDEL NATO 95.

SIR P DEAN

SENT 0527Z/15

RECD 0528Z/15

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR
DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED
TO OTHER POSTS]

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67

*Mr. A. T. ...
Mr. ...
12/8*

*Ref X. Are we
keeping the Delta in the picture? I
don't think we can do any good ourselves
with the hideous (at any
rate for the present) but*

see - 1/63

CYPHER/CAT 'A'
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO. 2641
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
15 AUGUST 1967
*Mr. Freeman who
know what is
going on.*

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2641 OF 15 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AV.IV, AMMAN,
MOSCOW AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.
MIDDLE EAST - UNITED NATIONS.

SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH AND I CALLED ON GENE ROSTOW THIS MORNING.
MR. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE WELL SATISFIED
WITH THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT OF SIR R. BEAUMONT ABOUT WHOM HE
SPOKE MOST WARMLY.

2. ROSTOW SAID THAT SPEAKING GENERALLY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES
HAD TAKEN UP A STRONG POSITION BASED ON MERITS WHICH HAD BEEN
SUPPORTED BY THE LATIN-AMERICANS AND WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ERODED.
THERE WERE NOW DEFINITE SIGNS THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS, SUCH AS
THE INDIAN AND THE YUGOSLAV, WANTED TO BE HELPFUL. PRESIDENT
TITO'S VISIT MIGHT MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO
CHANGE THEIR MINDS AND TO ADOPT A STRONGER POSITION IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE WORKING ON THE INDIANS
TO THIS END. THERE WERE ALSO SIGNS OF GREATER REALISM IN CAIRO. THE
AMERICANS HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY REPORTS ON TITO'S VISIT BUT
THERE WERE CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
HAD A MUCH STRONGER POSITION IN THE UAR THAN THEY HAD HAD BEFORE
FIGHTING BROKE OUT, THE UAR GOVERNMENT WERE LESS DEPENDENT THAN THEY
HAD BEEN A FEW WEEKS AGO ON THE SOVIET UNION. ALTHOUGH THE FLOW OF
SOVIET ARMS TO THE UAR AND ALGERIA CONTINUED, THE RUSSIANS WOULD
PROBABLY DO THEIR BEST TO CALM DOWN THE TENSION BETWEEN THE ARABS
AND ISRAEL. WE MUST EXPECT HOWEVER THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DO
THEIR BEST TO PRESS FORWARD THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MODERATE AND
REVOLUTIONARY ARABS WITH A VIEW TO WEAKENING THE WESTERN POSTION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SO LONG AS THERE WERE PROSPECTS OF BEING ABLE
TO WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IT WAS

DIFFICULT
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WASHINGTON TELEGRAM No. 2641 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

DIFFICULT TO DRAW ATTENTION DIRECTLY TO SOVIET LONGER-TERM OBJECTIVES AND IN ANY CASE THE PRESIDENT WAS ANXIOUS TO WORK SO FAR AS POSSIBLE WITH THE RUSSIANS BOTH IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND OVER VIETNAM. NEVERTHELESS, SOVIET LONG TERM INTENTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PARTICULARLY IN EGYPT WERE INIMICAL TO THE WEST.

3. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE FULL DRESS U.S. STUDY OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOVIET POLICIES THERE (MY TEL NO. 2599, PARAGRAPH 9, NOT TO ALL) WOULD SHORTLY BE READY AND THAT HE HOPED TO LET US SEE A COPY SOON. THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO CIRCULATE IT TO AT LEAST SOME OF THE NATO GOVERNMENTS AND WERE HOPING THAT THERE COULD BE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT IT WITHIN NATO BEGINNING SOME TIME IN SEPTEMBER. JULIUS HOLMES WOULD COME TO EUROPE FOR THE PURPOSE FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THE OBJECT WOULD BE TO PERSUADE THE NATO GOVERNMENTS TO FACE REALITY: THEIR BEHAVIOUR DURING THE RECENT CRISIS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE DUTCH, AND TO SOME EXTENT, THE BELGIANS, HAD BEEN VERY WEAK.

4. SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH REFERRED TO THE RISKS OF A DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS WITHIN NATO BUT ROSTOW THOUGHT THAT THE SITUATION WAS POTENTIALLY SO SERIOUS THAT THESE RISKS MIGHT HAVE TO BE RUN FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING A MORE HELPFUL WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN RECENT INDICATIONS THAT THE FRENCH IN PARTICULAR WERE VERY ALARMED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN ALGERIA.

5. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE SUDAN WHERE MR. ROSTOW SAID THERE WERE CONTINUAL RUMOURS OF A POSSIBLE (FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED) COUP AND THE AMERICANS WERE FINDING IT VERY HARD TO REACH THE SUDANESE GOVERNMENT. SIR P. GORE-BOOTH ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS HAD ANY INFORMATION ABOUT WHO WAS ACTUALLY IN CONTROL IN IRAQ BUT MR. ROSTOW SAID THAT THEY HAD NONE.

/6.

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WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2641 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-3-

6. MR. ROSTOW ALSO SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN AND WERE STILL VERY ACTIVE DIPLOMATICALLY IN TRYING TO PROMOTE THE FLOW OF OIL FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO PREVENT EXTREME MEASURES BEING TAKEN.

7. SEE M.I.F.T.

F O PASS TEL AVIV 112, AMMAN 100, MOSCOW 199 AND SAVING UKDEL NATO 94.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 0550Z/15

RECD 0552Z/15

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION,
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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(56)

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
LONDON,
S.W.1.

SE 2/2

10 August, 1967.

India and Israel

Thank you for sending us a copy of the Indian aide memoire to the Government of Israel on the Indian U.N.E.F. casualties in Gaza.

2. Len Allinson obtained an interesting piece of information in relation to this matter from a sponsored visitor, Mr. Justice Mudholkar, who was here recently. Mudholkar is Chairman of the Indian Press Council and told Allinson in strict confidence that his son had been an officer with the Indian United Nations troops in Sinai. He said that his son, who is now back in India, had told him that the Indian casualties were really the fault of the Egyptians who had moved up behind and alongside the U.N. observers. Some of the Indian casualties had been caused by an Egyptian mine. He asked that this information should be kept very strictly confidential because if it was known that his son had revealed these facts the boy would get into very serious trouble with the Indian authorities.

3. It is possible that this information is pretty well known in Delhi in private circles, but I pass it on in case you have not come across it.

(R.M. PURCELL)
South Asia Department

B.H. Kay, Esq.,
British High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

At n

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Mr. Purcell

I have sent one
of the copies to Mr.
Spears. Perhaps we
should now discuss with
Mr. E. V. Dyer, & F.D.,
but to say to Mr. Freeman?

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P.A.

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R + cnc of 14/8

Mr. Vith

I assume that our
 main immediate objective
 now is to mount the
 Security Council resolution
 referred to at para 6,
 of which I have seen
 something in telegrams. If
 Mr. Freeman is to approach
 the Indians formally about their
 position it should possibly be in
 connection with the proposed resolution.
 I think we should now
 certainly discuss with the depths
 concerned.

R.M. Russell

14/8

Please do so.
 If they don't wish to
 pursue the Indians, then it is
 no need for us to press them
 to do so, but we should
 tell Delhi.

If known the F.O.
 free

see some water in an approach
to the Indian Court, let us
see a light.

175
15:8



15: Days

no net and

Mr. Dutt

North & East Africa Dept
are considering what Mr Freeman
might usefully say to the
Indians, if anything, in relation to
the Middle East. They are
of course taking account of the
facts at -/56 & -/57.

Mr Turner has replied to
Sir N. Mitchell's Minute on -/57
explaining that the F.O are considering
this matter, and that they will in any
event be sending out some guidance
for Delhi and elsewhere soon.

R. A. Russell

17/8



17/8

P.A. 12/5

S. U. [Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL



British High Commission,
New Delhi.

Our ref: PL.31/1

8 August 1967

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 57 15 AUG 1967 SE 2/2

Dear Tony,

See -/63

P.A.

Middle East Crisis

(51) In our telegram No: 1681 (not to all) we promised to let you have by this bag any information which we could pick up about Mr. Chagla's visit to Cairo and Mr. C. S. Jha's visit to Moscow, in response to the request in your telegram No: 1686 of 1 August.

(50)

2. We have not been able so far to get anything authoritative on Chagla's visit. The General Manager of United News of India recently told a member of Chancery of an off-the-record interview he had had with Mr. Chagla following the latter's visit to Cairo. Mr. Chagla claimed to have gone to the U.A.R. with the intention of persuading Nasser to accept the fact of his defeat and to make the necessary compromises (which were unspecified) for a settlement in the Middle East. The Foreign Minister said he found, however, that it was impossible to reason with the Arabs in their present mood which was "very emotional". This report was confirmed in a conversation which the Air Adviser had over the weekend with an I.A.F. Air Commodore who is the Director of Guided Weapons. The Indian officer claimed that India had made fairly strong representations to the U.A.R. followed up by continuous enquiries as to when the Suez Canal would be re-opened; so far, however, they have achieved nothing and the conclusion which the Indians have reached is that while Nasser may keep the Canal closed only Boumedienne of Algeria can give the word for it to be re-opened. It therefore seems possible that the Indians may have made some representations to the U.A.R. about re-opening the Canal, but in view of Mr. Chagla's own personality and in view also of the fact that both Mr. Chagla and Mrs. Gandhi continue to emphasise that it is in India's own interests to support the U.A.R. (see for example our telegram No. 35 Saving) we find it difficult to believe that these representations have been particularly forceful.

3. In the course of the weekend the High Commissioner took the opportunity of his last social contact with Mr. C. S. Jha to raise the Middle East and I enclose a copy of his minute recording what passed. This confirms our impression that the Indians have accepted that they are unable to influence Nasser's decision to keep the Canal closed.

4. The two latest developments are that according to the press the Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires called on Mrs. Gandhi yesterday to deliver a message from President Tito, which is presumed to be about the Middle East, and the French Ambassador is calling on Mr. Chagla in the next day or two to discuss the same subject on instructions from

/his Government.

A. A. Duff, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.S.C.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.

Separate minute

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12/8

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his Government. The French Ambassador has promised (on a personal basis) to let the High Commissioner know something of what transpires in his meeting with Mr. Chagla and if an opportunity arises for contact with the Yugoslav Charge, who is normally reasonably forthcoming, we shall ask him about his message.

5. All this is regrettably imprecise. Inquiries to ascertain the Indian Government views, which are so often departmentally inconsistent and expressed in an uncoordinated manner, tend to lead to this sort of imprecision. It may be that the sharp executive point of the Indian Government's diplomatic policy, if indeed there is one, is to be discerned best, or only discerned in New York. You will remember that the High Commissioner was told by C.S. Jha some weeks ago that the U.N. was where Indian views were being expressed and that he hoped our delegation would keep in touch with Parthasarathi. A propos the American Charge told the High Commissioner that he had recently remonstrated with Haksar that Minister Chagla's public utterances on the Middle East were much more intransigent and unhelpful than Parthasarathi's interventions at the U.N. Haksar (and this is another extraordinary side-light on the actualities of Indian bureaucratic power) said immediately that he had not noticed this but that it was undesirable and he would fix it!

6. It may be that the only way to pursue this here now is for the High Commissioner to call on Azim Husain, Secretary II, as suggested by C.S. Jha, and to enquire formally about the Indian position. Or indeed he could call on Mr. Chagla but he would be unlikely to get anything very useful from this. The High Commissioner feels he could base himself on the absence of any reply or even acknowledgment to the Prime Minister's last message to Mrs. Gandhi. But the High Commissioner feels that it might be prudent, before doing so, to know more exactly what is in your mind, and, if possible, to be guided by instructions on what to work for. His inclinations on this are fortified by the fact that the Americans read out to us on 5 August, on hearing of our interest in India's position, which they shared, the text of Anglo-U.S. exchanges (Sir P. Dean and Gene Rostow) in Washington on 29 July and subsequent comments by Mr. Rusk and the State Department, about the possibility of U.K. diplomatic action towards obtaining a substantive resolution in the Security Council by the end of August. Such action possibly to include approaches to India, France and the minor maritime powers. We have, no doubt, advisedly, not been informed of any of this. But in the light of what the Americans have told us, the High Commissioner is chary of enquiring formally of the Indians without being fully in the picture on our own objectives. I would add that at the moment the Americans have no more information than we do about Indian actions or intentions.

7. I am not sure to whom this can usefully be copied in London so enclose two extra copies for your use. I am also sending a copy to Gilmore in Washington and to Youde in New York.

*yours ever,
John.*

(J.P. Waterfield)

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SUEZ

I had a very brief opportunity to speak in private to the Foreign Secretary on 5 August. It was an unsatisfactory conversation because Mr. Jha made it very plain that he was now thinking about France rather than Indian foreign policy and he told me with glee that he had refused to accept any new files since 2 August. This is despite the fact that he is nominally Foreign Secretary till 13 August.

However I did ask him how the Indians felt about the prospects for the Canal and what they were doing to help about it. Jha's answer was most depressing. He said he could see little prospect of progress and that Government of India were becoming reconciled to the fact that the Canal would probably be closed for a long time. They had "explained" quite forcibly to Nasser that India was a major victim of his present policy, but Nasser was completely obdurate about the Canal, as opposed to the Gulf of Aquaba, over which he would not raise undue difficulties. Of course, if the Israelis could be persuaded to withdraw from the proximity of the Canal itself, this might make the crucial difference. But he saw no signs that this was likely. The Israelis appeared to be inflexible and he was not at all sure that it was in the power of the U.S. to bring effective pressure on them. All in all he saw "total deadlock".

This was a hand-wringing performance, which leaves me with little hope that my constructive help can be expected from the Indians. On the other hand it was noticeable that Jha spoke in an objective, if despairing, way: there was no indication that he was thinking of pulling Egyptian chestnuts out of the fire. But there was the same old willingness to accept Nasser's NO as final.

I told Jha that I should rather like to look at all this in more detail and he said that Azim Husain would be the appropriate official to contact. Under Jha, he had had executive responsibility for the West Asia problem in Ministry of External Affairs.

HIGH COMMISSIONER

8 August, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

(54)



BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

8 August, 1967.

PL 31/1

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10/8

International Affairs: Views of Indian

Dear Michael,

Air Force Officers

(55)

In his letter PL 31/1 of today's date to Duff (not to all), John Waterfield mentioned some information which he had been given about the Middle East by an Indian Air Force Officer. This conversation took place at a farewell dinner given for Air Commodore Webb by the Indian Air Force and I now enclose the Air Adviser's minute recording all points of interest which emerged during the evening.

2. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Washington, Moscow, Peking and Tokyo.

Yours ever

Duncan Slater

(D. SLATER)

R.M. Purcell, Esq.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.



P.A

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In the course of a Dinner Party given for me by the Indian Air Force the following points of interest emerged from conversations with DCAS SASO Western Air Command, the Director of Guided Weapons and the Director of Air Intelligence.

India has made fairly strong representation followed by continuous enquiries of Egypt as to when the Suez Canal will be reopened. So far they have achieved nothing and the conclusion the Indians have reached is that while Nasser may keep the Canal closed, only Boumedienne of Algeria can give the word for it to be reopened. (An MP confirmed this yesterday.)

The Russians are said to be very cross because the Israelis have supplied the US with captured equipment for evaluation, particularly the latest anti-tank rockets which even some of the iron curtain countries have not yet received. The Indians believe the Russians may yet choose to escalate the Middle East into another war. They are not convinced of US-Soviet "collusion".

This led on to India's attitude to Israel and from there to "the lack of understanding of Indian problems by the UK and US": the US in particular being impossible over food, i.e. tying it to armaments. The fact that India was a secular state and that concessions on Kashmir were quite impossible and why did the UK and US sympathise with Pakistani Muslims.

An increase of President's Rule was inevitable in the coming months and the UK and US must help the Government by supplying food and loans in increasing amounts. India's future depends on this monsoon.

and Their views on China were of particular interest. They consider that Mao Tse-Tung believes the US will ultimately wage a preventive war against China (shades of Foster Dulles) and that China now feels strong enough to absorb a nuclear attack and is preparing to face the follow up landing which would be required to occupy the country. They feel that the present turmoil is all part of a vast training scheme to train the people to fight guerrilla actions at short range/to teach local communes to function in conditions of near anarchy. They consider that the situation is, in fact, well under control although fringe areas may on occasions be carried away with enthusiasm which would explain the present situation in Hong Kong. They consider that the Chinese do not yet intend to make a serious bid for Hong Kong and that the situation will "stabilise" into constant unrest. The Indians themselves do not believe the Chinese assessment of American intentions to be correct.

The Indians are now watching Japan with the closest interest since they consider that Japan will be the next nuclear power and the third world power in the near future. They think the Japanese no longer believe in the validity of the US nuclear umbrella and that Japan will develop a military nuclear capability in order to further political and trade ambitions, including a big expansion programme with the USSR. The Japanese (according to the Indians) consider that power politics are the only ones which can pay in the Far East.

(signed) Paul Webb
Air Commodore
7 August 1967

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Reference.....

Enter for record

FLOSY

The Counsellor of the Indian High Commission called on me yesterday to tell me that the Indians in Cairo had been talking to Makkawi and others of FLOSY in Cairo. As far as I gathered, they had not been talking, recently at least, to Al-Asnag.

2. Mr. Kaul reported FLOSY as saying that they had not talked to the British in New York; that they had, of course, talked to the U.N. Mission; that they had indicated that they were prepared to play a role in a central caretaker government in South Arabia; that they must, however, have 80% participation in anything arranged; and that the British must fix this should be required to.

3. Mr. Kaul asked me if I could tell him anything about the position, and particularly the discussions in New York; whether it was true that FLOSY had not talked to the British; whether we had heard of the 80% bid before and what our reactions were to it; and what he should tell his people in Cairo.

4. I gave Mr. Kaul, expressly on a confidential basis, a frank resumé of events in and over South Arabia since 19 June, going into the origins and respective strength of FLOSY and the NLF with some care. I told him that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had spoken frankly with the Mission, holding nothing back, on the basis that he and they had a common task to perform and that he would do everything he could to help. I told him that Makkawi had failed to respond to the suggestion that he should talk to Lord Caradon; that he had left New York before Sir Humphrey had got there; and that there had been no British conversations with Makkawi. I did not refer to any other conversations with FLOSY beyond remarking that one of the Khodabux Khan's had left Aden for fear of the NLF some two months ago, yet had nevertheless spoken very unrealistically to me here. We had heard of bids by FLOSY ranging from 100% to 60% - and it was discouraging that their latest broadcast bid was for 100%. Any such bids were unrealistic, because we should never make any progress if the factions approached any possibility of discussion with exclusive preconditions.

5. I asked Kaul to ensure that our confidential conversation did not get back to FLOSY or others. We should welcome it, however, if the Indians in / Cairo

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1. Mr. Hunt
2. Mr. E. W. ...
3. Mr. ...
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
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Cairo felt able to harp on three propositions:-

- (a) There was a difference between what we might want to do and what we ~~can~~ do. We had never had the power to impose constitutional patterns. Still less had we within six months of independence. It was no use any faction thinking we could impose our will - even if we regarded a given bid as reasonable, which in this case I did not.
- (b) South Arabians must work out the pattern of the future and had little time left to do it - as trade unionists and others facing economic ruin in Aden now clearly realised, at long last, though Makkawi might not.
- (c) The U.N. Mission offer^{ed} what might be the only opportunity for all concerned to talk without preconditions in a forum where their attendance could not be regarded as a concession of political substance. They would be fools and deserve^d the damnation of their own people if they failed to talk after all this.

L. J. J. J.

6. Finally Mr. Kaul asked me whether we had been able to talk to the NLF and what their attitude was. I replied that they had seemed likely to talk to the U.N. a week ago, but have now apparently taken to competition once more with FLOSY in intransigence. We ~~did~~ not know whether they would go to Geneva. Perhaps because their proscription had only recently been lifted, they had not so far been prepared to talk to the High Commissioner.


(D.J. McCarthy)
4 August 1967

c.c. South Asia Dept., C.O.
High Commissioner, Aden
UKMIS New York
UKMIS Geneva
Mr. Tesh, Cairo
U.K. High Commission, New Delhi

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BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,
NEW DELHI.

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1) Copy to: M. A. ... 4 August, 1967.

Dear Sir

2) NA n 10/8

(30)

India and Israel

Duncan Slater wrote to you on 13 June enclosing the Ministry of External Affairs' Aide Memoire to the Government of Israel on the Indian U.N.E.F. casualties in Gaza.

... 2. On 1 August the Israeli Consul General was again summoned from Bombay to receive the attached Aide Memoire, which categorically rejects the Israeli explanation that the Gaza casualties were accidental, and insists that they were the result of deliberate and unprovoked Israeli attacks.

3. The Indian Aide Memoire claims to draw on the evidence of the reports of the U.N. Secretary General. In an article in the 'Times of India' of 1 August, their Washington correspondent has however pointed out that the U.N. report does not support the official Indian contention, even though the report was written by the Indian force Commander, General Bihye. The article describes the Indian Government's conclusion that the attacks were intentional as a case of "exploitation of grief for political ends".

... 4. I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to the Chanceries in Washington and Tel Aviv.

Yours ever
Bernard Kay.

(B.H. KAY)

W.A. Allinson Esq., M.V.O.,
South Asia Department,
Commonwealth Office.



Aide Memoire

While the Government of India has noted expression of regret by the Israeli Government mentioned in their Aide Memoire, they are not aware that such regrets were expressed earlier. In his interventions in the U.N. Security Council on June 5th and June 6th the Representative of India condemned the treacherous and brutal attacks on Indian personnel by Israeli action, but the Representative of Israel gave no reply either on June 6th or June 8th nor indeed did he make even a reference to these very clear and specific charges by the Representative of India.

From what was stated on these two occasions it would appear that the Representative of Israel did not at first give credence to the charge about the killing of Indian personnel of the UNEF, but when that became an established fact, he gave no explanation or apology to the Representative of India nor did he refer to those killed and wounded of the Indian contingent though he was prompt enough to express deep regrets to the accidental loss of some Americans.

In Israeli Government's reply it is stated that the incidents occurred in the 'area of hostilities' at 'a time when heavy fighting was taking place' suggesting thereby that the casualties were caused unintentionally and accidentally.

In para 5 it is stated that:

"The Government of Israel rejects as unfounded any suggestion that the casualties among the Indian UNEF soldiers were deliberately inflicted. There could be no possible motive for such an action and there is no shred of evidence to support this accusation".

The Government of India categorically rejects the Israeli Government's contention that the casualties among the Indian UNEF soldiers were not deliberately inflicted. As to the reason for such action the Israeli authorities are in a better position to know, but on the basis of the reports of the U.N. Secretary General and the information given by the officers and men of the Indian UNEF contingent, there can be no doubt that, leaving aside the accidental death of three Indian UNEF personnel on 6th June, 1967, the Israeli armed forces on five occasions deliberately attacked Indian UNEF personnel killing 11 and wounding 24. There is, undeniable, first-hand evidence to show that these Indian UNEF casualties occurred as a result of deliberate Israeli attacks on innocent and unarmed Indians who had not given any provocation as would be seen from the account of these incidents attached herewith.

It may be reiterated that not only were the Israeli authorities fully acquainted with the detailed deployment of UNEF but all UNEF vehicles and camps were distinctively marked and UNEF personnel were easily identifiable by their uniforms and headgear. In the circumstances and in view of the nature of the incidents, the Israeli authorities cannot justifiably disavow full responsibility for the deliberate infliction of these casualties on Indian personnel with UNEF. The Government of India, therefore, rejects the Israeli explanation of these attacks and casualties as being accidental. The attacks were deliberate and the Israeli Government should accept the full responsibility for the casualties resulting therefrom.

In paragraphs (4) and (5) the Government of Israel have expressed their views regarding the withdrawal of UNEF, and the relations of Israel with its neighbouring countries which are not relevant to the question of the casualties caused to the members of the Indian Contingent of the UNEF and regarding which the Government of India holds different views as expressed by the Representative of India in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the U.N.

A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE INCIDENTS INVOLVING
CASUALTIES OF INDIAN PERSONNEL OF U.N.E.F.

.....

The U.N. Secretary General, in his report (A/6672) to the U.N. General Assembly on 12th July 1967, has stated that immediately on the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States on 5th June 1967, the Commander of UNEF General Rikhye addressed personal appeals to Israel and U.A.R. military authorities to ensure the safety of UNEF personnel and installations. U Thant specifically states that "the Israel defence forces were fully acquainted with the detailed deployment of UNEF". Moreover, the report points out, the Commander of UNEF had ensured that "all camps and vehicles would prominently display United Nations flag and markings, so that they would be clearly visible from ground and air".

2. In spite of these measures having been taken, there were five incidents in which the Indian Contingent with UNEF suffered casualties as a result of deliberate attacks by Israeli defence forces:

(1) The U.N. Secretary General, in his report (A/6672) to the U.N. General Assembly on 12th July 1967 has mentioned that:

"On 5 June, at 0920 hours, UNEF vehicles came under air strafing, small arms and tank fire on the road between Deir el Balah and Rafah. At about this time a supply convoy of the Indian battalion, while returning from Rafah, was fired upon by Israel aircraft, tanks and machine-guns, resulting in the death of five Indian soldiers....."

As far as the firing on Indian UNEF personnel by Israeli tanks and machine-guns is concerned the detailed account of the incident is as follows:

While a UNEF convoy of five vehicles with U.N. markings and carrying U.N. and white flags, with 21 Indian personnel, was returning from Rafah just short of Khan Yunis, the UNEF convoy saw some Israeli tanks approaching from the opposite direction. The convoy stopped to allow the tanks to pass. There were no U.A.R. forces in the

vicinity. The leading....2/-

vicinity. The leading Israeli tank and another passed by but the third tank advanced directly on to the leading UNEF vehicle and from a distance of 5 to 7 yards fired a machine gun burst and began squashing the driver's cab by driving up with the main armament exerting pressure from the front. The driver, whose wrist was broken in the initial firing, was squashed in the cab and killed instantaneously. The soldier in the co-driver's seat was wounded. When the fourth Israeli tank passed by the stationary UNEF vehicles, it opened fire on Indian UNEF personnel who had by then dismounted from their vehicles and were attempting to assist their wounded comrades. As a result of this firing, 7 Indian soldiers were wounded. The total number of killed was five and wounded seven.

(2) When the UNEF convoy mentioned above did not return to their headquarters at Dier El Balah, the Officer Commanding of the Indian Contingent sent a party of fourteen in two vehicles (one jeep and one truck) with a Medical Officer to rescue the personnel mentioned above. When the jeep carrying the usual UNEF identification was approaching Khan Yunis it was fired upon by an Israeli tank from a short distance. Fortunately, the shot missed the jeep enabling the Medical Officer and other personnel to jump into a nearly cactus hedge. Thereupon the tank opened fire with its machine-gun while it crushed the jeep and the other vehicle was destroyed by fire. At the place of this incident, there were three Israeli tanks. The Medical Officer and other personnel intermittently made attempts to show UNEF flags from a trench but every time they were fired upon by the other tanks passing by and forced to remain in the trench. The nursing orderly was wounded during these firings. The tanks withdrew after $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours when the main body of 40 tanks had passed.

(3) In his report of 12th July 1967 to the U.N. General Assembly the U.N. Secretary General has said:
"On 5th June, at 0930 hours, the Indian battalion companies located at Camps Chandigarh and Lucknow

were ordered to....3/-

were ordered to withdraw to Dier el Balah. At this time troops of the United Arab Republic had moved away from their positions in the area, and when the Israel attack came, the Israel tanks directly confronted the Indian soldiers who had taken cover in trenches to protect themselves from the firing from both sides." Regarding Camp Lucknow, the position was as follows: Camp Lucknow of the Indian UNEF Contingent was located about 700 metres from the ADL and had on all its corners white and U.N. flags. At about 1245 hours an Israeli tank forces was noticed advancing and shelling the camp. The firing continued till about 1500 hours, during which the washerman of the Company was wounded. The washerman later died. On approaching the camp, two squadrons of Israeli tanks fanned out right and left encircling the camp. As the tanks passed on the flanks they fired into the camp hitting the building which collapsed destroying the communications facilities. The Indian UNEF personnel who were unarmed had done nothing to provoke the Israeli forces.

(4) In his report of 12th July, U Thant had said:

"At 1525 hours, mortars of the United Arab Republic started firing from a location close to the Indian battalion's camp Delhi. This drew Israel counter-mortar fire, and as a result the Indian battalion suffered three killed and fourteen wounded."

From the details it appears that not far from the main Indian UNEF camp at Dier El Balah the U.A.R. forces had deployed some mortars towards the beach from where they were firing towards Israel beginning at 1455 hours and continued sporadically for about 10 minutes. The Officer Commanding the Indian Contingent asked the U.A.R. Liaison Officer to have the U.A.R. forces remove these mortars from the vicinity of the camp. The U.A.R. Liaison Officer promised to have this done but before any action could be taken, ten minutes later, between 1515 hours and 1520 hours

the Israeli forces.....4/-

the Israeli forces fired on the camp killing two and wounding ten. This incident could possibly be related to the proximity of the U.A.R. forces. It is, however, to be appreciated that the Gaza Strip, while being about 45 Kms. long, is very narrow, ranging between 4 to 8 Kms. The Dier El Balah main camp was only about $2\frac{1}{2}$ Kms. from the ADL, which would indicate clearly that the Israeli forces were well aware of the location of the camp. Israeli action cannot therefore be regarded as accidental. Connected with this is another incident which shows the attitude of the Israeli armed forces towards UNEF. After the shelling referred to above stopped, a regiment of 40 Israeli tanks passed by a police chowki near the Dier El Balah camp. As they passed by the chowki they fired towards the camp damaging many UNEF vehicles standing in the main motor transport centre of the camp. The total number of casualties in this incident were 2 killed and 14 wounded.

(5) On June 6th for more than 5 hours (from 0900 to 1430 hours) the UNEF Headquarters building at Gaza was continuously under Israeli artillery fire. The UNEF headquarters had clear UNEF markings and flags. Nevertheless, the headquarters were not spared. At the headquarters from among the Indian personnel three were killed and three wounded.

3. A reference may also be made to two instances which were indicative of the attitude of the Israeli armed forces towards Indian UNEF personnel:-

- (i) On 5 June 1967, a Captain and two other ranks of the Indian UNEF contingent, while proceeding on duty to the Services Institute warehouse at Rafah, were caught between Israeli and U.A.R. cross fire. The officer and his men took shelter in a graveyard and as they had no tools with them, dug a trench with their bare hands for safety. At about 1900 hours when the fighting.....5/-

when the fighting was over, one Israeli Lieutenant approached the trench and fired some shots over the heads of the Indian UNEF personnel who thereafter came out of the trench. Even though the Indian UNEF personnel informed the Israelis that they were U.N. soldiers, they were manhandled and all their belongings taken away from them. The Indian officer and the two other ranks were detained by the Israelis in a room in a nearby school till 8th June 1967 when they were allowed to return to their battalion headquarters and their belongings were returned to them.

- (ii) On June 6th at 1730 hours the main Indian Contingent Camp at Dier El Balah was visited by an Israeli Patton tank with the gun swinging at the Quarter Guard, and an Israeli Colonel with a few others in a jeep mounting a machine gun. The Israeli officer told the Indian Battalion Commander that Indian camp was harbouring Egyptian soldiers. The Indian Commander categorically refuted this allegation saying that ~~all Indian personnel had been evacuated on June 5th from other camps and were concentrated~~ there. The Israeli officer threatened to blow up the camp if the latter came to know of any Egyptian soldiers being in the camp, and gave him an unsigned warning in writing containing this threat.
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NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 1681 3 August 1967

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(50) Your telegram No. 1686: Middle East.

Other than as reported in my telegram No. 28 Saving of 17 July which comments on reports about Indian credit for U.A.R. neither we nor the Americans have heard anything.

2. I am doing my best but it will not be possible for me conveniently to see anyone who might communicate usefully on this until after tomorrow's bag. I shall hope to report by bag leaving 8 August.

3. Food Secretary's attitude is that India's needs might best be supplied from Australia in future if the Canal remains closed. He is not likely to urge diplomatic action to get the Canal opened as costs of shipping via the Cape are a matter for the Finance Ministry. I am afraid this is a sad reflection of Indian Departmental introspection.

Mr. Freeman

Sent 1105Z/3 August 1967

Recd. 1228Z/3 August 1967

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